Macroeconomic Perspectives on the Equity Premium Puzzle by Zenhorst, J. (Jorn)
Macroeconomic Perspectives on the
Equity Premium Puzzle
ISBN: 978 90 361 0335 0
c© Jorn Zenhorst, 2012
All rights reserved. Save exceptions stated by the law, no part of this publication may
be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system of any nature, or transmitted in any form
or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, in-
cluded a complete or partial transcription, without the prior written permission of the
author, application for which should be addressed to the author.
Cover design: Crasborn Graphic Designers bno, Valkenburg a.d. Geul
This book is no. 547 of the Tinbergen Institute Research Series, established through
cooperation between Thela Thesis and the Tinbergen Institute. A list of books which
already appeared in the series can be found in the back.
Macroeconomic Perspectives on the
Equity Premium Puzzle
Macroeconomische perspectieven ten aanzien van de
aandelenpremiepuzzel
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
op gezag van de
rector magnificus
prof.dr. H.G. Schmidt
en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties.
De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden op
donderdag 13 december 2012 om 11:30 uur
door
Jorn Zenhorst
geboren te Noordoostpolder
Promotiecommissie
Promotor: Prof.dr. C.G. de Vries
Overige leden: Prof.dr. I.J.M. Arnold
Prof.dr. N.C. Mark
Prof.dr. J. Swank
Copromotor: Dr. L.C.G. Pozzi
Contents
1 Introduction and outline 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Existing literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Relevance to Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2 World Equity Premium based Risk Aversion Estimates 19
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.A Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.A.1 Data issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.A.2 Replication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3 Macro Consumption and Equity Premium based Risk Aversion of Labor
and Capitalists 31
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.1 Heterogeneous agent model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
f Contents
3.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.1 Drawbacks of the macro approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.2 Standard errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3.3 Pooling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.5.1 Coefficient of relative risk aversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.5.2 Adjusted coefficients of relative risk aversion . . . . . . . . . 62
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.A Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.A.1 Definitions Table 3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.A.2 Influence ‘per capita’ streams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.A.3 Results representative agent in per capita terms . . . . . . . . 72
4 A Better Risk-free Rate Proxy, a Larger Equity Premium Puzzle 75
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.3.1 Standard errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.3.2 Pooling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.4.1 Selection of OECD countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.4.2 Australia and New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4.3 Monthly U.S. data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.5.1 Selection of OECD countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.5.2 Australia and New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.5.3 Monthly U.S. data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Contents g
4.A Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.A.1 Monthly U.S. data: Data definitions and important information 98
5 A State Space Approach to Time-varying Risk Aversion 101
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.2.1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.4.1 First Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.4.2 Second Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.4.3 Third specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.4.4 Fourth specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.4.5 Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.A Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.A.1 Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.A.2 State Space Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.A.3 Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6 Nederlandse samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 141
Bibliography 147

Chapter 1
Introduction and outline
1.1 Introduction
Suppose you were born on January 1, 1983. A few months later, your parents, wanting
to set aside some money for your 18th birthday, were at a crossroads. They could
either invest money in risk-free Dutch government bonds or in the newly created AEX
index, investing in companies’ shares. After careful consideration they decided to
take a risk and invest (the equivalent of) e 100 in shares. On your 18th birthday your
parents gave you an envelope and explained what they had done. When you opened the
envelope you were flabbergasted to discover that thise 100 had grown toe 1.405,02; a
staggering annual nominal return of slightly less than 16%. Inflation averaged at about
2%, so this translates into a real (i.e. corrected for inflation) return of 14%. But what
would have happened if your parents had not taken a risk? Then the envelope would
have contained e 260,01, a nominal and real return of 5.5% and 3.6%, respectively.
This example illustrates that over longer periods, stocks provide an investor with
a higher return than bonds. In economics this return difference is called the equity
premium: the premium stocks pay over bonds. Although stocks outperform bonds
over longer timespans, this holds up less and less over shorter horizons. For example,
during 2008 the AEX index lost more than half of its value. As stocks move up and
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down much more than bonds, they are considered more risky. The equity premium
compensates an investor for bearing this risk.
Among asset pricing models the consumption-based Capital Asset Pricing Model
is the workhorse model. This model assumes the existence of an investor who has an
utility function defined over consumption. In other words, on the most fundamental
level an investor is not interested in returns, but in the goods and services she can
afford by trading stocks and bonds. Households need to be extremely risk averse for
observed excess returns to be consistent with actual consumption behavior. This is, in
a nutshell, the equity premium puzzle.
At the heart of the equity premium puzzle lies the low volatility (i.e. degree of vari-
ation) of observed consumption growth. To see this, notice that a risky asset commands
a low rate of return if it provides poor insurance against consumption fluctuations by
paying little in periods of high consumption growth and plenty in periods of low con-
sumption growth. The underlying reason is that as such an asset hedges an individual
against bad spells, it is in high demand and therefore only offers a low return. In con-
trast, an asset that pays little in tough times and plenty when times are good is less
desirable. As a result, investors require a higher return to hold it in their portfolio.
Data reveal that fluctuations in consumption growth are small. Stated differently, con-
sumption growth is very smooth. This implies that high returns on risky assets can be
supported only if one assumes that consumers highly dislike even tiny consumption
fluctuations. In other words, one must assume that consumers are extraordinarily risk
averse.
Typical values of risk aversion in the literature vary considerably, but values in ex-
cess of 50 are not uncommon. To see why many economists argue that this is excessive,
consider the following lottery:
Choice 1 e 50.000 with probability 0.5
e 100.000 with probability 0.5
Choice 2 e X with probability 1.0
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For which value of X would you be indifferent between these two choices? That is,
what is the least amount of money you would like to receive for certain in order to give
up the gamble of the first choice?
Under the assumption of relative risk aversion, here is how your choice of X cor-
responds to your risk aversion coefficient, denoted by γ:
X γ
e 70,711 1
e 63,246 3
e 58,566 5
e 53,991 10
e 51,209 30
e 50,712 50
e 50,351 100
Notice that if one is risk neutral (i.e. does not care about risk), the exptected value
of X would be e 75.000. If someone is only slightly risk averse (γ = 1), she would
already forgo e 4.289 compared to the situation of risk neutrality. As the value of
X decreases, the level of risk aversion increases. As mentioned, values of risk aver-
sion exceeding 50 are commonplace. This translates into a value of X of merely e
50.712. Would someone accept less than e 1000 to forgo the opportunity of having
a 50% chance to gain an additional e 50.000? This seems implausible, hence most
economists argue that the level of risk aversion necessary to generate the observed
equity premium is too large to be believable — the equity premium puzzle.
The puzzle is not that the return on stocks exceeds that of bonds. In this sense
the puzzle is not of a qualitative nature, but quantitative instead. The excess return
is too large to be explained by variation in actual consumption growth. It is arguably
the single most prolific asset pricing puzzle and it has received a lot of attention from
the academic community. The next Section discusses this existing literature by briefly
reviewing some of the proposed resolutions.
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1.2 Existing literature
As explained earlier, the equity premium puzzle, first documented by Mehra and
Prescott (1985), holds that estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion (γ)
from consumption data are excessively high. Another way to look at it is the follow-
ing. Mehra and Prescott (1985) use U.S. data over a time span of ninety years where
the return on the stock market is taken to be the return on the S&P 500 index and the
risk-free rate is the 3-month U.S. Treasury Bill rate. Their calculations show an av-
erage equity premium over the period of 1889 - 1978 of a staggering 6.18%. While
citing other articles, Mehra and Prescott (1985) argue that estimates of γ exceeding 10
are implausible. Plugging in this value in the consumption based Capital Asset Pricing
Model (henceforth c-CAPM) results in a theoretical equity premium of 0.35% which
is, at least in economic terms, quite different from the empirical point estimate.
An alternative explanation is that consumption growth is too smooth. The expected
excess return can be modeled as the quantity of risk times the price of risk. In the c-
CAPM is the former is measured as the covariance of (per capita) consumption growth
with the excess return while the coefficient of relative risk aversion denotes the price of
risk. As mentioned above, the equity premium is high. Consumption is very smooth,
as a result its covariance with the excess return is low. The only way for this equation
to hold is through a high level of risk aversion.
The following will discuss a number of important contributions to the literature
concerning this puzzle but is by no means exhaustive, as aptly put by Cochrane (2005,
p. 22): ‘The ink spilled on the equity premium would sink the Titanic.’ The inter-
ested reader is referred to Kocherlakota (1996), Cochrane (1997), Campbell (2000),
Campbell (2003) and Mehra and Prescott (2003) for excellent literature reviews. The
purpose of this section is to provide the reader a flavor of the progress made so far. The
voluminous literature concerning this topic can be separated into a number of different
strands, some of which are more prominent than others. Moreover, the more recent
literature on the equity premium puzzle usually combines several of these strands,
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making the ensuing distinction less clear.
Brown et al. (1995) argue that survival bias might resolve the puzzle. The focal
point of this theory is that ex-post returns are used to compute the premium while an
ex-ante expected premium is more appropriate. Specifically, although the U.S. stock
market performed well over the last decades, this would have been hard to predict
beforehand. The underlying reason is that it is a priori difficult to assess the survival
probability of exchanges. However, for this argument to work the impact of financial
crises (and other events) should be (much) smaller on bond markets compared to stock
exchanges. This is not what real-life observations suggest. For example, it is well-
known that in tough times governments all around the world have tried to inflate away
part of their nominal government debt.
In a related manner, is the puzzle solely an U.S. phenomenon? This question is
answered affirmatively by Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) and Aggarwal and Goodell
(2008). The former paper collects data from 39 countries going as far back as the
1920s and concludes that the high equity premium found in the U.S. is the exception
rather than the rule. Aggarwal and Goodell (2008) show that the equity premiums in
16 emerging markets are generally small. As a result they argue that there is no equity
premium puzzle in these countries. However, given that their study spans a period of
only 8 years, this conclusion is questionable. There is a larger body of research show-
ing the existence of the puzzle in countries besides the U.S. For example, Campbell
(2003) presents evidence that it is a feature of a large number of developed countries
such as Canada, Japan, the UK and those located in Western Europe. Moreover, it also
seems to be a feature of emerging markets, see e.g. Salomons and Grootveld (2003),
Shackman (2006) and Erbas¸ and Mirakhor (2007).
Other papers introduce the concept of disaster risk as a possible remedy to the
puzzle. Rietz (1988) adds a third state to the two-state world of Mehra and Prescott
(1985) that represents a possible, though highly unlikely, crash state. However, in order
to match the empirical premium, he needs to assume that a possible crash evaporates at
least half of the output in one year. To put this into perspective, this is equivalent to the
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fall in output during the first three years of the Great Depression. Even in today’s times,
such an event seems highly improbable. In addition, notice that for this explanation to
have a bite, such a crash must affect shares much more than bonds for if it influences
both asset classes equally it would not have an effect on the equity premium. Finally,
given the cross-country evidence substantiating this puzzle, such a catastrophe should
hit all major asset markets simultaneously.
Another line of research adapts the preferences of investors. The standard model
uses the power utility function which is very convenient but suffers from one major
flaw: the elasticity of substitution is restricted to be the inverse of the relative risk
aversion coefficient. The former governs the aversion to intertemporal variation (i.e.
growth), while the latter indicates an individual’s aversion to risk (i.e. different states
of nature). In other words, this utility function ties risk to time preferences. If an
agent is very risk averse, she will also dislike consumption growth. As a fundamental
economic reason for this restriction is lacking, the suitability of this type of preferences
is questioned. This strand can be further separated into three broad categories.
The first group is based on the work of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Epstein and Zin
(1991). They introduce a generalization of the standard preferences which has one im-
portant advantage. Their preferences class decouples the elasticity of substitution from
risk aversion such that both parameters can be estimated/calibrated independently. Its
main complication is that it depends on future utility which is unobservable. Epstein
and Zin (1991) rewrite the utility function in such a way that it depends on the return
to the representative agent’s entire portfolio of assets (hence including human capital,
housing etc.). They use the value-weighted return to the NYSE as a proxy, but this
of course understates the true level of diversification. More detrimental, it may over-
state the covariability of consumption growth and the excess return. Hence although
this alternative preference class leads to lower levels of risk aversion, there are serious
doubts whether it offers a true resolution or that smaller risk aversion coefficients are
merely the result of a favorable empirical implementation.
Second, as some economists became more and more critical towards the assump-
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tion of rational agents and introduced concepts from psychology into the debate, there
are now also a number of papers that deal with the equity premium puzzle from a be-
havioral point of view. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) is probably the best known paper
taking this perspective, advocating an explanation they call myopic loss aversion; also
see Barberis et al. (2001) and Rabin and Thaler (2001). This concept is based on the
concepts of loss aversion (the tendency to be more sensitive to losses than to equal-
sized gains) and mental accounting (the myopic heuristics people use to organize and
evaluate their financial positions introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their
prospect theory). The latter reflects the notion that investors pay too much attention
to the substantial short-term risks associated with equity. The results in Benartzi and
Thaler (1995) reveal that the observed equity premium is consistent with this theory
if investors evaluate their portfolio annually. Although individual investors might not
be aware of these biases, institutional investors are without a doubt mindful of them.
Given that these agents have a dominant position in trading stocks, it seems unlikely
that this line of research provides a true resolution.
Finally, besides the generalization and behavioral modification to the utility func-
tion, others have argued that introducing a habit term into this function constitutes a
promising resolution strategy. The basic idea is that consumers become accustomed
to certain levels of consumption such that they (highly) dislike drops in consumption,
much more so than in the standard model. To see why this has the potential to solve
the puzzle notice that habit-forming consumers dislike variations in habit-adjusted con-
sumption rather than variations in consumption itself. Moreover, a given percentage
change in consumption produces a much larger percentage change in habit-adjusted
consumption. Hence small fluctuations in consumption growth generate larger vari-
ations in habit-adjusted consumption growth. As a result, excess returns can be ex-
plained using more moderate risk aversion coefficients.
Research in this field introduces either an internal habit or an external habit. The
former is based on an individual’s own past consumption and is studied by, among
others, Sundaresan (1989) and Constantinides (1990). In such a setup, an individual
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requires a high level of consumption just to survive. In other words, she will pay a
lot to avoid small consumption gambles. External habit formation, known as ‘keeping
up with the Joneses’ postulates that an individual’s utility is a function not just of
her own consumption but also of societal’s level of consumption. If someone sees a
neighbor with a nice new car, she is more inclined to follow suit. This resolution is
taken up by Abel (1990), Gali (1994), Abel (1999) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
The intuition is that although an investor is not that averse to individual consumption
risk, she is not inclined to invest in stocks because she is highly averse to per capita
consumption risk.
All in all, neither generalizing the standard preference class nor insights from be-
havioral finance seem capable of offering a resolution. Habit formation (either internal
or external) can only resolve the puzzle if individuals are either very averse to their
own consumption risk or to per capita consumption risk. However, there is no con-
sensus within the academic profession that either statement is a valid description of an
individual’s true behavior.
It does not appear easy for individuals to directly insure themselves against all
possible fluctuations in their consumption streams. For example, it is difficult to di-
rectly insure oneself against fluctuations in labor income. Intuitively, in the absence of
complete markets, individual consumption growth will feature risk not present in per
capita consumption growth and so it will be more variable. Therefore it might be that
individual consumption growth will covary enough with stock returns (remember that
in the c-CAPM this covariance is the quantity of risk) to explain the equity premium.
Notable contributions are Telmer (1993), Lucas (1994) and Heaton and Lucas (1995,
1996). These papers examine the quantitative predictions of dynamic incomplete mar-
ket models, calibrated using individual income data, for the equity premium. They find
that dynamic self-insurance allows individuals to closely approximate the allocations
in a complete markets environment. That is, even though markets might be incomplete
individuals will be able to trade away any idiosyncrasies.
Two critical assumptions underlying this numerical work is that (i) income shocks
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have an autocorrelation less than one and (ii) asset trading must be costless. Regarding
the former, Constantinides and Duffie (1996) argue that if labor income shocks are
instead permanent (autocorrelation of unity), then it is possible for incomplete market
models to explain the large equity premium. However, empirical work is in general
not favorable to this proposition. For example, Heaton and Lucas (1996) estimate the
autocorrelation of undiversifiable income shocks to be 0.5. Second, the above analysis
hinges critically on the assumption of costless trade, is this assumption justifiable?
As shown by Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) and Heaton and Lucas (1996), the only
way for transaction costs (i.e. informational costs, brokerage fees, bid-ask spread and
taxes) to explain the puzzle is to assert that there are significant differences in trading
costs across stock and bond markets. There is, however, little evidence to support this
proposition. The same goes for borrowing constraints. Heaton and Lucas (1995, 1996)
argue that an individual who is constrained in the stock market must in general also
be constrained in the bond market and vice versa. As a result, borrowing constraints
cannot explain the large equity premium.
Others, e.g. Cecchetti and Mark (1990), Kandel and Stambaugh (1991), Cecchetti
et al. (1993) and Burnside (1994), have simply argued that risk aversion is higher than
anticipated. Mehra and Prescott (1985), citing others, argue that values of risk aversion
exceeding 10 are implausible. Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) show that values of γ as
high as 30 still imply feasible behavior if agents are faced with a potential wealth loss
of just one percent. Despite this evidence, most economists still believe that values in
excess of 10 seem to be inconsistent with real-life behavior by individuals.
Another assumption underlying the model is that individuals are sufficiently ho-
mogeneous such that their behavior can be described by a representative agent. As
shown by Constantinides (1982), even if individuals are heterogeneous in preferences
and levels of wealth, it is still possible to construct a representative agent. They key
is that asset markets are complete and frictionless so that individuals can trade away
any idiosyncratic risk in consumption. In other words, this allows them to become
marginally homogeneous.
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Despite this result, the validity of a representative agent is challenged. Some claim
that only a subset of investors are involved in the stock market and it should be their
consumption growth that features in the first-order conditions. It is therefore also
known under the heading of limited stock market participation. As these individu-
als actively trade, the link between their consumption growth and stock returns should
be tighter. Thus the covariance between their consumption growth and the excess re-
turn should be higher. However, as shown by Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), although
this is indeed the case it is not sufficient to explain the puzzle. Subsequent research
used household-level data to test this premise; prominent examples include Attanasio
et al. (2002), Brav et al. (2002) and Vissing-Jørgenson (2002). All three papers show
that this covariance is higher for stockholders than for nonstockholders. Hence this
modification clearly helps in resolving the puzzle. These papers tend not to be criti-
cized on theoretical grounds, but rather on their empirical implementation with some
economists questioning the reliability and validity of these micro data.
As an example of combining two possible remedies, Constantinides et al. (2002)
attempt to resolve the puzzle by combining borrowing constraints with consumer het-
erogeneity in an overlapping-generations model. During the first period the individual
receives a relatively low endowment income and is prohibited from borrowing. This is
justifiable given that banks will be reluctant to lend money against future wage income
or human capital. In the second period, the individual is employed and receives wage
income subject to large uncertainty. During the final period the individual retires and
consumes the assets accumulated in the second period. As the correlation of equity
income with consumption changes over the life cycle, so does the attractiveness of
equity as an asset. Due to borrowing constraints young people, who in an economy
with complete markets and without frictions hold equity, are effectively shut out of this
market. Thus equity is exclusively priced by middle-aged investors, whose consump-
tion is much more linked to stock returns. Consumption is high when equity income
is high, and equity is no longer a hedge against fluctuations in consumption. These
individuals must therefore be offered a higher return to hold these assets.
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Bansal and Yaron (2004) introduce the concept of long-run risk into the debate.
They model both consumption and dividend growth as having a small long-term com-
ponent and time-varying volatilities where the latter proxies for variation in economic
uncertainty. The intuition underlying their results is that individuals require a large
equity premium because they are fearful of a reduction in economic growth prospects
or rising economic uncertainty which puts downward pressure on asset prices. This
paper has been criticized by Hansen et al. (2008), who claim that long-run properties
of consumption growth are hard to measure. Moreover, the empirical evidence sub-
stantiating these properties is rather weak. Cochrane (2005) argues that movements in
long-run consumption growth forecasts are observationally equivalent to unobservable
shifts in marginal utility. In sum, the conclusions of Bansal and Yaron (2004) are at a
minimum questionable. Nevertheless, it is an important contribution and it has sparked
subsequent work along these lines.
Despite this plethora of proposed resolutions, the consensus within the academic
community is that the puzzle remains unsolved. Finding a resolution has become even
more difficult as any proposed solution also has to provide an answer to the related
risk-free rate puzzle of Weil (1989). In addition, it should also be consistent with a
number of other asset pricing phenomena such as the procyclical variation in stock
prices, the long-horizon predictability of excess stock returns and the countercyclical
variation of stock market volatility.
1.3 Relevance to Society
The example in Section 1.1 underscores the remarkable wealth building potential of
equity compared to bonds. It should come as no surprise therefore, that the equity pre-
mium is of central importance in portfolio allocation decisions (i.e. which fraction of
funds to invest in the stock market) of pension funds and endowments and in estimat-
ing the appropriate cost of capital. More indirectly it also paramount in estimating the
effects of business cycle fluctuations and hence has some important policy and welfare
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implications.
Up until the mid-1980s Dutch pension funds invested mainly in bonds and mort-
gages. During this decade they diversified into other asset categories, most promi-
nently stock, but also commodities and private equity. Nowadays, equity represents
about 50% of pension fund reserves. One of the reasons for this diversification is that
the return on bonds was not sufficient to provide employees with a decent and afford-
able pension. An additional annual return of one percentage points adds about 30% to
an employee’s pension worth. However, in case the risk attitude of the representative
agent is indeed as high as some estimates make believe, pension funds should be very
cautious in investing in the stock market.
As examples of the role played by the equity premium in pensions, consider the
following. First, Van Ewijk et al. (2009) discuss the welfare gain of intergenerational
risk sharing. Their model shows that assuming an equity premium of 2% results in a
welfare gain of 4%, while the welfare gain is almost quadrupled if the equity premium
is raised to 4%. Second, Bovenberg and van Ewijk (2011) discuss the relation between
the degree of risk taking and the required reserves to cover a pension funds’ future
liabilities. The most appropriate risk premium is deduced from the interest paid on
wage-indexed bonds or bonds linked to GDP. However, these assets are not traded.
Therefore the Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis uses a discount rate
based on a long-term equity premium of 4%.
The equity premium also features prominently in the current debate in the U.S.
concerning the future of Social Security. When Social Security taxes exceed the pro-
gram’s expenditures, the excess is invested in non-marketable U.S. government bonds,
it is prohibited from being invested in any other assets. Critics of this law have pro-
posed to privatize funding, thereby allowing excess funds to be invested in the stock
market as well.
Welch (2000) argues, on the basis of several surveys conducted among small and
institutional (professional) investors that the latter group often tends to be more conser-
vative with respect to their estimates of the equity premium. In particular, pension fund
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executives are reported to estimate the expected risk premium at about 3%, which is
at the low end of the spectrum of estimates reported in the academic literature. Hence,
while the consensus among the pension funds is that its existence cannot be neglected,
they do not seem to believe that the difference in return between stocks and bonds is
very high. These conflicting views cry for a reconciliation in the interest of public
wealth.
Turning to welfare, the discussion in Lucas (1987) serves as the starting point. This
paper argues that the welfare costs of fluctuations in consumption are negligible at
about 0.0005% of consumption. However, this result is of course critically dependent
on the method used for the calculations. The underlying model assumes that markets
are complete — this implies that individuals must be able to diversify any idiosyncratic
risk in consumption — and preferences are modeled by the power utility function.
Given the wealth of evidence against the ability of this model to match key asset pricing
phenomena, subsequent research has questioned the conclusion of Lucas (1987). It is
again not feasible to do justice to all research in this field, so the following will briefly
touch on a small number of contributions; see Lucas (2003) for an excellent survey of
this literature.
Atkeson and Phelan (1994) investigate the first assumption and consider the wel-
fare and policy implications when markets are incomplete. The motivation is that the
marginal utility of consumption might exhibit much more variation when individuals
are confronted with substantial idiosyncratic income risk. Given that agents are not
able to trade away these risks themselves, one might wonder whether government pol-
icy can be helpful in smoothing consumption streams and hence increasing welfare.
The critical point in their analysis is the extent to which countercyclical policy reduces
directly the income risk faced by each individual. Based on a model incorporating the
wage and unemployment risk faced by individuals over the business cycle, the main
effect of countercyclical policy is merely to reduce (or even completely remove) the
correlation across individuals in the unemployment risk they face. Hence the only ef-
fect on welfare is via its impact on asset prices and so the potential welfare gains from
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countercyclical policy are, in line with Lucas (1987), negligible.
Krusell et al. (2009) show that accounting for consumer heterogeneity is critically
important. Their baseline specification which features idiosyncratic risk and unem-
ployment yields a gain of about 0.1%. However, when they distinguish between short-
and long-term unemployment, the gain is approximately 10 times larger. The underly-
ing reasons are simple: if an individual is hit by an unemployment spell that lasts for
an extended period of time, her present and future income is diminished significantly.
Moreover, the risk of becoming unemployed is highly procyclical. An important result
of their analysis is that although the gain is on average equal to 1%, there are substan-
tial differences between wealth groups. For both the poorest and richest individuals the
gain of removing cycles is positive and equal to 4% and 2%, respectively. This implies
that about 65% of the population, the ‘middle class’ lose out, their welfare actually
decreases.
Others adapted the preferences class to remove the tight link between risk aversion
and intertemporal substitution under constant relative risk aversion preferences. For
example, Tallarini (2000) uses preferences of the Epstein-Zin type and estimates the
welfare cost of aggregate consumption risk to be about 10% of consumption. In sharp
contrast, Otrok (2001), while using a different preference class, obtains estimates in
the range of 0.002% to 0.006%, which is much closer to the results of Lucas (1987).
The concept of habit formation has also been used in this literature and for example
Van Wincoop (1994) finds that eliminating consumption fluctuations provides gains
ranging from 1 to 25 percent.
Sidestepping the issue of choosing the most appropriate preference class, Alvarez
and Jermann (2004) take a nonparametric approach and use asset prices to measure
the cost of consumption fluctuations directly. However, their approach does rely on
the assumption of complete markets. They emphasize that the frequency at which
variation in consumption is removed is paramount. In particular, while removing all
variation results in a gain that is in the neighborhood of 30%, focusing on business-
cycle frequencies (cycles of at most 8 years) shrinks the gain to a number less than
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1%.
If anything, the discussion above reveals that there is no consensus concerning the
effect of the equity premium puzzle on welfare and therefore also policy. Estimates
vary widely, depending crucially on assumptions concerning the appropriate prefer-
ence class and idiosyncratic risks (consumer heterogeneity). Until the academic com-
munity comes up with an asset pricing model that can account for the equity premium
puzzle (and other asset pricing phenomena), it does not seem likely that we can give a
meaningful answer to this question.
1.4 Outline
All four chapters are self-contained and can be read independently. Although they are
all concerned with the equity premium puzzle, the focus of each chapter is different.
In other words, every chapter deals with this puzzle from a different point of view. The
second chapter develops a method to quantify the uncertainty surrounding estimates of
risk aversion and then uses these results to construct a pooled estimate based on data
from a number of developed countries. Chapter 3 constitutes the core of this thesis. It
introduces a heterogeneous agent model populated by stockholders and nonstockhold-
ers. The main innovation is the macroeconomic perspective, using data from national
accounts. The fourth chapter tweaks the canonical c-CAPM by focusing on an element
that has so far stayed below the radar: the risk-free rate While the first three chapters
deal directly with the equity premium puzzle, Chapter 5 is the odd one out. Its central
theme is the variability of risk aversion over time, dealing with the equity premium
puzzle on the side. In more detail, the outline is as follows.
Chapter 2 is based on Pozzi et al. (2010). The point of this chapter is not to come
up with yet another theoretical explanation for the high coefficient of relative risk aver-
sion. Rather, it answers the question to which extent the equity premium puzzle is a
statistical phenomenon due to lack of reliability of macroeconomic data. In his author-
itative review Campbell (2003) shows that the estimates vary widely across a number
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of countries, but he has no statistical analysis of this uncertainty. We replicate Camp-
bell’s results, extend his data set and use the jackknife resampling method to gauge
the uncertainty with which risk aversion is estimated in the c-CAPM. Furthermore,
by pooling the country data one obtains a much tighter confidence band on the world
coefficient of relative risk aversion than an analysis based on an individual country.
Chapter 3 is based on De Vries and Zenhorst (2012). Limited stock market partic-
ipation has been proposed as a resolution to the equity premium puzzle. The idea is
that stockholders’ consumption growth is more tightly linked to excess returns, thereby
increasing the covariance and lowering the relative risk aversion coefficient. Existing
research in this strand of the literature uses household-level data. In contrast, this
chapter use macroeconomic data to distinguish between different sources of income
and associated spending. This gives a longer time series than is available for the panel
studies and enables an international comparison. The macro approach is not seen as
a substitute for, but as complementary to the micro-based approach. The idea is as
follows. The stockholders consume only from their capital income, while the non-
stockholders consume mainly from their wages. The capital income and wage income
are constructed from the categories of net national disposable income. Subsequently
aggregate consumption is assigned to the two types of factor income in proportion to
their income. These latter series are then used to compute the coefficient of relative risk
aversion for both groups. As expected, estimates concerning stockholders are lower
than those based on a representative agent. Nevertheless, the level of risk aversion of
stockholders exceeds the range of plausible values.
Chapter 4 is based on Zenhorst (2012a). One of the necessary series to estimate the
coefficient of relative risk aversion is the risk-free rate. While other parts of the model,
such as the functional form of the utility function, have received much attention, the
same cannot be said about the risk-free rate. Most studies using U.S. data choose the
3-month T-bill rate to represent the risk-free rate. However, it is questionable whether
such an asset is indeed the best proxy of a risk-free asset for the typical consumer. It
seems that some kind of return on a savings account (or time deposit) is much closer to
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the “asset reality” a household is faced with. As the interest rate paid on deposits is in
general lower than the rate governments pay on their short-term debt, the excess return
when using a deposit rate as the risk-free rate is higher. This implies that, ceteris
paribus, the coefficient of relative risk aversion will increase and hence the equity
premium puzzle will be even larger.
Chapter 5 is based on Zenhorst (2012b). Most papers concerning this puzzle
treat risk aversion as a structural parameter whose value is constant over time. Al-
though convenient, this assumption is hard to justify. Insights from the psychology of
decision-making reveal that people are more sensitive to reductions in their levels of
well-being than to increases. In other words, a loss of $ 100 hurts more than the joy
provided by winning an equal amount. Hence real life observations clearly suggest
that there is variation in risk aversion. The central aim of this chapter is to show this
time variation in the coefficient of relative risk aversion. It formulates an asset pricing
model in which risk aversion varies in response to news in consumption growth, infla-
tion and unemployment growth. Hence besides the standard consumption growth we
add two macroeconomic variables that should influence risk aversion. The setup also
allows for time-varying volatilities of the innovations. The main yardstick by which to
judge the results is to check whether movements in the coefficient of relative risk aver-
sion are in line with official U.S. recession and expansion dates and other important
events that took place over the sample period. Risk aversion is estimated to be highly
persistent and, as expected, in the run-up to recessions and during these periods it is
generally rising.

Chapter 2
World Equity Premium based Risk
Aversion Estimates
Joint work with Lorenzo Pozzi en Casper de Vries
2.1 Introduction
The equity premium puzzle is the empirical observation due to Mehra and Prescott
(1985) that the coefficient of relative risk aversion estimated from the macro consump-
tion based CAPM with power utility is excessively high on U.S. data. This observation
has fascinated many in the economics profession over the past two decades. Progress
has been made towards understanding the puzzle by looking into the consequences of
limited participation in the stock market (Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Attanasio et al.,
2002; Vissing-Jørgenson, 2002), habit formation of investors (Campbell and Cochrane,
1999) and decoupling risk aversion from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
(Epstein and Zin, 1989). But the final verdict is not out.
The point of this paper is not to come up with yet another theoretical explanation
for the high coefficient of relative risk aversion. Rather, we ask to which extent the eq-
uity premium puzzle is a statistical phenomenon due to lack of macro data reliability.
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In his authoritative review Campbell (1999) already showed that risk aversion esti-
mates vary widely across a number of countries, but gave no statistical analysis of this
uncertainty. We replicate Campbell’s results, extend his data set and use the jackknife
resampling method to gauge the uncertainty. Furthermore, we show that by pooling
the country data one obtains a much tighter confidence band on the world coefficient
of relative risk aversion than an analysis based on an individual country.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section the model
is outlined. Our methodology is introduced in the third section. Next, the data used
in our empirical investigation are described. Section 2.5 discusses the results and the
final section concludes.
2.2 Model
In the canonical framework where a representative investor has a time-separable power
utility function over aggregate consumption, the Euler equation reads
1 = Et[Rt+1Mt+1]. (2.1)
Here R is the gross return on an asset and M denotes the stochastic discount fac-
tor. The discount factor is Mt+1 = δ(Ct+1/Ct)−γ , where δ is the subjective rate of
time preference, C is aggregate consumption and γ is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion. Suppose that asset returns and aggregate consumption are conditionally log-
normally distributed with constant variance. Take logs of equation (2.1) and rewrite to
get
Etrt+1 = −log δ + γEt∆ct+1 − σ
2
r + (γσc)
2 − 2γσ(r,c)
2
.
The small case letters denote logarithms; σ2r and σ
2
c are, respectively, the uncondi-
tional variance of the log return innovations and consumption innovations and σ(r,c)
is their unconditional covariance. For a riskless asset rf , return innovations and the
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covariance with consumption are both zero, implying that the log risk premium can be
conveniently expressed as
Et[rt+1 − rft+1] + σ
2
exr
2
= γσ(exr,c). (2.2)
In words, equation (2.2) says that the expected excess return (exr) of equity are equal
to the amount of risk aversion times the covariance between consumption growth and
excess returns minus a correction factor (i.e. a Jensen inequality term arising as we
are using expectations of log returns). The expression permits a calibration of the risk
aversion parameter γ from estimates of the moments in equation (2.2). In most cases
U.S. data on these moments are used. As the U.S. has historically been blessed with
high equity returns and rather smooth consumption growth, typical γ estimates are
high.
Using moment estimates given in equation (2.2) to back out the parameter of rela-
tive risk aversion gives a point estimate, but not a confidence interval. For this reason
confidence bands are mostly not reported.1 Given that estimates in the literature vary
quite dramatically it is of interest to provide for a confidence interval. The next section
uses the jackknife resampling scheme to provide such confidence bands.
2.3 Methodology
In order to gauge the uncertainty with which risk aversion is estimated, we use the
block-jackknife procedure, see e.g. Shao and Tu (1995), as it is easy to implement and
because it can deal with the serial correlation that is present in the consumption series.
Let n be the size of the sample, let m denote the number of omitted observations in
a resample and let N denote the number of resamples. Note that the total number of
resamples is N = n−m + 1. To estimate the variance of γˆn, the estimate of γ based
1Cecchetti et al. (1993) use GMM to construct standard errors of estimated parameters. Their results
are difficult to compare with our outcomes, since they employ a Markov switching model.
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on all observations, one deletes m subsequent observations at a time and denotes the
new estimate of γ by γˆ(i). The i-th pseudovalue of γˆn, denoted by γ˜(i), is defined as[
nγˆn − (n−m)γˆ(i)
]
/m. The resulting vector of pseudovalues across the resamples
is used to estimate the variance of γˆn, i.e.
S2γˆn =
m
nN
N∑
i=1
(
γ˜(i) − 1
N
N∑
i=1
γ˜(i)
)2
. (2.3)
These estimates can then be used to form a country-specific confidence interval for γˆn.
More specifically, the Quenouille-Tukey mean of the pseudovalues, see Shao and Tu
(1995, p. 6), is the bias-corrected version of the estimate of γn and the required critical
value is taken from a t-distribution, with N − 1 degrees of freedom (Miller, 1974).
Our second contribution is to use the cross-sectional dimension of our data set to
get a confidence band for the pooled estimator, to which we refer as the world coeffi-
cient of relative risk aversion (γw). It is highly likely that the information contained in
the estimates of γn differs between countries, so some kind of weighted average seems
to be a natural choice. As the block-jackknife procedure gives us the country-specific
sample variances, we can use the optimal weights from Graybill and Deal (1959), de-
fined as
wj =
1/S2γˆn,j∑k
j=1 1/S
2
γˆn,j
, (2.4)
where k denotes the number of countries. Confidence intervals are formed by weight-
ing the country-specific averages of the pseudovalues to get γˆw. It is straightforward
to show that the variance of this estimate is given by
S2γˆw =
1∑k
j=1 1/S
2
γˆn,j
. (2.5)
The critical values are based on a t-distribution with k − 1 degrees of freedom.
Besides the optimal weighting scheme, we also employ two weighting schemes
based on GDP and stock market capitalization. The variance of the world coefficient
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of risk aversion is then given by
S2γˆw =
k∑
j=1
(wjSγˆn,j)
2, (2.6)
where wj is now defined as the GDP (market capitalization) of country j divided by
the sum of GDP (market capitalization) of all countries.
2.4 Data
The methodology described in the previous section is applied to data for OECD coun-
tries. Of the 30 countries, 9 had to be dropped for the following reasons. Iceland,
Luxembourg and the Slovak Republic are excluded since we do not have three-month
interest rates for these countries. Too few observations has led to the exclusion of
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Mexico, Portugal and Turkey. For all 21 remaining coun-
tries, data are taken from three different sources. First, private final consumption ex-
penditure (Quarterly National Accounts, in constant prices)2 and CPI (Main Economic
Indicators, all items) are from the OECD. Second, equity returns (in local currency
units) are from MSCI. Finally, the risk-free rate and population figures are from the
International Financial Statistics provided by the IMF. The sample period is country-
specific, as can be seen in Table 2.1; the panel is thus unbalanced.3
For the economic based weighting schemes we need two additional variables. The
first is GDP (Annual National Accounts, in U.S. dollars, current prices, current ex-
change rates; OECD) and the second is market capitalization in U.S. dollars (World
Federation of Exchanges).
2Note that this implies that our results are independent of the measure of inflation.
3Appendix 2.A.1 contains some specific computational details concerning the data.
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2.5 Results
Estimates of γn based on equation (2.2) are shown in Table 2.1. The number of omitted
observations in each block, m, is set to 4 so that we leave out one year of observations
at a time. Four of the 21 coefficients of relative risk aversion are negative, implying
that agents are risk loving. The remaining estimates are positive and rather high, with
the exception of Korea and Poland. Yet the results are in line with those reported by
Campbell (1999). In the Appendix we replicate the results of Campbell, but add our
estimates for the pseudovalues and the confidence bands.4
The averages of the pseudovalues, i.e.
∑N
i=1 γ˜i, are reported in the next column.
Note that these differ considerably from the overall estimates γˆn. Given the small value
ofm, this is indicative for the uncertainty in the estimates of γ. More than half of these
values are negative, perhaps implying that most estimates are severely biased. These
average pseudovalues are the basis of the symmetric 95% confidence interval. From
this, it is evident that there is a lot of uncertainty in the estimate of the coefficient of
relative risk aversion. Only the confidence band for Korea is rather tight, the others
are fairly wide. The averages of the pseudovalues may look fluke, but if one considers
the confidence interval, or realizes that the confidence band for Campbell (1999) also
comprise a very wide range, the point estimates of Table 2.1 look more in line with the
generally smaller point estimates from the Campbell subset (see Appendix 2.A.2).
The confidence intervals also show that the null hypothesis of a coefficient of rel-
ative risk aversion between one and ten, a range most economists (e.g. Mehra and
Prescott, 1985) consider to be a reasonable guess, is never rejected on the basis of the
individual country jackknifed confidence bands.
Some preliminary results from pooling can already be deduced from Table 2.1. In
particular, consider the means and standard errors of the third and fourth columns. The
mean of γˆn is 97, with a standard error of 50; implying that a confidence interval based
4Note that all estimates of γn are identical, except the one for the U.S. The reason is that the riskfree
rate we employ differs slightly from the one used by Campbell.
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Table 2.1: Country-specific results
Notes: The estimate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion is denoted by γˆn, PS is the mean of the
pseudovalues, defined in Section 2.3. The confidence interval is based on PS, with standard error equal
to the square root of the variance estimated by equation (2.3) and critical value from a t-distribution
with N − 1 degrees of freedom.
Country Sample period γˆn PS 95% CI
Australia 1970Q1 - 2003Q3 128.14 -649.74 -6436.59 5137.11
Austria 1988Q2 - 2003Q3 91.79 105.83 -164.52 376.18
Belgium 1995Q2 - 2003Q3 194.01 -890.14 -3253.38 1473.11
Canada 1970Q1 - 2003Q3 45.28 31.03 -63.63 125.68
Czech Republic 1996Q2 - 2003Q3 -192.06 -1186.11 -2549.97 177.75
Denmark 1990Q2 - 2003Q3 97.10 -1148.47 -3548.99 1252.06
Finland 1990Q2 - 2003Q3 205.86 -0.03 -824.94 824.88
France 1978Q2 - 2003Q3 165.19 126.98 -99.48 353.44
Germany 1975Q4 - 2003Q3 165.70 408.70 -1242.74 2060.14
Italy 1981Q2 - 2003Q3 109.93 57.05 -831.56 945.67
Japan 1994Q2 - 2003Q3 -36.89 -140.97 -576.13 294.19
Korea 1988Q1 - 2003Q3 4.37 -4.68 -43.45 34.09
Netherlands 1988Q2 - 2003Q3 230.63 -142.00 -1208.82 924.83
New Zealand 1988Q1 - 2003Q3 -108.28 -6922.59 -28175.74 14330.56
Norway 1978Q2 - 2003Q3 -395.14 578.19 -5001.92 6158.29
Poland 1995Q2 - 2003Q3 4.88 -22.44 -117.17 72.28
Spain 1995Q2 - 2003Q3 155.84 98.38 -182.41 379.17
Sweden 1993Q2 - 2003Q3 178.29 -240.76 -1160.22 678.71
Switzerland 1980Q2 - 2003Q3 852.61 -987.57 -55476.58 53501.45
United Kingdom 1970Q1 - 2003Q3 69.22 24.06 -139.95 188.06
United States 1970Q1 - 2003Q3 67.56 47.15 -74.84 169.14
on these numbers would be rather wide. When using the bias-corrected estimates, the
results are even worse. With a mean of -517 and a standard error of 338, the resulting
confidence interval would be even wider. However, note that these results are obtained
under equal weighting. Hence the estimate of Switzerland would have a weight equal
to that of Korea, although the latter is estimated much more precisely. Now we turn to
some results in which some alternative weighting schemes are used.
Table 2.2 presents the results based on pooling of country-specific data, which
gives an estimate of the world risk aversion parameter. The top panel presents the
26 World Equity Premium based Risk Aversion Estimates
outcomes obtained while using the optimal variance weights. The optimally weighted
mean of the pseudovalues is just over 4.5 (hence within this plausible range) and the
95% confidence interval is rather tight. Note that it is less wide than its counterpart for
the U.S., hence pooling of information is clearly beneficial. Moreover, the resultant
confidence interval contains the often hypothesized reasonable values of below 10.
Again equality to one is not rejected for the world risk aversion parameter. The other
two rows hold the results after, respectively, disregarding Korea and Switzerland. The
reason for Korea is that its variance of γ is estimated much more precisely than any
other country. As a result its weight is much larger. In contrast, the estimated variance
of Switzerland is the highest. As shown in the top panel of Table 2.2, although Korea
has a rather large weight, our results are quite robust to its inclusion. The point estimate
is now outside the a priori plausible range, but the confidence interval is still tight. As
expected, excluding Switzerland has only a negligible effect.
Looking at the middle panel clearly shows that Switzerland is a bit of an outsider.
As it has a large GDP weight, it considerably affects the point estimate. Omitting
Switzerland increases γˆw and the estimate then lies well within the plausible range.
However, due to the different weights, the standard error of this estimate is higher than
before. Consequently, the confidence interval is wide and uninformative. Compar-
ing the results with and without Korea shows that its large weight has only a minor
influence on the results.
Finally, the results based on market capitalization convey more or less the same
message as those based on GDP. Korea’s influence is minimal, while Switzerland
seems to drive the outcomes to a rather large extent. Now the uncertainty in the
world coefficient of risk aversion (not excluding Switzerland) is even higher than in
the middle panel, as can be inferred from the very wide confidence interval. In con-
trast, the result excluding Switzerland is more (yet marginally) informative compared
to the middle panel. This can be easily explained from the notion that the weight of
Switzerland is larger in the bottom panel.
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Table 2.2: Pooled results
Notes: The world coefficient of relative risk aversion is denoted by γˆw, the standard error for the confi-
dence interval is the square root of equation (2.5) for the top panel and the square root of equation (2.6)
for the middle and bottom panels. The critical value is taken from a t-distribution with k − 1 degrees
of freedom. The top panel uses the optimal weights (OPT ) described by equation (2.4), the middle and
bottom panels use economic weights based on, respectively, GDP and market capitalization (MC at the
end of 2003. In each panel, the top row holds the outcomes using all countries (All), the second row
disregards Korea (KO) while the third row excludes Switzerland (SW ) from the analysis.
Description γˆw 95 % CI
OPT, All 4.57 -27.60 36.74
OPT, KO 20.56 -32.76 73.87
OPT, SW 4.57 -27.71 36.85
GDP, All -16.90 -712.01 678.21
GDP, KO -17.17 -729.90 695.57
GDP, SW -5.65 -240.95 229.65
MC, All -32.02 -1737.96 1673.91
MC, KO -32.36 -1765.13 1700.41
MC, SW -2.85 -202.37 196.67
2.6 Conclusion
The equity premium puzzle holds that the coefficient of relative risk aversion estimated
from the consumption based CAPM with power utility is excessively high. Moreover,
estimates in the literature vary considerably. We employ the jackknife resampling
method in order to estimate the uncertainty associated with the coefficient of relative
risk aversion. Our results show that the country-specific confidence intervals are fairly
wide. We never reject equality to one. However, when the data of countries are pooled
and a single, optimally weighted point estimate is constructed, the resulting confidence
band is tighter and presents less of a puzzle than the individual country estimates.
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2.A Appendices
2.A.1 Data issues
Some remarks regarding the data are in order. First, the computation of the real excess
return; the difference between the real equity return and the real risk-free rate. In order
to compute the return on equity, two series are required: the end-of-month price-index
(hereafter denoted by P , datatype PIL) and the end-of-month total return index (R,
datatype RIL). The first step is to use the following definition to back out the monthly
dividend yield (DY) at time t:
Rt
Rt−1
≡ Pt
Pt−1
(1 +DYt).
Next monthly dividends at time t are computed by multiplying Pt by the dividend yield
at time t and the quarterly return on equity (Re) is computed according to
Ret =
(
Pt +
∑t
i=t−2D(i)
Pt−3
)
− 1,
where D(i) is the monthly dividend series, Pt is the end-of-month price and Pt−3 is
the price at the end of the previous quarter (hence t − 3). Finally, log equity returns
are computed as
rt = log(1 +Ret).
The second input series is the risk-free rate. As these are annualized and expressed
as percentage points in the database, the log quarterly risk-free rates are computed
according to
rft = log
((
1 +
Rft
100
) 1
4
)
.
These two returns are then made real by subtracting time t inflation, denoted by pit.
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This is simply the first difference of the logarithmic transformed CPI, i.e.
pit = log(CPIt)− log(CPIt−1) = log
(
CPIt
CPIt−1
)
.
It is important to note the timing of the variables is this respect. An investor earns
rft if he bought the asset at the end of the previous quarter and sells it at the end of the
current quarter. This is why the real risk-free rate is computed as
rrft = rft−1 − pit.
The real equity return is simply rrt = rt − pit. Our series of interest, the real excess
return is then rexrt = rrt − rrft.
Second, the population series. As these figures are only available at an annual
frequency (mid-year estimate), we need to construct a quarterly series with population
estimates ourselves. In line with Campbell (1999), we assume constant growth rates
between subsequent annual observations. As data refers to mid-year estimates, the
annual observations are taken to represent the second quarter of each year.
Finally, for four countries, the riskfree rate has missing values towards the end of
the sample period. Fortunately, in all cases appropriate series have been found that
allow us to extrapolate the original series based on these substitutes. Below follows a
short description of these four cases.
• Australia: Missing values from July 2002 onwards. We use data on the Aus-
tralian interbank rate, this series has a correlation of 0.996 for the overlapping
part with the original series;
• Austria: Missing values from January 1999 onwards. We use data on the 3
month interbank offered rate, this series has a correlation of 0.995 for the over-
lapping part with the original series;
• Denmark: Missing values from January 1989 onwards. We use data on T-bills
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taken from the Central Bank of Denmark, this series has a correlation of 1 for
the overlapping part with the original series;
• Netherlands: Missing values from January 1999 onwards. We use on the call
money rate, this series has a correlation of 1 for the overlapping part with the
original series.
2.A.2 Replication
Table 2.3: Replication of Campbell (1999)
Notes: The estimate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion is denoted by γˆn, PS is the mean of the
pseudovalues, defined in Section 2.3. The confidence interval is based on PS, with standard error equal
to the square root of the variance estimated by equation (2.3) and critical value from a t-distribution
with N − 1 degrees of freedom. The estimates in the third column, with the exception of the U.S.,
match those reported in Campbell (1999), the final three columns are our contribution. Mnemonics
are as follows: Australia (AU), Canada (CN), France (FR), Germany (BD), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), the
Netherlands (NL), Sweden (SD), Switzerland (SW), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States
(US).
Country Sample period γˆn PS 95 % CI
AU 1970Q1 - 1996Q2 45.70 7.11 -162.63 187.91
CN 1970Q1 - 1996Q2 56.43 8.97 -135.34 185.90
FR 1973Q2 - 1996Q2 -310.32 14.63 -2431.38 7700.34
BD 1978Q4 - 1996Q2 343.13 13.33 -45863.66 80054.16
IT 1971Q2 - 1995Q2 2465.32 4.70 35243.95 80566.08
JP 1970Q2 - 1996Q2 134.12 13.44 -923.57 562.81
NL 1977Q2 - 1996Q1 1050.93 23.97 -33070.35 69140.34
SD 1970Q1 - 1994Q4 7215.18 20.71 -2035151.38 3726567.77
SW 1982Q2 - 1996Q2 -207.29 26.79 -19693.37 15176.76
UK 1970Q1 - 1996Q2 156.31 14.86 -5425.25 2239.24
US 1970Q1 - 1996Q3 150.82 37.45 -253.48 408.73
Chapter 3
Macro Consumption and Equity
Premium based Risk Aversion of
Labor and Capitalists
Joint work with Casper de Vries
3.1 Introduction
The equity premium puzzle holds that estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aver-
sion from consumption data are excessively high. Since Mehra and Prescott (1985)
christened the puzzle and despite considerable research efforts, it is still with us today.
Yet, our understanding of the puzzle has grown considerably. One strand has investi-
gated the effect of non-standard utility functions, notably habit formation, to explain
the puzzle. The other main line of research, introduced by Mankiw and Zeldes (1991),
has looked into the effect of limited stock market participation. Their paper uses mi-
cro panel data showing that the consumption of stockholders is quite distinct from the
consumption of nonstockholders. In particular, the covariance between consumption
growth and excess returns is larger for stockholders than for nonstockholders, implying
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that the resulting estimate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion is lower; thereby
reducing the size of the puzzle. This micro panel based research line has been followed
up by, amongst others, Vissing-Jørgenson (2002).
In contrast with other papers, we use macro data to distinguish between differ-
ent sources of income and associated spending. This gives a longer time series than
is available for the panel studies and enables an international comparison. We view
the macro approach not as a substitute for, but as complementary to the micro-based
approach. The idea is as follows. The stockholders consume only from their capital
income, while the nonstockholders consume mainly from their wages. The capital in-
come and wage income are constructed from the categories of net national disposable
income. Subsequently aggregate consumption is assigned to the two types of factor
income in proportion to their income. These latter series are then used to compute the
coefficient of relative risk aversion for both groups. The crucial maintained assump-
tion in this approach is the assignment of expenditure in proportion with factor income
derived from the national accounts.
As the stock market is associated with risk, one expects equity owners to have a
lower relative risk aversion coefficient than wage earners. As a result, equity owners’
coefficient of relative risk aversion should also be lower than one that is based on a
representative agent model. Applying our model to a selection of OECD countries
reveals that this is borne out. In particular, the average coefficient of relative risk
aversion for stockholders is 62.3. In contrast, the average estimate of 186.9 for a
single representative agent is much higher.
The size of our data set enables us to calculate standard errors by means of the jack-
knife procedure.1 The individual country estimates have a wide band of uncertainty.
By pooling the information from different countries we can reduce this uncertainty and
the world coefficient of relative risk aversion of stockholders is shown to be within a
range of values that most economists deem plausible. An alternative approach, sug-
1There are only few other papers that report standard errors, the most notable examples are Cecchetti
et al. (1993) and Vissing-Jørgenson (2002).
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gested by Campbell (1999), is to fix the correlation between consumption growth and
excess returns at unity while computing coefficients of relative risk aversion. In this
case almost all the country-specific values for equity owners take on plausible values.
These results suggest that the macro based limited stock market participation by itself
cannot completely resolve the equity premium puzzle for individual countries. How-
ever, when pooling or fixing the correlation at unity is introduced, our approach yields
plausible estimates for the coefficients of risk aversion.
The main motivation underlying our macroeconomic approach is as follows. As in
any research program, some of the maintained assumptions in the micro panel data
based investigations are stronger than ideal. For example, in Mankiw and Zeldes
(1991) consumption is approximated by food consumption, which according to Attana-
sio and Weber (1995), is a dubious proxy for total consumption. Moreover, the panel
data generally have a short time span covering the same households (in Mankiw and
Zeldes (1991) there are only 13 observations). Finally, the approach suffers from mea-
surement error as the distinction between stockholders and nonstockholders is static.
Due to data limitations, someone is defined as a shareholder over the entire sample
period if he owns shares in the final period. Likewise, if a person does not have stock
in the final period, he is considered to be a non-stockholder in all periods.
Some of the flaws of the earlier research were overcome in later research, including
Attanasio et al. (2002), Brav et al. (2002) and Vissing-Jørgenson (2002). But these
more recent studies also suffer from a number drawbacks. As discussed by Vissing-
Jørgenson (2002), who makes use of the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX),
only 70% of households have data for all interviews so attrition is quite substantial. In
addition, households are asked for holdings of ‘stocks, bonds, mutual funds and other
such securities’. Hence households who do not own stocks, but have some money in
a money market fund will nevertheless be classified as a stockholder. Third, it has
been documented that many households only hold stock or bonds in their pension
plan. However, survey results are unable to show whether households in a defined
contribution plan report their holdings. Such households are than mistakenly classified
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as nonstockholders. This is a likely reason as to why the proportion of stockholders in
CEX is lower than in other sources. In addition, Attanasio et al. (2004) note that, for
many commodities aggregating CEX data does not conform with the NIPA Personal
Consumption Expenditure (PCE) data of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. In
particular, for some items the underestimation is substantial. In terms of aggregate
consumption, the CEX aggregate is about 35% lower than its PCE counterpart. Even
more detrimental, instead of converging, the difference between both aggregates has
been increasing during the second part of the 1990s.
Our macro approach should be seen as complementary to the micro based house-
hold level data literature. Our approach, being based on national income data, does not
suffer from attrition and sidesteps the issue of classifying households as stockhold-
ers or nonstockholders. Furthermore, an advantage is that it yields comparable cross
country estimates. Nevertheless, it also has its maintained hypothesis, most notably
the assignment of expenditure in proportion with the factor income share. We discuss
this issue extensively in Section 3.3.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 concisely intro-
duces the canonical model and a simple heterogeneous agent model. Our methodology
of how to construct quarterly capital and labor income series using macroeconomic
data is explained in the third section. Here we also discuss some drawbacks of our
method and how standard errors for the estimates of the risk aversion coefficient can
be obtained using a simple jackknifing approach. Section 3.4 discusses the data. The
results of our approach are given in Section 3.5. In particular, we present estimates of
the regular and adjusted risk aversion coefficients, their confidence intervals and the
pooled estimates. The final section concludes.
3.2 Model
The focus of this paper is on constructing consumption series for stockholders and
nonstockholders using only macroeconomic data. We stick to the original model ex-
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cept for disaggregating consumption growth into two parts. The model is explained in
terms of a representative investor and aggregate consumption, but due to the aggrega-
tion theorem of Grossman and Shiller (1982), it applies just as well to a representative
stockholder or nonstockholder and their respective consumption streams.
The canonical framework, (Grossman and Shiller, 1981; Hansen and Jagannathan,
1991; Cochrane and Hansen, 1992), assumes the existence of a representative investor
who has a time-separable utility function defined over aggregate consumption. Under
these assumptions, the Euler equation reads
1 = Et
[
Rt+1δ (Ct+1/Ct)
−γ] . (3.1)
Here R is the gross return on an asset, δ is the subjective rate of time preference,
C is aggregate consumption and γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Next,
following Hansen and Singleton (1983), the simplifying assumption is made that asset
returns and aggregate consumption are jointly conditionally lognormally distributed
with constant variance. Taking logs of equation (3.1) and rewriting leads to
Etrt+1 = −log δ + γEt∆ct+1 − σ
2
r + (γσc)
2 − 2γσ(r,c)
2
. (3.2)
Small case letters denote logarithms; σ2r and σ
2
c are, respectively, the unconditional
variance of the log returns and consumption innovations and σ(r,c) is their uncondi-
tional covariance. Consider the implications of equation (3.2) for a riskless real asset.
Obviously, the variance of its returns and its covariance with any random variable are
zero, implying that the riskless real interest rate obeys
rft+1 = −log δ + γEt∆ct+1 − (γσc)
2
2
. (3.3)
Combining equations (3.2) and (3.3) gives
Et[rt+1 − rft+1] + σ
2
exr
2
= γσ(exr,c). (3.4)
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Equation (3.4) holds that expected excess returns of equity (equity premiums) are
equal to the amount of risk aversion times the covariance between consumption growth
and excess returns minus a correction factor (due to Jensen’s inequality). This ex-
pression permits a calibration of the risk aversion parameter γ from estimates of the
moments in equation (3.4). Most often U.S. data is used to estimate these moments.
As the U.S. has historically been blessed with high equity returns and rather smooth
(aggregate, per capita) consumption growth, typical values of γ are high. For example,
Campbell (1999) reports an estimate of 150.2
By itself, this does not constitute a puzzle. To understand why these high estimates
are disturbing, one needs to resort to other evidence regarding appropriate values for
the relative risk aversion coefficient. For example, Mehra and Prescott (1985), after
citing a number of studies, argue that values of γ exceeding 10 are not very plausible.
An intuitive argument for this bound based on choice under uncertainty is given by
Mankiw and Zeldes (1991, p. 105).
As mentioned, the canonical model was initially empirically tested using aggre-
gate, per capita consumption growth data. Given the very high values of γ derived
from the macro data, one response was to question the paradigm of the representative
agent. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) introduced the notion of limited stock market par-
ticipation by explicitly separating stockholders from nonstockholders. More precisely,
consider two types of agents: one relying on labor income, the other on income derived
from share holding. Since the covariance is a linear operator, one can write
σ(exr,c) = ασ(exr,cL) + (1− α)σ(exr,cK),
where σ(exr,cL) and σ(exr,cK) are the covariances of excess returns and consumption
growth of labor and capital owners respectively, while α is the average share of labor in
aggregate consumption (assuming that possible fluctuations in α are uncorrelated with
2However, the equity premium is not a U.S. phenomenon. Campbell (1999) shows the existence of
the puzzle in a number of developed countries, where estimates of relative risk aversion vary between
-310 and well over 7000. Hence in some other countries the puzzle seems to be even larger.
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the excess returns). Denote the left hand side expectation in equation (3.4) by A. Then
the risk aversion parameters of the two types of agents simply equal γL = A/σ(exr,cL)
and γK = A/σ(exr,cK); where γL and γK are the coefficients of relative risk aversion.
In the plausible case that σ(exr,cK) > σ(exr,cL), then γK < γL. It follows that in per
capita terms
γK <
A
ασ(exr,cK) + (1− α)σ(exr,cL) < γL. (3.5)
The middle term is the aggregate coefficient of risk aversion. It is biased from the per-
spective of each of the two types of agents. Hence the rationale for trying to compute
these coefficients separately.
Unlike stockholders who have an obvious exposure to equity, nonstockholders have
no clear link to this class of assets. Therefore, there is no a priori reason to believe
that nonstockholders satisfy the first-order condition underlying the Euler equation as
they will not likely optimize consumption taking expected future equity returns into
account. As a result, estimates of γL should be interpreted with care.
Although it appears from equation (3.5) that the representative agent’s risk aversion
estimate is always in between those of stockholders and nonstockholders, this need not
always be the case. If the two covariances (correlations) are both positive, the relation
in equation (3.5) obviously holds. If however either σ(exr,cK) or σ(exr,cL) is negative the
relationship may break down. If one covariance is negative while the other is positive,
the weighted average covariance of the representative agent specification can be close
to zero. As a result, the coefficient of relative risk aversion will then take on a more
extreme value than either of those associated with the two subgroups.
3.2.1 Heterogeneous agent model
We turn to developing the details of a two-period model populated by two types of
consumers both of which supply labor in the first period. Agents in the first group use
their wage income for consumption and investment in stocks where the latter is then
used to consume in the second period (stockholders). Agents in the second group also
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earn wage income in the second period. Moreover, they have access to bonds (non-
stockholders). The aim of the model is to show that agents will self-select depending
on their coefficient of relative risk aversion, i.e. to show the existence of a ‘separating’
equilibrium.
Consumption and labor
The utility function of an agent in the first group is of the standard power utility type,
i.e.
E(U)S =
1
1− γC
1−γ
1 +
δ
1− γE
[
C1−γ2
]− ψLS,
where again γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, δ is the subjective discount
factor and C1 and C2 are, respectively, consumption in the first and second period.
Moreover, ψ is the preference for leisure. We focus on the empirically relevant case
where γ > 1. Recall that if γ = 0 agents are risk neutral, while they are risk averse if
γ > 0; γ = 1 yields the log utility case.
As mentioned just above, the first type of consumer (stockholders) works the first
period and invests this money partly to reap the dividends from stock ownership in the
second period. Hence for this type of agent, first and second period consumption are
given by
C1 = WLS − S, (3.6)
C2 = RS, (3.7)
where W is the real wage rate, LS is stockholders’ labor supply, S denotes stocks and
R is the stochastic real equity return. The factor labor works both periods and invests
partly in bonds in the first period. Its utility function reads
E(U)B =
1
1− γC
1−γ
1 +
δ
1− γE
[
C1−γ2
]− ψ (1 + δ)LB.
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Nonstockholders work both periods and bonds are used to smooth consumption in-
tertemporally
C1 = WLB −B, (3.8)
C2 = WLB + IB, (3.9)
where B denotes bonds and I is the deterministic and exogenously determined return
on bonds. The disadvantage of working in both periods is represented by the coefficient
ψ times the factor (1 + δ), as working in the second period is discounted by δ.
Stockholders
The first step towards solving for the two endogenous variables of stockholders is to
substitute for consumption in the utility function using the expressions in equations
(3.6) and (3.7)
E(U)S =
1
1− γ (WLS − S)
1−γ +
δ
1− γE
[
(RS)1−γ
]− ψLS, (3.10)
The first-order conditions with respect to S and LS are given by
E(U)SS : (WLS − S)−γ = δE
[
R1−γ
]
S−γ, (3.11)
E(U)LS : W (WLS − S)−γ = ψ. (3.12)
Combining equations (3.11) and (3.12) and solving for the first endogenous variable,
i.e. S, results in
S =
(
δW
ψ
) 1
γ (
E
[
R1−γ
]) 1
γ , (3.13)
In order to solve for stockholders’ labor supply, start with equation (3.12) and
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multiply both sides by LS . Rewriting then leads to
WLS =
(
W
ψ
) 1
γ
+ S,
=
(
W
ψ
) 1
γ
+
(
δW
ψ
) 1
γ (
E
[
R1−γ
]) 1
γ , (3.14)
=
(
W
ψ
) 1
γ (
1 + δ
1
γ
(
E
[
R1−γ
]) 1
γ
)
,
where the second line uses equation (3.13). Dividing the final line of equation (3.14)
by W gives an expression for labor supply by stockholders:
LS = W
1−γ
γ ψ
−1
γ
(
1 + δ
1
γ
(
E
[
R1−γ
]) 1
γ
)
. (3.15)
The final step is to substitute for both S and LS in the utility function. Respectively
using the first line of equation (3.14), equation (3.13) and equation (3.15) to substitute
for the three terms in equation (3.10) gives
E(U)S =
(
W
ψ
) 1−γ
γ γ
1− γ
(
1 + δ
1
γ
(
E
[
R1−γ
]) 1
γ
)
. (3.16)
Bondholders
To solve for labor’s two endogenous variables (B and LB), we use the same solution
strategy as for the stockholders and obtain
E(U)B =
(
W
ψ
) 1−γ
γ γ
1− γ
(
1 + I
(1 + δ) I
) 1−γ
γ (
1 + δ
1
γ I
1−γ
γ
)
. (3.17)
Bonds or Stocks?
We compare the expected utilities of bondholders and stockholders for γ > 1 and
calibrated values for R and I .3 The disutility from work parameter ψ is assumed to be
3We investigate γ > 1 as this is the empirically relevant range.
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the same for both agents, as well as the discount factor δ. Equating E(U)S to E(U)B
from equation (3.16) and (3.17) yields the risk aversion coefficient γ¯ at which bond
and equity investors are equally well off
(
1 + 1/I
1 + δ
) 1−γ¯
γ¯ (
1 + δ
1
γ¯ I
1−γ¯
γ¯
)
= 1 + δ
1
γ¯ E
[
R1−γ¯
] 1
γ¯ .
Note that γ¯ is solely a non-linear function of δ, I , and R. As it turns out , for γ > 1
the solution for γ¯ is unique.4
Implementation
In order to evaluate the expected utility of stockholders, we first need a specification
for R. We consider two options: (i) a Bernouilli distribution and (ii) a lognormal
distribution. For the former there is an up state and a down state
R =
U > 1 with probability p,D < 1 with probability 1− p. (3.18)
In addition to this, we also assume U > I > 1, reflecting that while the net return on
bonds is positive, it is smaller than the equity return in the good state of the world.
Moreover, we (roughly) base values of the key parameters on stock market data
from January 1871 onwards taken from Robert Shiller’s website.5 In particular, we
assign
U = 1.16,
D = 0.90,
I = 1.02,
such that a good state of the world implies an equity return of 16%, while a bad state
4This has been evaluated numerically.
5http://www.econ.yale.edu/˜shiller/data.htm
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means a 10% drop in the price of stock. In addition, the return on bonds is 2%. The
probability of the positive state of the world (p) is set to 0.65 such that the equity
premium equals 5%.
Our second specification assumes that R is lognormally distributed, with µ = 0.07
and σ2 = 0.03, where the values are again from Robert Shiller. Although not required,
we also assign values to the remaining parameters as follows
W = 4,
ψ = 10.4,
δ = 0.99,
where the value of ψ is taken from Niemann and Pichler (2011) and δ is the usual
choice in calibration exercises, see for example Guvenen (2009, p. 1721). The wage
is arbitrarily chosen, but its effect is limited. As mentioned, these three parameters
only influence the level of utility, they do not have any impact on the choice between
investing in either bonds or stocks. As a result, these parameters do not influence γ¯,
the value of γ where an investor would be indifferent between investing in both asset
types.
Figure 3.1a (3.1b) shows the ratio of expected utilities based on the Bernouilli
(lognormal) distribution specified above. In particular, we compute the expected utility
for investing in bonds and stocks for a range of values for γ > 1 and then divide E(U)B
by E(U)S . Since the expected utilities take on negative values for γ > 1, the relation
between E(U)B and E(U)S is reversed. Hence a value larger than one indicates that
investing in stocks is preferred over investing in bonds (the expected utility of stocks
is less negative than the expected utility of bonds) and vice versa, while a value equal
to one indicates indifference between both types of assets.
Both of the ratios in Figures 3.1a and 3.1b have the shape of a mountain parabola.
Although their shape is similar, note that the scale is slightly different. In particular,
the lognormal distribution exhibits a steeper decline than the Bernouilli distribution. It
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(a) Real equity return follows a Bernoulli dis-
tribution with U = 1.16 and D = 0.90. The
real bond return equals I = 1.02 and the eq-
uity premium is set to 5%.
(b) Real equity return follows a lognormal dis-
tribution with µ = 0.07 and σ2 = 0.03. The
real bond return equals I = 1.02.
Figure 3.1: Ratio of expected utilities based on equations (3.16) and (3.17) against γ under two alter-
native specifications for R, the real equity return. All values are roughly based on annual stock market
data taken from Robert Shiller’s website.
is clear that for low values of γ an investor has a preference for stocks, while for larger
values the preference switches to bonds. AssumingR follows a Bernouilli distribution,
the following two regions can be identified:
• Region I (preference for stocks): γ ∈ (1, 7.52)⇒ E(U)B < E(U)S;
• Region II (preference for bonds): γ ∈ (7.52,∞)⇒ E(U)B > E(U)S .
For γ = 7.52, an investor is indifferent between investing in bonds or stocks.6
In order to infer to which degree our parameter values influence this value of γ¯,
we conduct two sensitivity tests. As we are merely interested in the effect our param-
eter values have on value of risk aversion at which investors are indifferent between
investing n both asset classes, the resulting effect is not always in line with intuition.
The reason is that as one of the parameters varies, the other three are kept fixed. For
example, as will be shown below, if we increase I , γ¯ goes up. From a theoretical
perspective one would argue that as bonds become more attractive, some agents who
6Under the assumption that R is lognormally distributed, γ¯ equals 4.99.
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previously held stocks (those near the former value of indifference) would now prefer
to hold bonds such that indifference value of risk aversion should go down. Note that
this argument runs through the equity risk premium which of course decreases as the
bond return goes up. However, we keep the equity risk premium fixed and hence γ¯
goes up.
In the first experiment, the bond return and equity premium are kept fixed, while
the up and down state of the stock are varied. Figure 3.2a shows the value of γ¯ where
the up and down state vary within the ranges 1.11-1.26 and 0.80-0.95, respectively.
The figure clearly shows that as U goes up, γ¯ goes down, while the break-even value
of γ moves in the same direction as D is increased. Both relationships can be easily
explained by looking at equation (3.16). Regarding the influence of U , note that as
U is increased, both p and U1−γ decrease. Hence pU1−γ decreases, but (1 − p)D1−γ
increases. For our range of values of relative risk aversion, the latter effect dominates
and hence (E [R1−γ])
1
γ increases. However, remember the negative sign of the fraction
γ
1−γ , this implies that E(U)S goes down. In other words, E(U)S becomes more negative
and as E(U)B is unaffected, the value of γ¯ is decreased. Note that this is not a linear
effect due to the nonlinear influence of γ. With respect toD the argument is similar. In
this case the effect on pU1−γ dominates such that (E [R1−γ])
1
γ decreases. As a result,
E(U)S is now less negative so the indifference value of risk aversion increases.
In the second robustness check, the up and down state are kept fixed, while the bond
return and equity premium are varied between 1.01-1.06 and 0.03-0.08, respectively.
Values of risk aversion at which an investor is indifferent between both asset classes for
this setup are presented in Figure 3.2b. Both parameters have similar influences on γ¯.
With respect to the bond return we need to consider both E(U)B and E(U)S . Increasing
I makes the expected utility of bondholders become less negative, but through p, the
probability that the stock is in the up state, the stockholder’s expected utility ‘increases’
even more. As a result there is a larger range of values of γ for which investing in
stocks is more attractive than investing in bonds. Increasing the equity premium, also
through p, only affects E(U)S; it becomes less negative and so in similar spirit to the
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explanation for the bond return, γ¯ increases.
(a) Value of γ¯ under the assumption that I =
1.02 and an equity premium of 5%. The up
and down state of the stock are varied between
1.11-1.26 and 0.80-0.95, respectively.
(b) Value of γ¯ under the assumption that U =
1.16 and D = 0.90. The bond return and
equity premium are varied between 1.01-1.06
and 0.03-0.08, respectively.
Figure 3.2: Impact of U , D, I and the equity premium on the coefficient of relative risk aversion at
which an investor is indifferent between investing in both asset types, based on equations (3.16) and
(3.17) with parameter values arbitrarily chosen.
In sum, assuming that the real equity return is Bernouilli distributed, both sensitiv-
ity tests indicate that for reasonable values of the parameters the break even coefficient
of relative risk aversion has a value in the range between 4 and 9. Values below or
above this range only occur when two parameters take on rather extreme values and
so, from an empirical point of view, have very limited relevance. Note that under the
assumption that R is lognormally distributed we find γ¯ = 4.99, which is within this
range.
3.3 Methodology
This section describes the construction of separate consumption streams for stockhold-
ers and nonstockholders using macroeconomic data. The starting point are the national
income accounts. As shown in Table 3.1, net national disposable income is the sum
of different components. The first item is labor income and subtracting the third item
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from the second item yields capital income. What about components (4) through (7)?
How should these be assigned to capital and labor income?
Table 3.1: Composition net national disposable income
Notes: Modified version of Table 13 of the Annual National Accounts, provided by the OECD. In
particular, net property income is the difference between property income received and property income
paid. The same applies to net social contributions and benefits other than social transfers in kind and
net current transfers. Note that figures are available for the entire economy as well as separately for
households and non-profit institutions serving households. See Appendix 3.A.1 for a full description of
all items.
(1) Compensation of employees
+/+ (2) Gross operating surplus and mixed income
−/− (3) Consumption of fixed capital
+/+ (4) Net property income
+/+ (5) Net social contributions and benefits other than social transfers in kind
+/+ (6) Net other current transfers
−/− (7) Current taxes on income, wealth etc.
Net national disposable income
Assigning components (4)-(7) involves the following two issues. First, one needs
to determine which fraction of each item to assign to equity owners and wage earners.
Second, there is only annual information on these items; implying that either one needs
to work with annual observations or find a way to accurately translate these observa-
tions into quarterly figures. Without further information such an assignment would be
rather arbitrary. In the end we decided to disregard net property income, net social
contributions and benefits other than social transfers in kind, net current transfers and
current taxes on income, wealth etc. in the construction of the income streams. Thus
we propose to construct a quarterly proxy for disposable income based merely on the
first three items. This is fairly rough, but expecting the alternative to be even harder to
justify, we believe it is the best possible solution.
Compensation of employees is available on a stand-alone basis at the quarterly
frequency. This is also the case for gross operating surplus and mixed income, and
the consumption of fixed capital. But for items (2)-(3) the data is not split between
households and non-profit institutions serving households (NPISHs), corporations and
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the general government. However, this distinction is available at the annual frequency.
For this reason we use annual data to assign the percentage that can be attributed to
households and then multiply this percentage with the quarterly series for both compo-
nents. In other words, information is extracted from the annual data in order to assign
part of the quarterly series to households.
The final step is to relate income to consumption. There are basically two ap-
proaches. We could (i) use these income series as a proxy for consumption or (ii)
somehow translate these income figures into consumption streams. The second method
has our preference, since it is well-known that consumption is much smoother than in-
come, see e.g. Campbell and Deaton (1989). As a result, the covariance between
excess returns and income growth is, ceteris paribus, higher vis-a-vis the situation in
which consumption growth is used.
From equation (3.4) it is obvious that a higher covariance translates into a lower
estimate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Also notice that this choice ensures
our estimates of stockholders’ risk aversion are more conservative. Finally, using in-
come as a proxy for spending puts the comparison between the estimates for stock-
holders and nonstockholders on the one hand and the single representative agent spec-
ification (in which consumption is used) on unequal footing. In particular, when the
estimates for equity owners are indeed lower than for the representative agent model
it would not be clear what drives this result. Is it the use of income growth instead
of consumption growth or is the consumption stream of stockholders fundamentally
different?
Hence we choose to relate the two income streams to consumption streams. We
assign aggregate consumption proportional to the share of both production factors in
our proxy of net national disposable income. This ensures that in every quarter all con-
sumption is assigned to either of the two groups and implies that current consumption
is proportional to current income.
In sum, our approach comprises the following steps.
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Step 1 Use data on the composition of net national disposable income for both the
total economy and separately for households to compute annual percentages of
gross operating surplus and mixed income, and consumption of fixed capital that
flows to households;
Step 2 Multiply these percentages with quarterly series on gross operating surplus and
mixed income, and consumption of fixed capital. This provides quarterly series
for gross operating surplus and mixed income, and consumption of fixed capital;
Step 3 Capital income is then formed by net operating surplus and mixed income;
Step 4 Labor income is compensation of employees;
Step 5 Assign consumption proportional to the proxy of net national disposable in-
come (i.e. the sum of capital and labor income described in Steps 3 and 4).
The standard model is derived under the assumption that there is a representative
agent whose utility is defined over aggregate consumption. Hence when empirically
testing the consumption-based CAPM, one uses real aggregate consumption per capita.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no aggregate time series on the number of
stockholders and nonstockholders and hence we cannot put our consumption streams
for both groups in, respectively, per stockholder and per non-stockholder terms.
3.3.1 Drawbacks of the macro approach
There are a number of potential drawbacks of the approach that we follow. First, the
proxy implemented to circumvent the issue of how to assign several components of net
national disposable income to capital and or labor is likely the most debatable since
several important elements of disposable income are disregarded. Nevertheless, the
omitted components do not easily fit within either capital or labor income. This implies
that if these elements are to be considered, they somehow need to be assigned to either
or both of the two categories. As there is no straightforward method to do so, such an
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approach would be arbitrary. Moreover, we believe it would be much harder to justify.
For example, which part of property income belongs to stockholders? Answering
such a question requires detailed information on this type of income. In addition, this
percentage is likely to vary over time, so we actually require a time series. Similar
observations apply to the other components (5)-(7).
Currently we ignore property income, social contributions and benefits other than
social transfers in kind, current transfers and current taxes (see Table 3.1). The motive
is that these items more or less cancel out. Hence, in general, our proxy is reasonably
accurate and the sum of capital income and labor income does not differ much from
net national disposable income of households.
Table 3.2 presents some summary statistics regarding our proxy. Note that national
disposable income of households is only available at the annual frequency, so we take
the sum of our quarterly series of capital and labor income over the year and compare
that to the concept we try to proxy. As can be inferred, the average deviation is rather
small for most countries.7 Notable exceptions are Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands
and Sweden. Moreover, the proxy does not seem to suffer from a large bias in either
direction as we see both negative as well as positive deviations. The variance of these
deviations is also not too high.
In order to check whether the average deviation is low because negative and pos-
itive deviations cancel over time, the next two columns show the average absolute
deviation and its variance. Given the small differences, this does not seem to be the
case.
This of course does not rule out the possibility that although the disregarded items
more or less cancel out, this does not occur within the two consumption streams but
across the streams. However, from the very nature of these four items this does not
seem very likely. For example, stockholders will probably receive more property
income, but because their income and wealth are also higher, they pay more taxes.
7The deviation is computed in nominal terms and relative to net national disposable income for
households.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics proxy
Notes: Obs denotes the number of yearly observations. µˆ(DEV ) and σˆ2(DEV ) denote, respectively,
the mean and variance of the deviation. This deviation is defined as the sum of quarterly capital and
labor income over the year minus the annual value of net national disposable income for households.
µˆ(|DEV |) and σˆ2(|DEV |) denote, respectively, the mean and variance of the absolute values of the
deviation. All columns in percentages.
Country Obs µˆ(DEV ) σˆ2(DEV ) µˆ(|DEV |) σˆ2(|DEV |)
Australia 35 -4.22 4.32 4.22 4.32
Austria 10 3.20 1.88 3.20 1.88
Belgium 10 3.18 6.35 3.45 4.39
Canada 35 -5.21 15.29 5.45 12.64
Czech Republic 9 5.88 10.97 5.88 10.97
Denmark 10 31.66 23.94 31.66 23.94
Finland 15 8.64 14.89 8.64 14.89
France 27 1.66 2.50 1.77 2.10
Germany 10 -3.15 5.77 3.24 5.13
Italy 15 -13.11 1.46 13.11 1.46
Netherlands 15 15.79 6.15 15.79 6.15
Norway 10 9.05 9.58 9.05 9.58
Sweden 10 25.41 15.81 25.41 15.81
Switzerland 10 10.71 2.87 10.71 2.87
United Kingdom 10 -4.90 11.96 5.00 10.84
United States 35 1.01 3.88 1.73 1.83
Moreover, note that it is not the level of consumption that determines the value of the
coefficient of relative risk aversion, it is the second moment of consumption growth
that is paramount.
The same argument also provides an additional justification for our choice to as-
sign consumption proportionally to income, the second issue deserving some more
attention. As long as our proxy does well in capturing the dynamics of both income
streams, the ultimate consumption growth series of both groups will also have the right
dynamics since the proportional assignment causes the consumption streams to inherit
their dynamics from the constructed income streams.
The third point deserving attention is the use of percentages derived from annual
data to assign part of quarterly series to households. Using annual data on both house-
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holds and the total economy allows us to compute the percentage that flows to house-
holds of gross operating surplus and mixed income, and consumption of fixed capital.
This can then be used to assign part of quarterly series to households. This means that
we assume that the percentage is constant throughout the year. Although it is probable
that this assumption does not hold for every time period and country, quarterly per-
centage fluctuations are probably not too large. Moreover, the percentages do change
every year, so we capture any longer-term trend, only fluctuations within the year are
disregarded. Therefore, we believe that the intra year fluctuations have limited influ-
ence on our analysis. The U.S. has quarterly data on gross operating surplus and mixed
income, and consumption of fixed capital that flows to households. Therefore, the dif-
ference between our approach and direct inference can be assessed. Comparing the
results shows very small differences and so we are confident that our approach does
not lead to a noteworthy bias.
Finally, we are not able to put the consumption streams of equity owners and wage
earners in per capita terms. We could use the findings of Poterba and Samwick (1995)
about U.S. stock ownership but this seems to be too much of a stretch since their anal-
ysis is based on three surveys. This implies that a time-series of stock ownership has
to be based on just a few observations. In addition, such a series would be required for
each country. Assuming that there is at least some information, there would probably
be large differences between the surveys, making it hard to compare the estimates of
the coefficient of relative risk aversion cross-country.
How does the per capita issue influence the estimate of γ for both groups? Look-
ing at equation (3.4), it is obvious that it affects the covariance between excess returns
and consumption growth, i.e. the standard deviation of consumption growth and the
correlation between excess returns and consumption growth. In Appendix 3.A.2 we
show how these two terms are affected. One can determine the sign of the effect for the
standard deviation of consumption growth. In particular, the sign depends on the corre-
lation between consumption growth and population growth. If ρ(∆ct+1,∆pt+1) > (<)
0 then the standard deviation of consumption growth increases (decreases) when it is
52 Equity Premium based Risk Aversion of Labor and Capitalists
not considered in per capita terms. Regarding the correlation between excess returns
and consumption growth, the sign cannot be determined and so the effect can be in
either direction. Given that the influence on estimates of the coefficient of relative risk
aversion depends on both terms as well as their relative magnitudes, the ultimate effect
is ambiguous.
3.3.2 Standard errors
Studies about the equity premium puzzle usually only report point estimates of the
coefficient of relative risk aversion.8 To get an idea of the uncertainty surrounding such
an estimate, Pozzi et al. (2010) introduce a simple method to construct standard errors
for estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Moreover, having standard
errors implies that we are able to test whether estimates for both groups are statistically
significantly different. Again, the following is written in general terms but applies to
estimates of γ for all three groups.
This method of constructing standard errors uses the block-jackknife procedure,
see e.g. Shao and Tu (1995). It is easy to implement and it can deal with the serial
correlation that is present in the consumption series of the canonical model, as well
as in our constructed consumption series for both stockholders and nonstockholders.
Let n be the size of the sample, let m denote the number of omitted observations in
a resample and let N denote the number of resamples. Note that the total number of
resamples is N = n−m + 1. To estimate the variance of γˆn, the estimate of γ based
on all observations, one first deletes m subsequent observations at a time and denotes
the new estimate of relative risk aversion by γˆ(i). Then the i-th pseudo value of γˆn,
denoted by γ˜(i), is defined as
[
nγˆn − (n−m)γˆ(i)
]
/m. The resulting vector of pseudo
values across the resamples is used to estimate the variance of γˆn, i.e.
S2γˆn =
m
nN
N∑
i=1
(
γ˜(i) − 1
N
N∑
i=1
γ˜(i)
)2
. (3.19)
8Cecchetti et al. (1993) and Vissing-Jørgenson (2002) are rare exceptions.
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This estimate can then be used to form a country-specific confidence interval (CI)
for γˆn. More specifically, the Quenouille-Tukey mean of the pseudo values, see Shao
and Tu (1995, p. 6), is the bias-corrected version of the estimate of γn and the required
critical value is taken from a t-distribution, with N − 1 degrees of freedom (Miller,
1974).
3.3.3 Pooling
The cross-sectional dimension of our data set allows the computation of pooled estima-
tors for each group, to which we refer as the world coefficient of relative risk aversion
(γw). A priori, there is no reason to assume that the country-specific estimates all
contain the same amount of information. For example sample periods differ between
countries. Therefore using a weighted average seems to be a natural choice. As the
block-jackknife procedure supplies the country-specific sample variances, the optimal
(i.e. unbiased and variance minimizing) weights of Graybill and Deal (1959) can be
used. The optimal weight for country j is defined as
wj =
1/S2γˆn,j∑k
j=1 1/S
2
γˆn,j
, (3.20)
where k denotes the number of countries. Confidence intervals for the pooled estima-
tors are then formed by weighting the country-specific averages of the pseudo values
to get γˆw. It is straightforward to show that the variance of this estimate is given by
S2γˆw =
1∑k
j=1 1/S
2
γˆn,j
. (3.21)
Critical values are taken from a t-distribution with k − 1 degrees of freedom.
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3.4 Data
The methodology described in the previous section is applied to data for a selection of
OECD countries, i.e. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom and the United States. Various data limitations force us to drop the
remaining 18 countries. For Iceland, Luxembourg and the Slovak Republic there is
no suitable equity return data; we also miss vital information for the construction of
the income series of these countries. The latter is also the reason why Chile, Estonia,
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, Slovenia and
Turkey are not included in our analysis. Too few observations leads us to disregard
Greece (only 13 observations), Poland (14) and Spain (18). The start of the sample
period is country-specific, depending on data availability; the end of the timespan is
the final quarter of 2004.
Implementation of our approach requires a large number of time series, both an-
nual as well as quarterly series. If applicable, all series are in local currency. The
annual series are obtained from the database of the OECD. All can be taken from the
simplified non-financial accounts (Table 13) in the Annual National Accounts. We
require gross operating surplus and mixed income, consumption of fixed capital and
net national disposable income. These three series are in current prices and in two
versions: for the total economy, and for households and non profit institutions serving
households (NPISHs).
Some quarterly series are also from the OECD. From the Quarterly National Ac-
counts, the following series are needed: net operating surplus and mixed income, con-
sumption of fixed capital and compensation of employees; all in current prices, the
latter also at quarterly levels. Private final consumption expenditure in constant prices
is also from this source. The Consumer Price Index (all items) is from the Main Eco-
nomic Indicators. For Australia this series is quarterly, for the other countries there is
a monthly index; for these we use the value of the final month of the quarter. All these
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series are taken directly from the OECD database.
Finally, three series are from other sources and obtained through Datastream. Data
to construct the equity return are from Morgan Stanley Capital International. For the
riskfree rate, we use the best proxy available in the International Financial Statistics,
provided by the IMF. When available, the 3-month T-bill rate (line 60C) is used; oth-
erwise a money market rate (line 60B) is selected. Annual mid-year population figures
are also taken from the IFS. Again, more details about the construction of the real
excess return and the transformation of the annual population figures into quarterly
estimates are given in Appendix 2.A.1.
3.5 Results
We first compute the coefficient of relative risk aversion denoted by γ for all three spec-
ifications (i.e. stockholders, nonstockholders and the representative agent) and discuss
the driving force behind the differences in point estimates. In addition, confidence in-
tervals are constructed and we present the pooled estimates. In the second subsection
we follow Campbell (1999) and provide results based on an adjusted relative risk aver-
sion coefficient (denoted by θ) by setting the correlation between consumption growth
and equity returns equal to unity. The argument is that the correlation term on the RHS
of equation (3.4) is difficult to estimate accurately. Confidence intervals and pooled
estimates are also presented for this alternative estimator.
To be able to judge the performance of our heterogeneous agent approach, the
standard model with a single representative agent is also estimated. In order to keep the
comparison fair, consumption growth is used instead of consumption growth per capita
(see the discussion in Section 3.1) The influence on the results for this specification are
quantitatively small and none of the qualitative conclusions are affected.9 This can also
be seen as an indication that not computing the consumption streams of stockholders
9The results of the representative agent specification are shown throughout this entire section; these
can be compared to the results in per capita terms which are given in Appendix 3.A.3.
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and nonstockholders in per recipient terms — one of the drawbacks of our approach
mentioned earlier — does not substantially influence the results.
3.5.1 Coefficient of relative risk aversion
Estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion based on equation (3.4) are pre-
sented in Table 3.3. Consistent with previous research, e.g. Campbell (1999), the
standard single representative agent model (subscript R) provides a wide spectrum
of risk aversion estimates, running from Norway’s estimate of -677 to Austria’s γ of
1084. None of the estimates comes close to the values that are considered plausible.
Coefficient values for stockholders (subscript K) shown in the next column, are in
general closer to zero. With the exception of the Netherlands and the United King-
dom, all values of γ are lower for stockholders than for the representative agent. The
final column reveals that estimates for nonstockholders (subscript L) are both nega-
tive as well as positive. However, remember that there is no a priori reason to believe
that nonstockholders satisfy the first-order condition underlying the Euler equation, so
estimates of γ have no clear interpretation for this group.10
Note that the estimate for the representative agent is in between those for the two
subgroups for 8 out of the 16 countries, recall the discussion of equation (3.5) in Sec-
tion 2. It is worth mentioning that for all countries the average excess return is positive
over the sample period. Hence any negative value for γ is the result of a negative
correlation between excess returns and the respective consumption growth (see Panel
B of Table 3.4 and the discussion later on). This correlation is also the reason why
stockholders for the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have such a high estimate;
their correlation is near zero.
10All estimates of γ are obtained using equation (3.4). Hence for nonstockholders we use excess
returns and the proportion of consumption that is assigned to labor. As there does not seem to be a direct
channel through which equity returns impact nonstockholders’ consumption, the first-order condition
is not likely satisfied. Our two agent model developed in Section 2.1 provides another expression for
labor’s coefficient of relative risk aversion. In this case it has a clear interpretation, but this model is not
empirically implemented.
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Table 3.3: Estimates of risk-aversion coefficient
Notes: Obs denotes the number of observations; γˆ is the estimate of the coefficient of relative risk
aversion based on equation (3.4). Subscripts refer to the three groups: the representative agent (R),
stockholders (K) and nonstockholders (L). Sample periods are country-specific, depending on data
availability; the end of the timespan is the final quarter of 2004.
Country Sample period Obs γˆR γˆK γˆL
Australia 1970Q1 - 2004Q3 139 137.66 23.13 -1135.49
Austria 1995Q2 - 2004Q3 38 1083.51 63.02 -440.54
Belgium 1995Q2 - 2004Q3 38 355.03 152.86 493.34
Canada 1970Q2 - 2004Q3 138 47.78 30.95 50.18
Czech Republic 1996Q2 - 2004Q3 34 -318.12 36.81 -74.79
Denmark 1995Q2 - 2004Q3 38 129.43 108.99 130.38
Finland 1990Q2 - 2004Q3 58 195.38 27.56 2312.13
France 1978Q2 - 2004Q3 106 187.21 54.96 426.42
Germany 1995Q2 - 2004Q3 38 532.32 54.40 -777.71
Italy 1990Q2 - 2004Q3 58 96.22 18.96 -126.26
Netherlands 1990Q2 - 2004Q3 58 156.55 580.14 141.49
Norway 1995Q2 - 2004Q3 38 -676.77 -17.13 127.10
Sweden 1995Q2 - 2004Q3 38 182.62 -3.03 18.16
Switzerland 1995Q2 - 2004Q3 38 734.60 34.40 -821.24
United Kingdom 1995Q2 - 2004Q3 38 74.06 -210.20 61.13
United States 1970Q2 - 2004Q3 138 72.59 40.25 89.04
Our results clearly indicate that estimates for stockholders constitute less of puzzle
in comparison with the results for the representative agent model. What drives this
result? A glance at equation (3.4) reveals that the LHS is equal for all three groups,
so any difference has to come from the only other unknown: the covariance between
excess returns and consumption growth. In particular, it has to be due to (i) higher
standard deviations of consumption growth for stockholders, (ii) higher correlations
between excess returns and consumption growth for stockholders or (iii) a combination
of these two factors.
Table 3.4, Panel A gives the standard deviations of consumption growth for all three
groups. As shown, the consumption growth of stockholders (column 3) is much more
variable than for nonstockholders (column 4). On average, it is approximately a factor
3 higher. Comparing the standard deviations for the representative agent (column 2) on
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one hand and those for the two subgroups on the other hand reveals that, with the ex-
ception of the United States, the estimate is lowest for the representative agent model.
This suggests that the two consumption streama are negatively correlated. The United
States is the only country for which consumption growth of both groups has gone hand
in hand. In all other countries, consumption growth seems to be better characterized
as a zero-sum game: positive consumption growth for stockholders implies negative
consumption growth for nonstockholders and vice versa.
The other possible explanation comes from the correlation between excess returns
and consumption growth as presented in Panel B of Table 3.4. Just like before, there is
no a priori reason to expect the correlation between excess returns and the consumption
growth of nonstockholders to satisfy certain conditions. We do expect the correlation
for stockholders to be higher than for the representative agent because they are the
group whose consumption stream is most likely affected by changes in excess returns.
The results are somewhat mixed. For seven of the countries, the correlation is in-
deed higher for stockholders than for the single agent specification. However, this im-
plies that for the majority of countries (i.e. nine), the correlation is closer to zero, turns
negative or becomes more negative. The negative correlations for Norway, Sweden
and the United Kingdom are difficult to explain from a theoretical perspective. More-
over, the presented correlations for nonstockholders are also occasionally puzzling;
estimates for Sweden and the United Kingdom are even higher than for the represen-
tative agent specification so that for these countries nonstockholders’ consumption is
most linked to asset returns. The most likely explanation for these abstruse results
lies in the suggestion of Campbell (1999), who claims short-term measurement errors
in consumption make the correlation difficult to measure accurately. Therefore, he
also presents results for which this correlation has been set equal to one; an assump-
tion that is also widely used in calibration exercises (e.g. Guvenen, 2009). In the next
subsection we presents results based on this maintained hypothesis.
In sum, for a small majority of the countries the correlation is higher for the repre-
sentative agent model than for stockholders, but in light of the discussion above, one
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should be careful in emphasizing this too much. More importantly, from a quantitative
point of view, it seems to be the higher standard deviation of consumption growth that
drives the lower estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion for stockholders
compared to the representative agent model.
Table 3.4: Standard deviation and correlation
Notes: σˆc is the estimated standard deviation of consumption growth and ρ(exr,c) is the estimated cor-
relation between the excess return and consumption growth. Subscripts refer to the three groups: the
representative agent (R), stockholders (K) and nonstockholders (L). Country-specific sample periods
are given in Table 3.3.
Panel A Panel B
Country σˆcR σˆcK σˆcL ρ(exr,cR) ρ(exr,cK) ρ(exr,cL)
Australia 1.57 7.88 2.36 0.08 0.10 -0.01
Austria 0.83 2.25 0.85 0.04 0.25 -0.10
Belgium 1.07 3.48 1.25 0.12 0.08 0.07
Canada 1.72 7.43 1.91 0.28 0.10 0.24
Czech Republic 1.53 6.01 2.34 -0.07 0.15 -0.19
Denmark 2.35 10.37 2.52 0.17 0.05 0.16
Finland 1.67 8.51 2.27 0.12 0.17 0.01
France 1.13 4.36 1.35 0.17 0.15 0.06
Germany 1.26 6.47 1.73 0.05 0.09 -0.02
Italy 1.46 3.44 1.73 0.10 0.21 -0.06
Netherlands 1.70 6.34 1.90 0.12 0.01 0.11
Norway 2.33 23.64 3.61 -0.02 -0.07 0.06
Sweden 1.25 38.02 5.65 0.19 -0.37 0.42
Switzerland 0.94 7.64 0.99 0.07 0.19 -0.06
United Kingdom 0.95 4.80 1.06 0.26 -0.02 0.29
United States 1.35 3.81 1.29 0.34 0.22 0.29
What is the uncertainty surrounding these point estimates? And are the estimates
of both groups statistically significantly different from each other? To answer these
questions, we apply the block-jackknife method of Pozzi et al. (2010) to construct 95%
confidence intervals for all estimates of γ, where m is set to 4 so that we leave out one
year of information when computing the variances of γˆ. Outcomes are presented in
Table 3.5. As mentioned in Section 3.2, the mean of the pseudo values can be seen
as the bias-corrected relative risk aversion coefficients. For an easier comparison, the
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values of γ are also shown. Comparing both sets of estimates for each of the three
groups reveals that the bias is in general (relatively) small. In addition, the bias is
not in a single direction. For all three groups, the division is almost equal between
positive and negative bias. Interestingly, the bias is always in the same direction for
each country. So when the bias in the estimate for the representative agent model is
positive, it is also positive for the estimates of stockholders and nonstockholders. All
in all, the bias in estimates of γ is not too alarming.
The width of the confidence intervals varies considerably from country to country.
It seems that the standard error is higher if the mean pseudo value (or point estimate)
takes on a more extreme negative or positive value. For example, the mean pseudo
values of nonstockholders for Australia and Finland are the most extreme; they also
have the largest width of all reported confidence intervals. Interestingly, the confidence
interval for the United States is the only one that does not encompass negative values.
Confidence intervals for the estimate of γ for stockholders are the smallest, so besides
the result that the point estimates for this group are lowest, they are also estimated with
the highest precision. Although, as can be inferred from the confidence intervals, the
mean pseudo values (or point estimates) differ considerably between stockholders and
nonstockholders, this difference is not significant at statistically plausible levels. The
confidence intervals are just too wide.
Finally, the standard errors for the country-specific risk aversion coefficients can be
used to construct a pooled estimate, denoted by γw, by weighing individual estimates
with the inverse of their relative uncertainty. The results in Table 3.6 are encouraging
in the sense that the pooled estimate for stockholders is 0.3, hence just below the plau-
sible range of values between one and ten (Mehra and Prescott, 1985). Moreover, the
accompanying 95% confidence interval is rather tight. For nonstockholders the esti-
mate is outside of the plausible range and its confidence interval is less informative.
Recall that if labor has no investment at all the approach does not deliver an estimate
of γ that can be related to the risk aversion of labor. The representative agent model
has the highest estimate as well as the most uncertainty. Combined, these results in-
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62 Equity Premium based Risk Aversion of Labor and Capitalists
dicate that pooling is a very effective way to reduce the uncertainty in the estimate
of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, but not to such a degree that estimates are
statistically different for stockholders and nonstockholders. However, we do find that
the confidence intervals for the representative agent and stockholders do not overlap.
Hence the difference between estimates of relative risk aversion between these two
groups is statistically significant.
Table 3.6: Pooled results
Notes: The pooled estimate of the relative risk aversion coefficient is denoted by γw, using weights
specified according to equation (3.20). The confidence interval uses the square root of equation (3.21)
as standard error and critical value from a t-distribution with k−1 degrees of freedom, where k denotes
the number of countries; see Section 3.3 for more details. Subscripts refer to the three groups: the
representative agent (R), stockholders (K) and nonstockholders (L).
Specification Estimate 95% CI
γˆwR 88.93 41.99 135.87
γˆwK 0.31 -4.75 5.37
γˆwL 29.70 2.59 56.82
3.5.2 Adjusted coefficients of relative risk aversion
As mentioned, Campbell (1999) argues that short-term measurement error in consump-
tion is the reason why the correlation between excess returns and consumption growth
is difficult to measure accurately in the canonical model. To alleviate this problem,
Campbell (1999) sets this correlation at a value of unity and presents estimates of this
adjusted risk-aversion coefficient, which we denote by θ. As this specification allows
us to determine the extent to which the equity premium puzzle is due to the smoothness
of consumption, it offers a method to figure out whether the more variable consump-
tion growth of stockholders is enough to solve the puzzle.
As shown in Table 3.7, this seems to be the case for the majority of the coun-
tries under investigation. In particular, the estimates for Austria (15.7) and Belgium
(12.6) are the only two that do not fall within the plausible range of below 10. The
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remaining estimates of θ for stockholders take on plausible values. This is in sharp
contrast to the adjusted estimates of relative risk aversion for the representative agent
specification. Here the estimate for Italy (9.4) is just below the upper boundary, all
other values are (well) above this threshold. Hence, in line with Campbell (1999), the
standard deviation of consumption growth for the representative agent specification is
not high enough to explain the equity premium puzzle. However, if one separates the
consumption stream of stockholders and nonstockholders, it seems that the variability
of stockholders’ consumption growth is enough to explain the equity premium puzzle
for the large majority of the countries under investigation.
Table 3.7: Estimates of the adjusted risk-aversion coefficient
Notes: θˆ is the estimate of the adjusted coefficient of relative risk aversion based on equation (3.4), but
with the implicit correlation term fixed at a value of unity. Subscripts refer to the three groups: the
representative agent (R), stockholders (K) and nonstockholders (L). Country-specific sample periods
are given in Table 3.3.
Country θˆR θˆK θˆL
Australia 11.56 2.30 7.71
Austria 42.66 15.73 41.80
Belgium 40.99 12.56 34.84
Canada 13.49 3.12 12.16
Czech Republic 21.70 5.53 14.24
Denmark 22.46 5.10 20.99
Finland 23.18 4.54 17.02
France 31.80 8.24 26.68
Germany 23.73 4.61 17.26
Italy 9.37 3.97 7.91
Netherlands 18.03 4.84 16.16
Norway 12.58 1.24 8.12
Sweden 34.03 1.12 7.53
Switzerland 52.81 6.46 50.12
United Kingdom 19.52 3.85 17.50
United States 24.76 8.78 26.07
Our interest is not solely in point estimates. The standard deviation of such esti-
mates is of equal importance. Applying the block-jackknife method to the adjusted
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estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion provides more informative confi-
dence intervals, for two reasons. First, recall the apparent relation between the value of
the estimate and its standard deviation in the sense that more extreme estimates seem
to be accompanied by a higher level of uncertainty. Second, since the correlation be-
tween excess returns and consumption growth is fixed, this term no longer contributes
to the uncertainty associated with the estimate of the adjusted coefficient of relative
risk aversion.
Before judging the uncertainty surrounding these adjusted estimates of the coef-
ficient of relative risk aversion, we first focus our attention towards the possible bias
in these point estimates, see Table 3.8. These results are qualitatively similar to those
presented in Table 3.5. More specifically, (i) the bias is almost as likely positive as
it is negative, (ii) the bias is always in the same direction for all three specifications
and (iii) the direction of the bias corresponds directly to that in Table 3.5, i.e. for 7
countries the bias is negative for all 6 specifications, for the remaining 9 countries, this
bias is always positive. Similarly to the situation with estimates of γ, the confidence
intervals are smaller for stockholders than for the other two specifications and the U.S.
is the only country for which the confidence interval does not contain negative values.
As expected, all confidence intervals are smaller than their counterparts in Table 3.5;
but, again, they do not give rise to significant differences between estimates.
Although estimates of θ are already estimated with higher precision than estimates
of γ, we can reduce this uncertainty even more by pooling all country-specific infor-
mation. Table 3.9 shows that the outcome for the stockholders is very appealing, the
pooled point estimate is 2.3 and its 95% confidence interval is extremely small. The
representative agent specification has an estimate that is just under 20, with a confi-
dence interval that is not too large. In sum, these results show that if the consumption
streams of stockholders and nonstockholders are separated, the correlation between ex-
cess returns and consumption growth is fixed and country-specific estimates are pooled
in an optimal sense, there seems to be a solution to the equity premium puzzle. Notice
that the confidence intervals for stockholders on one hand, and those for the represen-
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tative agent and nonstockholders on the other hand do not overlap, implying that the
pooled estimate of stockholders differ significantly from the other two estimates at the
conventional significance level of 5%.
Table 3.9: Pooled results for the adjusted coefficients
Notes: The pooled estimate of the adjusted risk aversion coefficient is denoted by θˆw, using weights
specified according to equation (3.20). The confidence interval uses the square root of equation (3.21)
as standard error and critical value from a t-distribution with k − 1 degrees of freedom; see Section 3.3
for more details. Subscripts refer to the three groups: the representative agent (R), stockholders (K)
and nonstockholders (L).
Situation Estimate 95% CI
θˆwR 19.670 10.88 28.52
θˆwK 2.33 1.02 3.65
θˆwL 12.99 6.75 19.23
3.6 Conclusion
Unlike previous research that attempts to explain the equity premium puzzle using
the notion of limited stock market participation based on household-level data, our
approach is based exclusively on using macroeconomic data. The greatest advantages
of our approach compared to previous studies is that we have longer timeseries (i.e.
more observations) and given that these data are gathered by the OECD, the results
can be compared more easily across countries.
Despite these benefits, limited stock market participation does not entirely explain
the puzzle. Estimates for stockholders are much more in line with plausible values of
the coefficient of relative risk aversion, so the macro approach does go a long way.
This result is mainly due to the higher standard deviation of consumption growth for
the stockholders group compared to that of nonstockholders and the combination of
these two groups into a single representative agent; the correlation between excess
returns and consumption growth plays at best a modest role.
By using a simple jackknifing method we have been able to construct standard
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errors for these estimates. Although estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion
are lower for stockholders, the difference with risk aversion estimates of the single
representative agent is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, using these country-
specific estimates to compute pooled estimators reduces this uncertainty and provides
encouraging results, i.e. the pooled estimate of stockholders is within the range of
plausible values and differs significantly from the estimate of the representative agent
specification.
Short-term measurement errors in consumption growth imply that the correlation
between this variable and excess returns is easily distorted. This plays a large role in
the conclusion that our approach does not offer a full solution to the puzzle. Following
the suggestion of Campbell (1999) and setting this correlation equal to a value of unity
results in estimates that do not only vary less from country to country, for almost all
countries they are within the range of plausible values. Hence the higher variability
of stockholders’ consumption growth, combined with a fixed value of the correlation
between excess returns and consumption growth, is able to provide a solution to the
equity premium puzzle. Despite their more precise estimation, there is still too much
uncertainty to obtain statistically significant differences between relative risk aversion
estimates for stockholders and nonstockholders. However, when the country-specific
estimates are combined in an optimal way, we are able to draw the conclusion that
the pooled estimate for stockholders is significantly lower than those for the single
representative agent and nonstockholders.
3.A Appendices
3.A.1 Definitions Table 3.1
Compensation of employees Compensation of employees is the total remuneration,
in cash or in kind, payable by an enterprise to an employee in return for work
done by the latter during the accounting period.
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Compensation of employees has two main components:
1. Wages and salaries payable in cash or in kind;
2. The value of the social contributions payable by employers: these may
be actual social contributions payable by employers to Social Security
schemes or to private funded social insurance schemes to secure social
benefits for their employees; or imputed social contributions by employ-
ers providing unfunded social benefits.
Gross operating surplus and mixed income The operating surplus measures the sur-
plus or deficit accruing from production before taking account of any interest,
rent or similar charges payable on financial or tangible non-produced assets bor-
rowed or rented by the enterprise, or any interest, rent or similar receipts receiv-
able on financial or tangible non-produced assets owned by the enterprise.
Note: for unincorporated enterprises owned by households, this component is
called “mixed income”.
Consumption of fixed capital Consumption of fixed capital represents the reduction
in the value of the fixed assets used in production during the accounting period
resulting from physical deterioration, normal obsolescence or normal accidental
damage.
Net property income Property income is the income receivable by the owner of a fi-
nancial asset or a tangible non-produced asset in return for providing funds to or
putting the tangible non-produced asset at the disposal of, another institutional
unit; it consists of interest, the distributed income of corporations (i.e. dividends
and withdrawals from income of quasi-corporations), reinvested earnings on di-
rect foreign investment, property income attributed to insurance policy holders,
and rent.
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Net social contributions & benefits other than social transfers in kind Social con-
tributions are actual or imputed payments to social insurance schemes to make
provision for social insurance benefits to be paid. Social benefits other than so-
cial transfers in kind consist of all social benefits except social transfers in kind;
in other words, they consist of: (a) all social benefits in cash — both social insur-
ance and social assistance benefits — provided by government units, including
social security funds, and NPISHs; and (b) all social insurance benefits provided
under private funded and unfunded social insurance schemes, whether in cash or
in kind.
Net current transfers Other current transfers consist of net premiums and claims
for non-life insurance, current transfers between different kinds of government
units, usually at different levels of government and also between general govern-
ment and foreign governments, and current transfers (i.e. non-financial transfers)
such as those between different households.
Current taxes on income, wealth etc. Most current taxes on income, wealth etc. con-
sist of taxes on the incomes of households or profits of corporations and taxes on
wealth that are payable regularly every tax period (as distinct from capital taxes
levied infrequently).
Net national disposable income National disposable income may be derived from
national income by adding all current transfers in cash or in kind receivable
by resident institutional units from non-resident units and subtracting all current
transfers in cash or in kind payable by resident institutional units to non-resident
units.
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3.A.2 Influence ‘per capita’ streams
The coefficient of relative risk aversion is calibrated according to
γˆ =
Et[ri,t+1 − rf,t+1] + σ2exr2
σ(exr,c)
.
Obviously, consumption only enters the denominator of this expression, so we do not
have to consider how it will affect the numerator. The covariance can be decomposed
as
σ(exr,c) = σexr · σc · ρ(exr,c),
where ρ(exr,c) denotes the correlation between excess returns and real consumption
growth per capita. This shows that we need to determine how not using per capita
terms affects (i) the standard deviation of consumption and (ii) the correlation between
excess returns and consumption.
Standard deviation consumption
For convenience, the derivation will be in terms of the variance instead of standard
deviation. Moreover, we assume that consumption is already in real terms. Using
consumption in nominal terms just adds to the algebra, it does not affect our final
result. The variance of real consumption growth is given by
Var(∆ct+1) = Var(ct+1 − ct),
= Var(ct+1) + Var(ct)− 2 · Cov(ct+1, ct).
Using the fact that ct = log[Ct/Pt], where Ct is real consumption and Pt denotes
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population size, this can be written as
Var(∆ct+1) = Var(log [Ct+1/Pt+1]) + Var(log [Ct/Pt])
− 2 · Cov(log [Ct+1/Pt+1] , log [Ct/Pt]),
= Var(ct+1 − pt+1) + Var(ct − pt)
− 2 · Cov(ct+1 − pt+1, ct − pt),
= Var(ct+1) + Var(pt+1)− 2 · Cov(ct+1, pt+1) + Var(ct)
+ Var(pt)− 2 · Cov(ct, pt)− 2 · Cov(ct+1, ct) (3.22)
+ 2 · Cov(ct+1, pt) + 2 · Cov(pt+1, ct)− 2 · Cov(pt+1, pt).
When consumption growth is not denoted in per capita terms (labeled ∆c∗t+1), this
expression boils down to
Var(∆c∗t+1) = Var(ct+1) + Var(ct)− 2 · Cov(ct+1, ct). (3.23)
The difference between equations (3.22) and (3.23) is given by
Var(∆c∗t+1)− Var(∆ct+1) = −Var(pt+1)− Var(pt) + 2 · Cov(pt+1, pt)
+ 2 · Cov(∆ct+1,∆pt+1).
Using that Var(pt+1) ≈ Var(pt) and Cov(pt+1, pt) ≈ Var(pt) allows us to approximate
this expression by
Var(∆c∗t+1)− Var(∆ct+1) ≈ 2 · Cov(∆ct+1,∆pt+1).
Thus the difference is approximately equal to two times the covariance between
real consumption growth and population growth; implying that the sign is determined
by their correlation. In particular, if ρ(∆ct+1,∆pt+1) > (<) 0 then the variance of con-
sumption growth increases (decreases) when it is not considered in per capita terms.
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Correlation excess returns and consumption
Unfortunately there is no simple expression that shows the difference between the
correlation terms. In per capita terms, the correlation equals
ρ(exrt,∆ct+1) = ρ(exrt, ct+1 − ct)
= ρ(exrt, ct+1 − pt+1 − ct + pt)
=
Cov(exrt, ct+1 − pt+1 − ct + pt)√
Var(exrt)
√
Var(ct+1 − pt+1 − ct + pt)
. (3.24)
In case population growth is disregarded, it is given by
ρ(exrt,∆c
∗
t+1) =
Cov(exrt, ct+1 − ct)√
Var(exrt)
√
Var(ct+1 − ct)
.
The difference, after decomposing the covariance in equation (3.24) and rewriting, is
given by
ρ(exrt,∆c
∗
t+1)− ρ(exrt,∆ct+1) = ρ(exrt,∆ct+1)−
ρ(exrt,∆ct+1)
√
Var(∆ct+1)√
Var(∆ct+1 −∆pt+1)
+
ρ(exrt,∆pt+1)
√
Var(∆pt+1)√
Var(∆ct+1 −∆pt+1)
.
As there is no way to split the denominator of the second and third term, the ex-
pression for the difference cannot be simplified any further. It is also not possible to
determine the sign of the expression a priori. The reason is that the sign depends on the
sign of the two correlation terms as well as the relative magnitudes of all terms in this
expression. Hence, the effect on the correlation can not be determined analytically.
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Table 3.11: Pooled results
Notes: The pooled estimate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion is denoted by γwR† , and the
pooled estimate of the adjusted risk aversion coefficient is denoted by θˆwR† . Both use weights specified
according to equation (3.20). The confidence interval uses the square root of equation (3.21) as standard
error and critical value from a t-distribution with k − 1 degrees of freedom; see Section 3.3 for more
details. The subscript (R) refers to the representative agent and the (†) indicates that these results are
based on consumption growth per capita.
Situation Estimate 95% CI
γˆwR† 88.01 41.61 134.40
θˆwR† 19.64 10.85 28.43
Chapter 4
A Better Risk-free Rate Proxy, a
Larger Equity Premium Puzzle
4.1 Introduction
In the realm of macroeconomics and financial economics, the equity premium puzzle
remains one of the most intriguing empirical observations. The notion that one needs
a (very) high coefficient of relative risk aversion in order to explain the difference
between stock returns and bond returns in a consumption based asset pricing model
has been at the cradle of a huge literature about the subject. Where previous studies
have predominantly focused on trying to offer a resolution to this puzzle, this paper
shows that the puzzle may be even larger than previously anticipated.
The novelty in our approach is that it uses data which have never been applied in
this context before. One of the necessary series to estimate the coefficient of relative
risk aversion is the risk-free rate. While other parts of the model, such as the functional
form of the utility function, have received much attention, the same cannot be said
about the risk-free rate. Most studies using U.S. data choose the 3-month T-bill rate to
represent the risk-free rate. However, it is questionable whether such an asset is indeed
the best proxy of a risk-free asset for the typical consumer. For the average investor,
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holding T-bills directly was too costly. According to the U.S. Bureau of Public Debt,
the minimum purchase of Treasury bills, notes and bonds has been $ 10,000 until
August 9, 1998. From August 10, 1998 until April 6, 2008 it was $ 1000. From April
7, 2008 until now it is $ 100. Hence although this latter threshold will not deter retail
investors too much from buying U.S. debt, the $ 10,000 threshold that has been in
effect for much of the previous century has meant that average investors have not been
able to directly purchase Treasury bills to hold in their portfolio.
The 1970s saw the birth of money market mutual funds as a way for U.S. retail
investors to indirectly hold U.S. government debt. Due to the large amounts of money
these funds invest on behalf of their clients, this might be seen as evidence that savings
deposits are losing importance. Recent evidence by the International Monetary Fund
(International Monetary Fund, 2010) shows that this is not the case. As recent as
2008, the total amount of outstanding bank deposits was still twice as high as total net
assets of money market mutual funds. For other developed nations, this ratio is (much)
higher. In Europe money market mutual funds are predominantly used by institutional
investors. Moreover, money market funds’ holdings for the area as a whole are small
relative to banks retail deposits (around 8 percent). Part of the reason is that some
of the incentives to move from deposits to money market funds investments that are
present in the U.S. (such as higher reserve requirements and no interest payable on
demand deposits) are absent in the European financial system. Hence although such
funds may have a central role in the U.S. financial system, this is not the case in other
developed countries such as the U.K., Japan and Australia as well as those located in
Europe. As a result, for inhabitants of these countries, it is still more of a challenge to
directly hold short-term government debt.
It seems that some kind of return on a savings account (or time deposit) is much
closer to the ‘asset reality’ a household is faced with. A recent study by the Investment
Company Institute and the Securities and Financial Markets Association (Investment
Company Institute, 2008) provides evidence supporting this view. In 2008, nearly
half (47%) of U.S. households held bonds as well as equities. Nearly two-thirds of
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these households hold bonds, so this evidence suggests that the proportion of bond
ownership in the U.S. is approximately 30%. The survey results also seem to suggest
that 88% of those who own equity or bonds also hold a bank deposit account. More
importantly, of the non-owners, 60% has a bank deposit account. Finally, less than one
out of five U.S. households only hold equities or bonds outside of employer-sponsored
retirement plans. We are most interested in those holding equities or bonds outside of
such a plan since they are most likely to change consumption in response to asset price
changes. Therefore the percentage of 30% mentioned just above should probably be
seen as the upper threshold. In sum, at least in the U.S., the proportion of households
holding government bonds is likely to be less than 30%, while the ownership of a bank
deposit account is at least twice as likely.
Such survey information does not seem to be readily available for other countries.
As the proportion of the population that invests in bonds does not likely differ substan-
tially between advanced countries, we feel the U.S. evidence is representative for other
developed nations as well. With respect to the percentage of the people having access
to a savings account, we feel it is justified to take the survey results of Investment
Company Institute (2008) as a lower bound. It is well-known that the U.S. has a low
savings rate compared to other developed nations, and so one would expect a higher
proportion of inhabitants of other developed countries to have a bank deposit account.
Thus for countries other than the U.S., a savings rate would be even closer to the ‘asset
universe’ a typical household is faced with.
The interest rate paid on deposits is in general lower than the rate governments pay
on their short-term debt. Consequently, the excess return when using a deposit rate as
the risk-free rate is higher. This implies that, ceteris paribus, the coefficient of relative
risk aversion will increase and hence the equity premium puzzle will be even larger.
This hypothesis is generally supported by data from a selection of OECD countries.
On average, estimates of relative risk aversion when using a deposit rate instead of a
T-bill rate are approximately 40% higher. The only developed countries for which the
opposite is true are Australia and the U.S.; for these two nations the deposit rate seems
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to be higher than the short-term government debt rate, so coefficients of relative risk
aversion are lower. While puzzling at first sight, the explanations are straightforward.
Regarding Australia, the solution lies in one of the characteristics of the deposit rate.
Unlike other countries, deposits at Australian financial institutions are not risk-free and
so the deposit rates carry an implicit default premium. The explanation for the U.S.
lies in the definition of the deposit rate: instead of a proper deposit rate, there is only
information on a certificates of deposit rate. As these are deposits with a fixed term (up
to five years) that are intended to be held to maturity, they pay a higher interest rate than
savings accounts from which the money may be withdrawn on demand. Subsequent
analysis using alternative data on Australian deposit rates points in the same direction,
but as these rates also carry a default premium, all results pertaining to Australian data
should be interpreted with care. For the U.S., using an alternative deposit rate results in
an higher estimate of relative risk aversion. In sum, for the overwhelming majority of
developed nations, the equity premium puzzle is larger under deposit rates than under
T-bill rates.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the
canonical model. The third section explains our choice of the risk-free rate and com-
pares it with the standard proxy. In addition, we briefly explain a jackknife approach
for the purpose of obtaining standard errors and discuss how these estimates can be
used to efficiently pool information. Data are discussed in Section 4.4. In particular,
the impact of changing the risk-free rate is tested on three sets of data: a selection
of OECD countries, other proxies for individual countries using national sources and
monthly U.S. data. Section 4.5 presents the results, i.e. we show how estimates of
the coefficient of relative risk aversion differ for the two risk-free rates in the three
situations identified just above. The final section concludes and offers suggestions for
future research.
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4.2 Model
The canonical framework, (Grossman and Shiller, 1981; Hansen and Jagannathan,
1991; Cochrane and Hansen, 1992), assumes the existence of a representative investor
who has a time-separable utility function defined over aggregate consumption. Under
these assumptions, the Euler equation reads
1 = Et[Rt+1δ(Ct+1/Ct)
−γ]. (4.1)
HereR is the gross return on an asset, δ is the subjective discount factor, C is aggregate
consumption and γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Next, following Hansen
and Singleton (1983), the simplifying assumption is made that asset returns and ag-
gregate consumption are jointly conditionally lognormally distributed with constant
variance. Taking logs of equation (4.1) and rewriting leads to
Etrt+1 = − log δ + γEt∆ct+1 − σ
2
r + (γσc)
2 − 2γσ(r,c)
2
. (4.2)
Small case letters denote logarithms; σ2r and σ
2
c are, respectively, the unconditional
variance of log returns and consumption innovations and σ(r,c) is their unconditional
covariance. Consider the implications of equation (4.2) for a riskless real asset. Obvi-
ously, the variance of its returns and its covariance with any random variable are zero,
implying that the riskless real interest rate obeys
rft+1 = − log δ + γEt∆ct+1 − (γσc)
2
2
. (4.3)
Combining equations (4.2) and (4.3) gives
Et[ri,t+1 − rft+1] + σ
2
exr
2
= γσ(exr,c). (4.4)
Equation (4.4) shows that expected excess returns of equity are equal to the amount
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of risk aversion times the covariance between consumption growth and excess returns
minus a correction factor (i.e. a Jensen inequality term arising as we are using ex-
pectations of log returns). This expression permits a calibration of the risk aversion
parameter γ from estimates of all three moment conditions.
These moments also take center stage in explaining why there is an equity pre-
mium puzzle. On the left-hand side is (i) the expected excess return which for almost
all countries is rather high over an extended period of time and (ii) a half times the
variance of this excess return. On the right-hand side is the covariance between ex-
cess returns and consumption growth. It is empirically well-known that consumption
growth is very smooth. As a result, this covariance is rather small. Hence the only way
for this equation to hold is through a (very) high value of γ, i.e. the equity premium
puzzle.
Estimates of the relative risk aversion coefficient vary substantially across countries
and sample periods — sometimes estimates even have a negative sign, implying risk-
loving behavior — but values above 50 are not uncommon. Such a value is puzzling
as it is irreconcilable with micro-based evidence derived from individual choice under
uncertainty. Mehra and Prescott (1985) already argue than values above 10 are im-
plausible; for an illuminating example using a simple lottery, see Mankiw and Zeldes
(1991).
4.3 Methodology
Existing research proposing resolutions to the equity premium puzzle have looked
at for example limited stock market participation (e.g. Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991;
Vissing-Jørgenson, 2002), incomplete markets and transaction costs (Aiyagari, 1993),
and adjusting the utility function (e.g. Epstein and Zin, 1989; Campbell and Cochrane,
1999). Our modification to the model is of a different nature. To the best of our
knowledge, the 3-month T-bill rate is almost always used as a proxy for the risk-free
rate. The reason for this choice is likely twofold. First, the T-bill rate is widely used
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in applied work as (a proxy for) the risk-free rate. Second, the maturity of this asset
matches the quarterly frequency at which detailed information regarding consumption
is available in countries’ national accounts.
We propose to use a savings rate as a proxy for the risk-free rate instead. In partic-
ular, a deposit rate.1 The primary reason is that this rate is more closely related to the
assets households have access to. As outlined in the introduction, there do not seem to
be many households that directly hold government debt, while most of us have some
kind of savings account at a financial institution. So, from the average household’s
perspective, this is a more natural proxy for the risk-free rate. The majority of savings
account holders do not have a balance exceeding the deposit guarantee, so for them the
savings account rate is not just a proxy, it is the actual risk-free rate.2
4.3.1 Standard errors
Studies about the equity premium puzzle usually only report the point estimates of the
coefficient of relative risk aversion. To get an idea of the uncertainty surrounding such
an estimate, Pozzi et al. (2010) introduce a simple method to construct standard errors
for estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
This method uses the block-jackknife procedure, see e.g. Shao and Tu (1995). The
main reasons are that it is easy to implement and it can deal with the serial correlation
that seems to be present in the consumption series. Let n be the size of the sample,
let m denote the number of omitted observations in a resample and let N denote the
number of resamples. Note that the total number of resamples is N = n−m + 1. To
estimate the variance of γˆn, the estimate of γ based on all observations, one first deletes
m subsequent observations at a time and denotes the new estimate of the risk aversion
coefficient by γˆ(i). Then the i-th pseudovalue of γˆn, denoted by γ˜(i), is defined as[
nγˆn − (n−m)γˆ(i)
]
/m. The resulting vector of pseudovalues across the resamples
1Definitions vary from country to country, but it predominantly refers to a 3-month deposit.
2As mentioned in the introduction, this is not the case for Australia.
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is used to estimate the variance of γˆn, i.e.
S2γˆn =
m
nN
N∑
i=1
(
γ˜(i) − 1
N
N∑
i=1
γ˜(i)
)2
. (4.5)
This estimate can then be used to form a country-specific confidence interval for
γˆn. More specifically, the Quenouille-Tukey mean of the pseudovalues, see Shao and
Tu (1995, p. 6), is the bias-corrected version of the estimate of γn and the required
critical value is taken from a t-distribution, with N − 1 degrees of freedom (Miller,
1974).
4.3.2 Pooling
The cross-sectional dimension of our data set allows the computation of pooled es-
timators for both proxies, to which we refer as the world coefficient of relative risk
aversion (γw). A priori, there is no reason to assume that the information contained
in the country-specific estimates is equal, so using a weighted average seems to be a
natural choice. As the block-jackknife procedure supplies the country-specific sample
variances, the optimal (i.e. unbiased and variance minimizing) weights of Graybill and
Deal (1959) can be used. These are defined as
wj =
1/S2γˆn,j∑k
j=1 1/S
2
γˆn,j
, (4.6)
where k denotes the number of countries. Confidence intervals for the pooled estima-
tors are then formed by weighting the country-specific averages of the pseudo values
to get γˆw. It is straightforward to show that the variance of this estimate is given by
S2γˆw =
1∑k
j=1 1/S
2
γˆn,j
. (4.7)
Critical values are taken from a t-distribution with k − 1 degrees of freedom.
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4.4 Data
The above model and methodology is applied to a selection of OECD countries. Most
studies concerning the equity premium puzzle use U.S. data but it is well-known that
the U.S. savings rate is quite low. In contrast, European citizens tend to save a larger
proportion of their income. Using data from a number of developed countries can de-
termine whether the difference in risk aversion estimates between the two proxies is
related to a country’s saving behavior. In addition, Australia and New Zealand have
data on alternative deposit rates, we investigate their impact as well. The main draw-
back is that the number of observations in these analyses is limited since consumption
is only available at the quarterly frequency. In contrast, the U.S. has monthly con-
sumption data. Therefore, we also estimate the model using monthly U.S. data, taken
from national sources.
4.4.1 Selection of OECD countries
The selection of OECD countries consists of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the
United States. Various data limitations force us to drop the remaining 14 countries. For
Iceland, Luxembourg and the Slovak Republic there is no suitable equity return data;
Denmark misses data on the deposit rate. The four countries that joined the OECD in
2010 (Chile, Estonia, Israel and Slovenia) do not have data on consumption and in-
flation. Too few observations leads us to disregard Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Mexico,
Portugal and Turkey. The start of the sample period is country-specific, depending on
data availability; the end of the timespan is restricted to the final quarter of 2008. Since
consumption and population series are often revised until a few years after initial pub-
lication, the sample period is restricted to ensure only final values enter the empirical
investigation.
Data for this part are taken from three sources, but all are obtained through Datas-
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tream. First, private final consumption expenditure (in constant prices) is taken from
the Quarterly National Accounts of the OECD. The Consumer Price Index (all items)
is from the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators.3 For Australia and New Zealand this
series is quarterly, for the other countries there is a monthly index; for these we use
the value of the final month of the quarter. Second, data to construct the equity return
are from Morgan Stanley Capital International. In particular, we use the monthly total
return and price index for the ‘Standard Country’ type in local currency units. Finally,
the risk-free rates are taken from the International Financial Statistics, provided by the
IMF. The deposit rate (line 60L) is readily available, for the standard risk-free rate the
3-month T-bill rate (60C) is selected; if this series is not available we use the money
market rate (line 60B) instead. Annual mid-year population figures (line 99Z) are also
taken from the IFS. Again, more details about the construction of the real excess re-
turn and the transformation of the annual population figures into quarterly estimates
are given in Appendix 2.A.1.
4.4.2 Australia and New Zealand
Australia and New Zealand have data on alternative deposit rates as well. The former
has the most extensive data on deposit rates of any developed nation. In total, the
Royal Bank of Australia has information on 12 types of deposit accounts (acronyms in
parentheses)4: (i) Banks’s bonus savings accounts (BSA), (ii) Online savings accounts
(OSA), (iii) Cash management accounts at banks (CM1), (iv) Cash management ac-
counts at banks (minimum balance of AUD 50,000; CM5), (v) Cash management trusts
(CMT), (vi) Banks’ term deposits for 1 month (T1M), (vii) Banks’ term deposits for
3 months (T3M), (viii) Banks’ term deposits for 6 months (T6M), (ix) Banks’ term
deposits for 1 year (T1Y), (x) Banks’ term deposits for 3 years (T3Y), (xi) Banks’
term deposits, average rate (all terms; TAN) and (xii) Banks’ term deposits, average
3Note that this implies that our results are independent of the measure of inflation used to make the
nominal interest rates real. Of course, they still depend on the implicit deflator used in the computation
of consumption denoted in constant prices.
4All have minimum balance of AUD 10,000; unless indicated otherwise.
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‘special’ rate (all terms; TAS).
The Royal Bank of New Zealand keeps track of only one series, i.e. the interest
paid for a new six month term deposit of $ 10,000 (TDR). For both countries, the other
series are are identical to those used in the first part of the empirical investigation.
4.4.3 Monthly U.S. data
The U.S. is the only country that has data on consumption at a monthly frequency,
which allows us to benefit from the increase in the number of observations. The first
category of data is macroeconomic, i.e. real consumption per capita and inflation.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has monthly data on total consumption in
chained dollars, but we are interested in real nondurables and services consumption.
Hence we compute this series ourselves using the ‘divisia approximation’ as explained
in Whelan (2002, p. 225). This method requires data on total consumption and durable
goods consumption in threefold: nominal terms, the price indices and in chained dol-
lars. The resulting real nondurables and services consumption is divided by monthly
population estimates, also provided by the BEA. An implicit price deflator is then con-
structed by using data on nominal nondurables and services consumption and its newly
created chained dollars counterpart.
Financial data comprise the second category of data. In particular, we require
an equity return and a risk-free rate. For the former, the monthly log return on the
S&P Composite Index is used; this series is provided by CRSP. As mentioned, we
use and contrast two different proxies for the risk-free rate. The first is the standard
3-month T-bill rate, taken from FRED. For the interest rate on savings deposits, we use
the average interest rate on savings deposits, provided by BankRate Monitor. As an
additional check, we also use the deposit rate (i.e. certificate of deposit rate) supplied
by the IMF. A more detailed description of the data is given in Appendix 4.A.1.
86 A Better Risk-free Rate Proxy, a Larger Equity Premium Puzzle
4.5 Results
This section discusses the results of using the two proxies for the risk-free rate. First,
the focus is on the group of OECD countries. Here we compute standard errors for
the coefficient of relative risk aversion and then use these statistics to compute the
optimally weighted pooled estimators. Hereafter we discuss the outcomes of using
alternative deposit rates of Australia and New Zealand. Finally, we contrast three
proxies using monthly U.S. data.
4.5.1 Selection of OECD countries
Before discussing the effect that our different risk-free rate has on estimates of the
coefficient of relative risk aversion, it might be insightful to first show how the two
proxies relate to each other. As shown in Table 4.1, the average deposit rate is lower
than the average T-bill rate for most countries. Given that monetary financial institu-
tions pay the deposit rate and earn the T-bill rate on some of their investments, this
is what one expects to see. There are only two exceptions: Australia and the United
States. Although puzzling at first sight, there is a straightforward explanation for both
countries. First, deposits at an Australian Authorized Deposit-taking Institution are not
risk-free, i.e. unlike other countries, there is no explicit guarantee on deposits. This
has only been introduced in late 2008. Hence for the sample period in question, the
deposit rate cannot be seen as a risk-free rate for households as it contains an implicit
default premium. With respect to the U.S., the explanation also lies in the characteri-
zation of the deposit rate. In contrast to the other countries included in this analysis,
there is no U.S. savings deposit rate available. The closest substitute is an average cer-
tificate of deposit rate of term deposits up to five years. This is much longer than other
countries’ rates which are based on three-month fixed term deposits or deposits than
can be withdrawn at notice. Therefore, the U.S. deposit rate carries a term premium.
In sum, results for both countries should be interpreted with care.
In addition, besides the lower average, the deposit rates also show the least amount
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of variability; i.e. there seems to be a correspondence between lower averages and
lower standard deviations. Taken together, these results already suggest that using the
deposit rate as the risk-free rate instead of the T-bill rate will increase the coefficients
of relative risk aversion and hence lead to a larger equity premium puzzle. The reason
is simple. Notice that the left-hand side of equation (4.4) consists of two terms. With
respect to the first term it is easy to see that a lower risk-free rate implies a higher
excess return. There is no clear distinction between the variance of the excess returns
under the two competing proxies, they are almost as often higher under the T-bill rate
as vice versa. However, the differences are very small (the largest value is 0.015 for
Korea) so this second term is clearly dominated by the first term. Hence the left-hand
side of equation (4.4) is higher under the deposit rate. Since it is well-known that
consumption growth is smooth, the covariance will not be affected much and so the
right-hand sides will be more or less equal for both proxies. It then follows that relative
risk aversion is expected to be higher under the deposit rate than under the T-bill rate.
Estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion based on equation (4.4) are
shown in Table 4.2. Note that the sample period is country-specific, depending on
data availability. The second and third column present the excess returns (plus half of
the variance) for both proxies of the risk-free rate, where the subscripts refer to the
deposit rate (D) and the T-bill (or money market) rate (T ). Comparing the numbers in
both columns reveals that the choice of risk-free rate generally has a limited influence
(the average difference is 124 basis points), but for some countries the difference is
substantial. Another striking feature is that for Australia and the United States, the
excess return under the T-bill rate is higher than under the deposit rate; a result in line
with the outcomes presented in Table 4.1.
Given that the excess return is the numerator in the fraction that determines the
coefficient of relative risk aversion, one expects a higher excess return to be associated
with a larger value of γ and this is indeed the case. For Australia and the United States
the coefficient of relative risk aversion is higher under the T-bill rate (column 5) than
under the deposit rate (column 4), and vice versa for the other countries. On average,
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics risk-free rate proxies
Notes: Obs is the number of observations. µ and σ denote, respectively, the average and standard
deviation. Subscripts refer to the applied risk-free rate: D for the deposit rate, T for the T-bill (or
money market) rate. All statistics in annualized percentages. The standard deviation is the square root
of the sample variance. Sample periods are country-specific, depending on data availability. Due to
revisions in consumption and population figures, the sample period is restricted to 2008Q4. Average is
the simple cross-country arithmetic average.
Country Sample period Obs µD σD µT σT
Australia 1972Q4 - 2008Q3 144 9.11 4.61 8.54 3.77
Austria 1988Q2 - 2000Q3 50 2.69 0.70 5.68 2.45
Belgium 1995Q2 - 2003Q4 35 2.82 0.67 3.35 0.72
Canada 1971Q2 - 2008Q3 150 5.78 3.80 7.13 3.82
Czech Republic 1996Q2 - 2008Q2 49 3.29 2.53 5.49 3.96
Finland 1990Q2 - 1997Q4 31 4.61 2.31 7.92 4.28
France 1978Q2 - 2008Q3 122 4.52 1.83 7.13 4.05
Germany 1977Q3 - 2003Q2 104 4.76 2.14 5.25 2.20
Italy 1983Q2 - 2003Q4 83 6.00 3.28 9.32 4.44
Japan 1980Q2 - 2008Q3 114 1.74 1.64 2.16 2.15
Korea 1988Q1 - 2008Q3 83 7.72 2.75 9.07 5.09
Netherlands 1988Q2 - 2008Q3 82 3.29 0.68 4.53 2.30
New Zealand 1990Q2 - 2008Q3 74 6.90 1.69 7.12 2.02
Norway 1986Q3 - 2008Q3 89 6.33 3.12 7.51 4.17
Poland 1995Q2 - 2006Q4 47 11.06 7.37 12.95 7.06
Spain 1995Q2 - 2003Q1 32 3.65 1.81 4.78 2.07
Sweden 1980Q2 - 2006Q2 105 6.25 3.97 8.11 4.31
Switzerland 1981Q2 - 2008Q3 110 3.15 2.52 3.28 2.44
United Kingdom 1970Q1 - 1998Q4 116 7.83 3.46 9.36 3.02
United States 1970Q1 - 2008Q3 155 6.59 3.35 5.82 2.95
Average 5.40 2.71 6.72 3.36
the difference in estimates is close to 40%. Also notice the large variability in esti-
mates across countries, a feature that is in line with previous research (e.g. Campbell,
1999). Looking at the values of γ under the T-bill rate, the equity premium puzzle
is prominent. The sole exception is Korea, where the value of 9.5 is still within the
plausible range. New Zealand’s estimate is even lower but has a negative sign, which
would imply risk-loving behavior. Note that these low values are the result of the ex-
tremely low average excess return. The closer this statistic is to zero, the smaller the
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resulting relative risk aversion coefficient, see equation (4.4).
Table 4.2: Estimates of relative risk aversion coefficient
Notes: aeRe is the is the average excess log return on the MSCI index over the risk-free rate plus one
half of the variance of this excess return. The estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion is denoted
by γˆ. Subscripts refer to the applied risk-free rate: D for the deposit rate, T for the T-bill (or money
market) rate. See Table 4.1 for country-specific sample periods. Average is the simple cross-country
arithmetic average.
Country Obs aeReD aeReT γˆD γˆT
Australia 144 4.60 5.13 189.53 221.05
Austria 50 8.40 5.58 300.44 199.35
Belgium 35 8.90 8.37 285.54 267.69
Canada 150 5.84 4.57 63.47 48.67
Czech Republic 49 16.46 14.45 -1496.98 -1574.62
Finland 31 16.43 13.25 277.38 174.02
France 122 10.27 7.81 190.52 139.97
Germany 104 6.61 6.13 209.28 198.07
Italy 83 8.63 5.57 268.61 162.52
Japan 114 5.15 4.74 92.74 87.77
Korea 83 7.01 5.89 11.40 9.59
Netherlands 82 8.24 7.02 266.05 216.74
New Zealand 74 0.16 -0.09 2.97 -1.67
Norway 89 7.12 5.98 773.85 477.52
Poland 47 8.59 7.00 101.23 77.09
Spain 32 13.69 12.55 186.66 170.98
Sweden 105 17.00 15.27 973.18 660.32
Switzerland 110 9.11 8.95 595.30 589.31
United Kingdom 116 9.01 7.60 104.41 87.18
United States 155 4.39 5.09 55.77 65.49
Average 8.78 7.54 172.57 113.85
Given the one-to-one correspondence between the average excess returns and the
coefficients of relative risk aversion, the standard deviation of the excess return and
the correlation between consumption growth and the excess return do not seem to in-
fluence the results much. This is verified by Table 4.3. There is no clear distinction
between the standard deviations of the two excess returns across countries, they are
almost as often higher under the deposit rate than under the T-bill rate and vice versa.
Moreover, the differences are relatively small and hence do not affect the estimate of
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γ to any considerable extent. The same is true for the correlations. They are pre-
dominantly more or less equal and when there is a difference it does not exceed 0.02.
Therefore, the covariances between consumption growth and excess returns are close
to each other, the average difference is less than 0.24, which is small compared to the
difference between the average excess returns.
These numbers also show what drives the low values of relative risk aversion for
Korea. Compared to the other countries, Korea’s excess return under both specifi-
cations displays the highest degree of variability. In addition, the correlations be-
tween consumption growth and the excess returns are also (much) higher than for
other OECD countries. As a result, the covariances between consumption growth and
the excess returns are much larger, as indicated by the final two columns of Table 4.3.
Hence for all countries the difference in estimates of γ between the two proxies
for the risk-free rate is predominantly driven by differences in average excess returns
(i.e. the numerator). Sometimes the covariance in the denominator has the opposing
effect, but due to the small relative differences, this does not exert much influence on
the value of relative risk aversion.
In order to infer the degree of precision with which coefficients of relative risk
aversion are estimated, Table 4.4 presents the mean of the pseudovalues and the 95%
confidence intervals. In line with the results in Pozzi et al. (2010) and De Vries and
Zenhorst (2012), we obtain evidence that the mean pseudovalues are occasionally far
removed from the value of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, but at the same
time some country-specific γ’s only seem to suffer from a marginal bias. The standard
deviations are substantial and hence the confidence intervals are in general wide.
As discussed in Section 3.2, the sample variances of the country-specific esti-
mates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion can be used to construct an optimally
weighted pooled estimator. As Panel A of Table 4.5 shows, the pooled estimators dif-
fer substantially. When one focuses solely on these point estimates, it appears that
risk aversion estimates are indeed larger under the deposit rates than under the T-
bill rates. The country-specific results in Table 4.2 also support this point of view.
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Table 4.3: Standard deviations, correlations and covariances
Notes: The standard deviation of the excess return is denoted by σexr, the correlation between the
excess return and consumption growth is denoted by ρ and cov is the covariance between these two
series. Subscripts refer to the applied risk-free rate: D for the deposit rate, T for the T-bill (or money
market) rate. See Table 4.1 for country-specific sample periods. Average is the simple cross-country
arithmetic average.
Country σ(exr,D) σ(exr,T ) ρD ρT covD covT
Australia 20.40 20.41 0.08 0.07 2.43 2.32
Austria 26.18 26.15 0.24 0.24 2.80 2.80
Belgium 23.43 23.43 0.16 0.16 3.12 3.13
Canada 17.14 17.16 0.34 0.34 9.20 9.38
Czech Republic 24.86 25.13 -0.03 -0.02 -1.10 -0.92
Finland 34.10 34.30 0.08 0.10 5.92 7.62
France 22.48 22.53 0.22 0.23 5.39 5.58
Germany 24.50 24.50 0.06 0.06 3.16 3.09
Italy 25.25 25.39 0.09 0.09 3.21 3.43
Japan 21.50 21.49 0.14 0.13 5.55 5.40
South Korea 35.03 35.29 0.41 0.41 61.48 61.38
Netherlands 19.62 19.65 0.10 0.10 3.10 3.24
New Zealand 17.00 17.03 0.18 0.18 5.32 5.35
Norway 28.07 28.03 0.02 0.02 0.92 1.25
Poland 29.63 29.77 0.24 0.26 8.49 9.09
Spain 28.29 28.28 0.27 0.27 7.34 7.34
Sweden 28.82 28.75 0.03 0.04 1.75 2.31
Switzerland 20.04 20.02 0.09 0.09 1.53 1.52
United Kingdom 21.31 21.32 0.17 0.17 8.63 8.71
United States 16.57 16.54 0.35 0.34 7.87 7.77
Average 24.21 24.26 0.16 0.16 7.30 7.49
The standard deviations for the pooled estimators are much smaller than those for the
country-specific estimates and so the confidence intervals are much tighter. However,
they span more or less the same range and so the difference between the pooled esti-
mators is not statistically significant at any conventional significance level. In light of
the discussion regarding the Australian and American deposit rates, Panel B presents
the pooled estimators while excluding the risk aversion estimates of these two coun-
tries. The results are qualitatively similar and so the pooled estimators are still not
statistically significant from each other.
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Table 4.5: Pooling
Notes: The pooled estimate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion is denoted by γˆw, using weights
specified according to equation (4.6). The confidence interval uses the square root of equation (4.7) as
standard error and critical value from a t-distribution with k − 1 degrees of freedom; see Section 4.3
for more details. Panel A: Subscripts refer to the applied risk-free rate: D for the deposit rate, T for the
T-bill (or money market) rate. Panel B: Same as Panel A but Australia and the U.S. are excluded. Panel
C: Pooled estimator of 12 Australian deposit rates.
Specification Estimate 95% CI
Panel A
γˆwD 26.83 -10.05 63.71
γˆwT 23.53 -12.07 59.13
Panel B
γˆwD 23.59 -15.99 63.17
γˆwT 19.71 -18.06 57.47
Panel C
γˆAU 119.98 12.88 227.08
4.5.2 Australia and New Zealand
As mentioned before, Australia and New Zealand are the only two countries for which
there are long time series on alternative deposit rates. Results of using these series
in our model are presented in Table 4.6. Estimates of γ for Australia range between
57.5 when using ‘online savings accounts’ and 228.8 when using ‘one-month term de-
posits’. The estimate of using the deposit rate from the IMF is 189.5; this is within
the range of values shown here. An outcome worth noticing is that there seems to be
a relation between the number of observations and the value of the correlation coeffi-
cient between consumption growth and excess returns. The shorter the sample period,
the larger the correlation coefficient seems to be. This is also the main driving force
between differences in values of relative risk aversion. As these estimates all apply to
the same country, it is insightful to investigate what value the pooled estimate would
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take. Using the jackknife approach to estimate standard deviations and then weight-
ing optimally gives a value of 120 (see Table 4.5). This is almost twice as low as the
value for the T-bill rate, but as mentioned before, all Australian deposit rates carry an
implicit default premium and hence these results should be interpreted with care.
The final row of Table 4.6 shows that the low value of γ for New Zealand in Table
4.2 is quite robust, given that it is 2.9 for this six-month term deposit rate. This is
no surprise as the standard deviation of the excess return and the correlation between
excess returns and consumption growth are practically similar. However, just like
before, the main reason for this low value of relative risk aversion is the small average
excess return.
Table 4.6: In-depth analysis of Australia and New Zealand
Notes: aeRe is the is the average excess log return on the MSCI index over the risk-free rate plus one
half of the variance of this excess return. The standard deviation of the excess return is denoted by σexr,
ρ denotes the correlation between the excess return and consumption growth and cov is the covariance
between these two series. The estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion is denoted by γˆ. See Section
4.2 for an explanation of mnemonics.
Country Sample period Obs aeRe σexr ρ cov γˆ
Australia
BSA 2002Q3 - 2008Q3 25 7.23 13.05 0.55 10.12 71.43
OSA 2004Q2 - 2008Q3 18 6.60 14.26 0.69 11.47 57.53
CM1 1989Q4 - 2008Q3 76 6.17 12.88 0.30 4.56 135.13
CM5 1989Q4 - 2008Q3 76 4.90 12.83 0.30 4.53 108.16
CMT 1983Q2 - 2008Q3 102 6.98 17.57 0.16 3.90 179.11
T1M 1982Q3 - 2008Q3 105 8.70 17.41 0.16 3.81 228.77
T3M 1982Q2 - 2008Q3 106 7.64 17.37 0.16 3.73 204.98
T6M 1982Q2 - 2008Q3 106 7.37 17.34 0.15 3.70 199.25
T1Y 1982Q2 - 2008Q3 106 7.01 17.38 0.15 3.71 189.01
T3Y 1982Q3 - 2008Q3 105 6.99 17.46 0.15 3.68 189.63
TAN 2002Q2 - 2008Q3 26 5.73 13.07 0.52 9.36 61.17
TAS 2002Q2 - 2008Q3 26 4.42 13.19 0.52 9.48 46.60
New Zealand
TDR 1990Q2 - 2008Q3 74 0.16 16.99 0.18 5.32 2.92
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4.5.3 Monthly U.S. data
Again we start by showing how the three proxies relate to each other. As shown in
Table 4.7, the certificate of deposit rate has the highest average, followed by the T-
bill rate while the savings rate has the lowest average. But the higher the average,
the higher the variability of the specific risk-free rate. Just like before, the averages
of the risk-free rates are important as they will largely determine the value of relative
risk aversion. Since the savings rate has the lowest average, it is expected to have the
highest coefficient of relative risk aversion. In contrast, the certificate of deposit rate
has the highest average, so it is likely to produce the lowest value of γ, while relative
risk aversion under the short-term government debt rate is expected lie between those
of the other two proxies.
Table 4.7: Descriptive statistics risk-free rates
Notes: The sample period runs from January 1990 until December 2008. The certificate of deposit rate
is the average of dealer offering rates on nationally traded certificates of deposit. The savings rate is the
average interest rate on savings deposits, provided by BankRate Monitor. The T-bill rate is the interest
rate on 3-month T-bills. All statistics are annualized and in percentage points. The standard deviation is
the square root of the sample variance.
Proxy Average Standard deviation
Certificate of deposit rate 4.46 1.84
Savings rate 2.17 1.48
T-bill rate 3.96 1.76
The results in Table 4.8 show that the average excess return (plus half of its vari-
ance) is indeed much higher for the savings rate than for the T-bill rate, with the cer-
tificate of deposit rate having the lowest value. But the correlations between the excess
return and consumption growth (indicated by ρ) is identical for all three proxies. Given
that the standard deviations of the excess returns are very close and the standard de-
viation of consumption growth is obviously identical, the differences in covariances
between the excess returns and consumption growth are almost negligible. In terms
of equation (4.4), the left-hand side when using the savings rate is much higher than
when using the T-bill rate, but the right-hand side only differs marginally. So it comes
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as no surprise that the estimate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion is higher for
our proxy than for the canonical choice. With respect to the certificate of deposit rate
the resulting value of relative risk aversion is much lower than that under the 3-month
T-bill rate; a finding similar to the quarterly empirical investigation shown in Table 4.2.
However, we feel that the savings rate is a more appropriate risk-free rate proxy than
the certificate of deposit rate, so for U.S. we also feel it is justified to claim that the eq-
uity premium puzzle is larger under a deposit rate than under a short-term government
debt rate.
Table 4.8: Estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion
Notes: The sample period runs from January 1990 until December 2008. Due to the computation of
consumption growth rates the first observation is lost, so the results are based on 227 observations. aeRe
is the average excess log return on the S&P index over the risk-free rate plus one half of the variance
of this excess return. σexr and σc are, respectively, the standard deviations of the log excess return
and consumption growth; ρ(exr,c) is their correlation and σ(exr,c) is their covariance. The estimated
coefficient of relative risk aversion is denoted by γˆ. See Table 4.7 for an explanation of the three series.
CD Savings T-bill
aeRe 0.55 2.76 1.00
σexr 14.99 14.99 14.98
σc 0.89 0.89 0.89
ρ(exr,c) 0.14 0.14 0.14
σ(exr,c) 1.86 1.86 1.84
γˆ 29.41 148.45 54.54
4.6 Conclusion
Although other assumptions and empirical implementations of the consumption CAPM
model have been modified in order to provide a resolution to the equity premium puz-
zle, the choice of the appropriate risk-free rate has been taken for granted. Particularly,
the 3-month T-bill rate has been the canonical choice in this respect. However, we
conjecture that an interest rate on a savings account is, from the average household’s
perspective, closer to their concept of a risk-free rate. Therefore it is more plausible to
serve as a benchmark to which equity returns are compared.
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This idea is first applied to data from a selection of OECD countries. Here we
find that for the overwhelming majority of countries, the resulting relative risk aver-
sion estimate is higher when the deposit rate instead of the T-bill rate is used. The
two exceptions are Australia and the U.S., but their deposit rates are not comparable to
those of the other countries: Australian deposits are not risk-free and the U.S. only has
data on certificates of deposit, not savings deposits. On average, the relative difference
between the country-specific estimates is close to 40%. The pooled estimators, con-
structed using standard deviations computed via a jackknife approach, also support this
result. However, although these pooled estimators are less plagued by estimation un-
certainty, the difference in estimates is not statistically significant at any conventional
significance level.
Two countries have data on alternative proxies for the risk-free rate, i.e. Australia
and New Zealand. For Australia, the pooled estimator constructed using the 12 al-
ternative deposit rates is also lower than the value of relative risk aversion under the
T-bill rate, but these results should be interpreted with care. New Zealand’s alternative
deposit rate produces an estimate of γ almost identical to that obtained in the first part
of the empirical investigation.
Finally, we also investigate the impact of alternative risk-free rates on monthly
U.S. data. Here we show that the average interest rate on savings accounts has been
lower than the T-bill rate, while the interest paid on certificates of deposit has exceeded
the short-term government debt rate. This implies that the resulting equity premium
is higher for the savings rate than for the T-bill rate. As a result, the estimate of the
coefficient of relative risk aversion is higher under the former and hence constitutes
more of a puzzle. The certificate of deposit rate, in line with the quarterly analysis,
produces a lower coefficient of relative risk aversion, but we are inclined to attach
more weight to the results under the savings rate and hence for the U.S., the equity
premium puzzle also seems to be larger.
After all modifications to the model and methodology that have produced lower
and lower values of relative risk aversion in the last decades, this paper has shown that
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the equity premium puzzle is larger. In a way, this is a setback since it will be more
difficult to get a resolution to this famous puzzle. However, when the time comes that
the puzzle has been solved, we need to make sure that the model is as close to reality
as possible. The notion of limited stock market participation is already a large step
into the right direction, but a short-term government debt rate is not likely part of an
average household’s asset reality, especially in developed countries other than the U.S.
where money market funds are not very popular. A savings rate is more plausible to be
the benchmark against which asset returns are compared and should therefore be used
in future empirical analyzes trying to offer a solution to the equity premium puzzle.
In 2003 the European Central Bank started gathering more detailed data with re-
spect to deposit rates. For now, the number of available observations is not large
enough to use in an empirical investigation, but as time goes by these can be used to
infer an even more detailed picture regarding the influence of the choice of risk-free
rate on estimates of relative risk aversion.
4.A Appendices
4.A.1 Monthly U.S. data: Data definitions and important informa-
tion
Consumption Two input series: Personal Consumption Expenditures (i.e. total con-
sumption) and durable goods consumption. Both series from BEA and in three
specifications. First, in nominal terms (Table 2.8.5; billions of dollars and sea-
sonally adjusted at annual rates). Second, price indices (Table 2.8.4; index num-
bers, 2005 = 100, seasonally adjusted). Third, chained dollar estimates (Table
2.8.6; Billions of chained (2005) dollars; seasonally adjusted at annual rates).
The final series is only available from 1995 onwards. For the pre-1995 period,
the real series are constructed by using nominal and price index data. The av-
erage deviation of this method for the 1995-2010 period is -0.00438% for total
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consumption and 0.00879% for durables consumption.
Population Monthly population figures from BEA (Table 2.6.3). Population is the
total population of the United States, including the Armed Forces overseas and
the institutionalized population. The monthly estimate is the average of the esti-
mates for the first of the month and the first of the following month; the annual
estimate is the average of the monthly estimates. Official source: Census.
Equity return Log return on the monthly S&P Composite Index, provided by CRSP.
T-bill rate Secondary market rates on 3-month Treasury Bills from FRED. Monthly
data in percentages, averages of business days on a discount basis.
Savings rate Average interest rate on savings deposits. Gathered by BankRate Moni-
tor, obtained from the Investment Company Institute.
CPI Implicit price deflator from constructed nominal series and price index of non-
durables and services consumption. As possible robustness checks, CPI series
from FRED (officially from Bureau of Labor Statistics) can be used. All series
are consumption price indices for all urban consumers, monthly data, 1982-84
= 100. Four alternatives: either all items or excluding food and energy; and
seasonally adjusted or not.

Chapter 5
A State Space Approach to
Time-varying Risk Aversion
5.1 Introduction
Ever since Mehra and Prescott (1985) christened the equity premium puzzle, a vast
amount of research time has been devoted to this topic. Existing research has con-
templated a large number of possible solutions among which heterogeneous agents
(Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Attanasio et al., 2002; Brav et al., 2002; Vissing-Jørgenson,
2002), and habit formation (Abel, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) are most
prominent; others include disaster risk (Rietz, 1988; Barro, 2006) and long run risk
(Bansal and Yaron, 2004).
This paper’s purpose is not to come up with yet another solution to this puzzle.
Most papers concerning this empirical observation treat risk aversion as a structural
parameter whose value is constant over time. Although convenient, this assumption
is hard to justify. Insights from the psychology of decision-making reveal that people
are more sensitive to reductions in their levels of well-being than to increases. In
other words, a loss of $100 hurts more than the joy provided by winning an equal
amount. This is better known as loss aversion and this concept plays a central role in
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the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Hence real life observations
clearly suggest that there is variation in risk aversion.
The central aim of this paper is to show this time variation in the coefficient of rel-
ative risk aversion. We formulate a consumption-based asset pricing model in which
risk aversion varies in response to news in consumption growth, inflation and un-
employment growth. Hence besides the standard consumption growth we add two
macroeconomic variables that, from our point of view, should influence risk aversion.
In addition we also allow for time-varying innovation volatilities for a total of four dif-
ferent specifications. We check whether movements in the coefficient of relative risk
aversion are in line with official U.S. recession and expansion dates and other impor-
tant events that took place over the sample period. During expansions we expect this
coefficient to be small while it should rise around recessions. The main novelty is the
use of state space techniques. As risk aversion is a latent variable, this methodology is
ideally suited for this purpose.
Brandt and Wang (2003) is the paper closest to ours in the sense that they formulate
a model in which news concerning consumption growth and inflation induce variation
in risk aversion. However, their focus is on the pricing implications of this framework
for the term structure of interest rates and the cross-section of stock returns.
Another motivation for this paper is Cochrane (2011) who, in a nutshell, argues that
current asset-pricing research is centered around variation in discount rates. Time-
varying risk aversion can be seen as a manifestation of this variation. This is most
obvious when he reasons that the ‘representative investor’ did not ignore the high pre-
miums offered by stocks in December 2008 because he had wrong expectations or
intermediaries were making asset-pricing decisions for him. No, these premiums were
ignored because he could be losing his job or his business might go under and he feels
that he is currently not in a position to take any risks. Hence during a recession his risk
aversion went up. Cochrane (2011) also writes that such a statement is vacuous unless
one restricts discount rates by ideally tying them to other data. This is exactly what we
do in this paper.
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Based on parameter estimates news concerning consumption growth is most im-
portant. Of the two additional variables unemployment growth has the largest impact,
while inflation plays a more modest role. Moreover, the path of risk aversion generated
by our specifications is generally in line with the official U.S. recession and expansion
dates. This implies that during expansions risk aversion either goes down or is already
at a subdued level. In contrast, in the run up to recessions risk aversion starts to rise,
remains at elevated levels throughout these periods and on several occasions it does not
decrease for a few years after the recession officially ended. Three of our four specifi-
cations indicate that the lowest levels of risk aversion over the last half a decade were
attained at the end of the 1980s / start of the 1990s. With respect to the highest level
our four specifications are very clear, this occurred at the end of the ‘Great Recession’
(June 2009) or in one of the following six months.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The second section in-
troduces our starting model and extends it along two dimensions for a total of four
different specifications. This section also covers the state space technique we use for
estimation. Section 5.3 addresses the data. Results for our four models are discussed
in Section 5.4. The final section concludes.
5.2 Model
Our starting point is the consumption-based capital asset pricing model (henceforth
c-CAPM) by Breeden (1979) and extended by Grossman and Shiller (1981), Hansen
and Jagannathan (1991) and Cochrane and Hansen (1992). Studies concerned with
the equity premium puzzle usually assume that the coefficient of relative risk aversion
and the covariance between per capita consumption growth and the excess return are
constant, i.e.
Et−1[exr] = γσ(exr,c),
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where exr is the excess return calculated as the difference between the equity return
and the risk-free rate, γ is the log coefficient of relative risk aversion and σexr,c is
the unconditional covariance between the excess return and per capita consumption
growth (c). Note that all lower case letters denote logarithms and that we leave out a
small correction factor for simplicity.1
As our purpose is to study time-varying risk aversion we have to use a more general
version of the c-CAPM in which γ is no longer constant. In addition, in the following
we sometimes assume that the covariance term varies as well. Hence, our most general
model for the excess return is given by
exrt = γtcovt−1[exrt , 
c
t ] + 
exr
t ,
where exr and γ are as before. Note that in contrast to the previous specification in
which the covariance refers to the excess return and consumption growth, the condi-
tional covariance is calculated between the innovations in these two variables. The
final term is a residual that has expectation zero.
We propose to generalize the model even further by focusing on
exrt = γtcovt−1[exrt , 
Macro
t ] + 
exr
t ,
where exr, γ and exrt are as before. The conditional covariance is again calculated
between innovations but instead of the shock to per capita consumption growth, we
now have a more general ‘macroeconomic shock’. This shock is given by
Macrot = θ
cct + θ
pipit + θ
uut ,
1The expression for the equity premium in the c-CAPM is given by
Et−1[exr] +
σ2exr
2
= γσ(exr,c).
The second term on the left-hand side is a correction factor due to Jensen’s inequality, see De Vries and
Zenhorst (2012) for more details. As it is small we disregard it.
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where c still refers to per capita consumption growth, pi denotes inflation and u is un-
employment growth. Hence the general macroeconomic shock is modeled as a linear
combination of three innovations. The first shock comes from the c-CAPM.
The second innovation originates from the postulation by Brandt and Wang (2003)
that news concerning inflation also influences γ. As documented in for example Camp-
bell and Shiller (1996) and Barr and Campbell (1997), inflation is correlated with
real asset prices. Third is our suggestion that in addition to news about consumption
growth and inflation, news concerning unemployment growth affects risk aversion as
well. The reason that we include unemployment growth is that it is countercyclical
and lagging (in relation to the business cycle), while both consumption growth and in-
flation are procyclical and coincident. In the recent recession, the plunge in U.S. stock
prices was swiftly followed by a large increase in the unemployment rate. The work of
Phelps (1999), Farmer (2011a) and Farmer (2011b) documents this link between the
stock market and unemployment more formally.
Note that this setup allows us to gauge the relative importance of these three vari-
ables, i.e. the variables with the highest parameter value (θ) is most important. In
addition, if θpi and/or θu differs significantly from zero then we have evidence that the
variability in excess returns is better described by multiple macroeconomic variables
than by consumption growth alone.
The final building block is that we allow all four innovations (i.e. exrt , 
c
t , 
pi
t and 
u
t )
to have time-varying volatilities. Financial variables are known to have non-constant
variances and existing research has shown that consumption growth (e.g. Kandel and
Stambaugh, 1991; Bansal et al., 2005; Beeler and Campbell, 2009) and inflation (e.g.
Friedman, 1977; Engle, 1982) exhibit this as well. In contrast, unemployment growth
does not seem to have this property. A simple LM test developed by Lee (1991)
for GARCH effects supports this point. As can be inferred from Table 5.1, there is
overwhelming evidence against the null hypothesis of constant variance for the real
excess return, consumption growth and inflation: all three p-values are even smaller
than 0.1%. In contrast, the p-value associated with the test statistic for unemployment
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growth is 0.51. Hence for this variable there is not enough support in favor of a varying
volatility.
Table 5.1: LM GARCH Test
Test for first-order GARCH effects in the variance of the innovations as in Lee (1991). Series abbrevia-
tions are as follows: real excess return (exr), real per capita consumption growth (c), inflation (pi) and
unemployment growth (u).
exr c pi u
Test value 155.027 23.254 263.099 0.431
p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.512
All four volatilities are modeled according to the QGARCH(1,1) model by Sentana
(1995). This specification allows for a different impact of positive and negative innova-
tions on volatility. This is imperative as it is well documented in the literature that the
conditional variance of stock returns often increases when returns are negative. This
is better known as the ‘leverage’ effect as a negative return results in a higher leverage
for a firm. In addition, inflation volatility tends to be high if the level of inflation is
high as well. Such dynamics are easily captured through the use of the asymmetric
GARCH model.2
Combining all of the above, our model is given by3
exrt = γt[θ
ckct + θ
pikpit + θ
ukut ] + 
exr
t , (5.1)
ct = c¯+ φ
cct−1 + ct , (5.2)
pit = p¯i + φ
pipit−1 + pit , (5.3)
ut = u¯+ φ
uut−1 + ut , (5.4)
γt = γ¯ + φ
γγt−1 + 
γ
t , (5.5)
(σit)
2 = βi1 + β
i
2
i
t−1 + β
i
3(
i
t−1)
2 + βi4(σ
i
t−1)
2, for i = exr, c, pi and u, (5.6)
kit = ρ(exr,i)σ
exr
t σ
i
t, for i = c, pi and u. (5.7)
2To guarantee that the conditional variance is positive, the following restrictions are imposed: (i)
β1 > 0, (ii) β3, β4 ≥ 0 and (iii) β2 < 4β3(1− β3 − β4).
3See Appendix 5.A.1 for an explicit derivation of equation (5.1).
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The covariance between the excess return and our three macroeconomic variables,
from now on denoted by ki for i = c, pi and u, is simply the product of ρexr,i —
the correlation between exrt and 
i
t — and their standard deviations, denoted by σ
exr
t
and σit, respectively. Real per capita consumption growth, inflation, unemployment
growth and time-varying risk aversion all follow AR(1) specifications. Note that as
a consequence of these time-varying volatilities, the covariances between the excess
return and respectively consumption growth, inflation and unemployment growth will
also exhibit variation.
5.2.1 Methodology
Our model is estimated using the state space framework. Due to the time-varying in-
novation variances it does not fit into a standard Gaussian linear state space system.
To accommodate this non-standard feature, we augment the state vector with the inno-
vations exrt+1, 
c
t+1, 
pi
t+1 and 
u
t+1 and hence follow the approach suggested by Harvey
et al. (1992). Using the Kalman filter and smoother we obtain estimates of all param-
eters, including those related to the conditional variances. Appendix 5.A.2 has a more
detailed exposition of all system matrices and provides more computational details
concerning our approach.
The covariances vary over time due to the time-varying nature of the variances.
An alternative approach would be to model these covariances directly. However, there
is no study in the line of Harvey et al. (1992) that focuses on covariances instead of
variances. Although these two concepts are of course closely linked, the presence of
the correlation complicates matters. This extension is left for future research.
5.3 Data
The model is estimated using U.S. data. The required series are available at varying
frequencies, i.e. the highest frequency at which consumption is available is monthly,
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while equity returns can be computed on a daily basis. As a result, our analysis is con-
ducted at the monthly frequency. We require both macroeconomic as well as financial
variables.
The first macroeconomic series is real consumption of nondurables and services
per capita. This series is not directly available, so we have to construct it ourselves.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis has data on monthly ‘real’ (i.e. chained dollars)
personal consumption expenditure as well as on durable consumption. Combining this
with price indexes for both series allows us to apply the ‘chain-subtraction’ method
to get a so-called Fisher index; see Whelan (2002) for more details on this procedure.
This index is then divided by a monthly population series, originally from the Bureau
of Census. The chained series are only available from 1995 onwards. By combining
personal consumption expenditure and durable consumption in nominal terms with the
price indexes, these series can be easily constructed for the pre-1995 period.
The consumer price index is the implicit price deflator derived from nondurables
and services consumption in nominal terms and chained values. Finally, unemploy-
ment is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In particular, we use the seasonally ad-
justed unemployment rate for people aged 16 or older (series LNS14000000).
The two financial variables are the equity return and the risk-free rate. For the
former we chose the log return of the S&P 500 index from CRSP. As a proxy for the
risk-free rate we use monthly data on the secondary market rate of the 3-month T-bill
(series TB3MS, FRED).
The sample period starts in January 1960 and runs until June 2011, for a total
of 618 observations. Table 5.2 presents some descriptive statistics of the data. On
average, real nondurables and services consumption growth per capita is about 0.15%
with a standard deviation approximately two and a half times this value. The monthly
real equity return on the S&P 500 is approximately 0.25%, but the standard deviation
of 4.35% is fairly large, especially when compared with that of consumption growth.
The worst month for equity investors is October 1987 with a return of -22.09%, while
the market showed its best performance, a return of 15.67%, thirteen years earlier in
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October 1974. The real risk-free rate is about one promille per month. Of all the
variables considered, it shows the lowest degree of variability. The mean of the real
excess return is equal to the difference between the real equity return and the real risk-
free rate and its standard deviation is just slightly below that of the former. The worst
month in terms of consumption growth is May 1960 (-1.35%), the highest growth (i.e.
1.64%) occurred in October 1965. Inflation is on average 0.33% per month, with a
standard deviation that is comparable with that of the risk-free rate. Inflation peaked
in August 1973, while the price level fell the most in November 2008. Unemployment
fell by almost 9% in April 1998 and soared by approximately 12% in March 1960; on
average the change in unemployment is a tenth of a percent, but note the rather large
standard deviation.
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics
All statistics in percentages and not annualized. The sample period is from January 1960 until June
2011, for a total of 618 observations. StDev denotes the sample standard deviation. Series abbrevia-
tions are as follows: real excess return (exr), real per capita consumption growth (c), inflation (pi) and
unemployment growth (u).
Average StDev Min Max
Real equity return 0.25 4.35 -22.09 15.67
Real risk-free rate 0.10 0.25 -0.92 1.35
exr 0.15 4.32 -22.28 15.66
c 0.15 0.38 -1.35 1.64
pi 0.33 0.26 -1.29 1.32
u 0.10 3.06 -8.89 11.78
5.4 Results
This section discusses the results of estimating our model using the state space ap-
proach. But before we discuss these results, we first consider three simpler specifica-
tions. In the first subsection we examine a model which only includes consumption
growth (c) and hence disregards inflation (pi) and unemployment growth (u). In ad-
dition, the covariance between the innovations in the excess return and consumption
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growth is kept fixed. Note that this implies that both exr and c need to have constant
variances. The reason is that this model resembles the standard c-CAPM but with
time-varying risk aversion. The second specification extends this setup by allowing
the shocks in the real excess return and consumption growth to have a time-varying
volatility. This then induces a time-varying covariance; this specification is discussed
in Section 5.4.2. Our expectation is that this second model captures part of the varia-
tion in γ through kct .
While the first two specifications only involve consumption growth, the third and
fourth model no longer disregard inflation and unemployment growth as additional
explanatory variables. The relation between these two specifications is the same as
before: the third model assumes constant variances (and covariances) while the fourth
specification models the volatility of the real excess return, consumption growth and
inflation to be time-varying, keeping (σu)2 fixed.4 Remember from Table 5.1 that there
is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the variance of unemployment
growth is constant. The outcomes of the model in which this volatility is nevertheless
assumed to vary are qualitatively similar and so this does not influence our results to a
significant extent.
5.4.1 First Specification
We first discuss the results from the simplest model which only includes consumption
growth. Moreover, we assume that the variance of the innovations and therefore the
covariance between the innovations (i.e. between the excess return and consumption
growth) are constant over time. Table 5.3 presents the parameter estimates; sandwich
based standard errors are given in parentheses. Note that θc has been normalized to
unity.
The persistence parameter in the estimated autoregressive equation for consump-
tion growth is 0.48 which indicates that this series is not very persistent. In sharp
4The equations describing the first three specifications are shown in Appendix 5.A.3.
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contrast, the AR(1) parameter for relative risk aversion — conveniently labeled γ1 to
distinguish it from the series generated by the other specifications — is 0.97, close to
upper bound of unity for non-explosive series. The bottom panel shows the correlation
between the innovations in consumption growth and (1) the innovations in the excess
return and (2) the innovations in relative risk aversion. The first is positive and hence
indicates that these innovations are positively associated. This implies that when there
is a positive shock to consumption growth it is likely that real excess returns are higher
as well. The correlation between (the innovations in) consumption growth and relative
risk aversion is negative which is in line with our a priori expectation: a positive sur-
prise in consumption growth should be associated with a decline in risk aversion. A
positive shock to consumption growth is considered to be good news and hence risk
aversion should decline. Note that all parameters estimates are statistically significant
from zero at the 5% significance level.
Our main variable of interest, the time-varying estimate of log relative risk aver-
sion, is shown in Figure 5.1. As indicated by the parameter estimate in Table 5.3,
this series is highly persistent. Although the value of 0.97 is not significantly differ-
ent from the value of unity which would make the variable of an explosive nature,
the figure clearly indicates that over the period from January 1960 until June 2011 it
exhibits mean reversion. The shaded regions indicate the NBER recession dates and
are the main tool to judge our model. Our sample period contains the following eight
recession periods:5
I. April 1960 until February 1961
II. December 1969 until November 1970
III. November 1973 until March 1975
IV. January 1980 until July 1980
V. July 1981 until November 1982
5We refer to Labonte and Makinen (2002) and Bordo and Landon-Lane (2010) for a more detailed
exposition of these eight periods including likely causes, severity and policy responses.
Table 5.3: Parameter estimates of the first specification
Notes: Series abbreviations are as follows: real excess return (exr), real per capita consumption growth
(c) and the log coefficient of relative risk aversion (labeled γ1). Estimation results refer to equations
(5.13)-(5.16), see Appendix 5.A.3. This model only features consumption growth and keeps the inno-
vation variances fixed. As a result the covariance between excess returns and consumption growth is
also constant. In addition, θc is normalized to unity. Correlations (denoted by ρ) are calculated between
the innovations of the series in question. Every column pertains to a single series and shows its relevant
parameter estimates, with superscript i referring to these series. The sample period runs from January
1960 until June 2011; sandwich based standard errors in parentheses.
exr c γ1
θi - 1.00 -
- (0.36) -
i¯ - 0.02 1.32
- (5.3E-3) (0.54)
φi - 0.48 0.97
- (0.11) (0.22)
(σi)2 1.9E-3 1.6E-5 489.45
(4.9E-4) (5.3E-6) (236.76)
ρ(exr,i) - 0.76 -
- (0.21) -
ρ(i,γ1) - -0.49 -
- (0.14) -
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VI. July 1990 until March 1991
VII. March 2001 until November 2001
VIII. December 2007 until June 2009
Before we discuss the path of log relative risk aversion in more detail, it is impor-
tant to realize the following. As we keep the covariance between the innovations in
the real excess return and consumption growth (kc) constant, one might be tempted to
conclude that all variation in γ1 comes from variation in the variance of the real excess
return. This is not the case. The reason is the presence of exr and γ which are both
unobserved. In other words, not all variation in the real excess return is reflected in
the path of risk aversion. Moreover, we present the smoothed series, i.e. we also apply
the Kalman smoothing technique. This implies that all information is used to estimate
the most likely path of risk aversion: historical, current but also future realizations of
excess returns and consumption growth. This is standard practice when using the state
space technique, but one should be aware of its influence.
Although risk aversion rises during the first recession period, it keeps increasing
for an extended period of time after the downturn officially ended. The leveling of log
risk aversion between 3 and 4 during 1962 until 1964 is caused by a spell of mostly
negative real excess returns in this period, but the innovations in γ1 also absorbed part
of the variation in the dependent variable. During periods II and III risk aversion rises,
but while it keeps on rising after the first recession period in the 1970s, it approxi-
mately peaks at the end of the trough for the recession related to the oil crises. The
declining path of γ1 during recession period IV (also known as the first leg of the ‘Dou-
ble Dip’ recession) is due to the predominantly positive returns in this period. During
the second leg of the ‘Double Dip’ recession (period V), risk aversion rises and again
peaks near the end of the trough.
Risk aversion rises in late 1987 due to the stock market crash but the effect of this
event is rather limited. This is partly due to negative innovations in the excess return
and some positive innovations in γ1. A likely reason for the somewhat muted impact
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on risk aversion is that this crash was unexpected and although its impact was huge,
its impact on equity returns was short-lived: the excess return of November is negative
but returns are positive for the period thereafter. The path slopes downward in period
VI but here negative and positive returns are more balanced so the decline is less steep
than during the fourth recession period. During the longest expansion in the history
of the U.S. (i.e. in between period VI and VII), γ1 is predominantly rising, especially
during the late 1990s. This can be explained by the events that took place during the
summer of 1998, i.e. the Russian ruble crises and the subsequent default of Long-Term
Capital Management which contributed to a spell of negative excess returns. The fact
that these events span a longer time period and have such an impact only supports our
view concerning the relatively small response of risk aversion to the 1987 stock market
crash.
The decade of the 1990s also exemplifies the impact of the Kalman smoother. As
mentioned, through the use of the smoother future realizations are used to get the
best estimate of risk aversion at time t. This implies that the level of γ just after the
1990 recession is to some degree influences by the events in 1998 and the recession
starting in the first quarter of 2001. In other words, in 1990 it is already known that
risk aversion should increase later in the decade as a result of these two events. In
combination with the high level of persistence, this produces the upward sloping path
of risk aversion during this decade.6
Surprisingly, risk aversion peaks just before 2001 recession and is already declining
during the recession period. Returns are mostly negative in this timespan so this can
only be the result of the unobserved innovations and this is indeed the case. Note that
this period also comprises the September 2001 terrorist attacks, for which one would
expect to observe rising levels of risk aversion. However, in light of the discussion
concerning the 1987 stock market crash, this results is less surprising. The path slopes
6As our interest is to show the time variation in risk aversion, applying the smoother is validated.
If one is interested in forecasting future levels of risk aversion one should of course use the output
generated by the Kalman filter.
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upward again in the run-up the ‘Great Recession’, rises during this period and peaks in
November 2009, five months after the recession officially ended. The decline in γ1 at
the end of the sample period is the result of the good performance of the stock market
after the most recent recession and the very low yields on government debt which,
combined, produce a large excess return.
With respect to the level of relative risk aversion, it has its minimum at the late
1960s (0.67) and in the period after the 1990s recession (0.74). Based on this specifi-
cation, the final recession of the sample period has been accompanied by the highest
level of risk aversion (6.81), but the 1975 (6.27) and 2001 (6.23) recessions are a close
second and third. The average log relative risk aversion is equal to 3.51 such that
the coefficient of relative risk aversion is approximately 98. This value corresponds
well to the literature on the equity premium puzzle in which such high values are not
uncommon.
Figure 5.1: Smoothed log relative risk aversion coefficient generated by the first specification (γ1) over
the sample period running from January 1960 until June 2011. Shaded bars indicate official recession
dates. Risk aversion is estimated from equations (5.13)-(5.16), see Appendix 5.A.3. This specification
only involves consumption growth and innovations in this series and the excess return are assumed to
have a constant variance. As a result the covariance between shocks in the excess return and consump-
tion growth innovations is also constant.
5.4.2 Second Specification
The second model still only involves consumption growth, but the shocks to both the
excess return and consumption growth now have a time-varying volatility. Moreover,
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this time-varying volatility implies that the covariance between the innovations in the
excess return and consumption growth, denoted by kct , varies as well. We again nor-
malize θc to unity. The results of this setup are presented in Table 5.4.
In line with our a priori expectation, remember our discussion of the ‘leverage’
effect in Section 5.2, the asymmetry coefficient (βexr2 ) of the conditional volatility pro-
cess for excess return innovations is negative. The AR(1) parameter in the equation for
consumption growth is about 0.12 larger than before, hence increasing its persistence.
The GARCH parameters regarding consumption growth reveal that the response of
volatility to a negative innovation does not differ significantly from that of a positive
innovation, i.e. the asymmetry parameter is not significantly different from zero at a
conventional significance level. Estimates for relative risk aversion are comparable to
those for the first model, i.e. γ2 is estimated to be highly persistent. The correlations
between the real excess return and, respectively, consumption growth and risk aver-
sion again have the expected sign (positive and negative) and are, in an absolute sense,
larger than in the first model. With the exception of βc2, all parameters are statistically
significant from zero at the conventional significance level.
Figure 5.2 shows the estimated path of log relative risk aversion for the second
model. Compared to γ1 there are a couple of differences.7 The first is that γ2 is higher
in the period between recession periods I and II. The second difference is that risk
aversion does not increase as much in the ‘oil crises’ period. Third, log risk aversion
declines sharper between periods V and VI and there is also no clear movement during
October 1987. Fourth, the level of γ2 is lower in the run-up to recession VII. In other
words, the upward sloping pattern is less steep than before. Relatedly, while γ1 is
clearly impacted by the events that took place in August 1998, the same cannot be said
about the path of risk aversion generated by this specification. Just like 1987, there is
also no clear response to the events that took place in September 2001. Finally, while
7One might be tempted to think that any differences between γ1 and γ2 can be ascribed to the time-
varying covariance kct . However, this is not the case. The reason lies in the presence of 
exr
t+1 and 
c
t+1
which are of course not necessarily equal between these two specifications.
Table 5.4: Parameter estimates of the second specification
Notes: Series abbreviations are as follows: real excess return (exr), real per capita consumption growth
(c) and the coefficient of relative risk aversion (labeled γ2). Estimation results refer to equations (5.17)-
(5.21), see Appendix 5.A.3. This model only features consumption growth and allows for variation in
the innovation variances. As a result the covariance between excess returns and consumption growth
is also time-varying. In addition, θc is normalized to unity. Correlations (denoted by ρ) are calculated
between the innovations of the series in question. Every column pertains to a single series and shows its
relevant parameter estimates, with superscript i referring to these series. The sample period runs from
January 1960 until June 2011; sandwich based standard errors in parentheses.
exr g γ2
θi - 1.00 -
- (0.27) -
i¯ - 0.03 0.65
- (7.7E-3) (0.24)
φi - 0.61 0.98
- (0.19) (0.33)
(σi)2 - - 53.09
- - (17.20)
βi1 9.6E-5 3.8E-5 -
(4.1E-5) (5.9E-6) -
βi2 -0.32 0.08 -
(0.09) (0.07) -
βi3 0.19 0.24 -
(0.07) (0.09) -
βi4 0.68 0.66 -
(0.24) (0.27) -
ρ(exr,i) - 0.81 -
- (0.32) -
ρ(i,γ2) - -0.65 -
- (0.29) -
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the path of risk aversion generated by the first model rises sharply during the ‘Great
Recession’, the increase in γ2 is less pronounced. Later on we will come back to some
of these differences.
The minimum value is 0.23 and it is attained at the start of the 1990s while the
maximum of 5.52 is observed just after the end of recession VIII. The average log value
of risk aversion equals 3.18 which translates to a value of 47.49 for the coefficient of
relative risk aversion over the whole sample period.
Figure 5.2: Smoothed log relative risk aversion coefficient generated by the first specification (γ2) over
the sample period running from January 1960 until June 2011. Shaded bars indicate official recession
dates. Risk aversion is estimated from equations (5.17)-(5.21), see Appendix 5.A.3. This specification
only involves consumption growth and innovations in this series and excess returns are assumed to have
a time-varying variance. As a result the covariance between shocks in the excess return and consumption
growth innovations also varies.
The conditional volatility of excess returns innovations is shown in Figure 5.3.
There are clear spikes in the conditional volatility for all eight recession periods, al-
though there are major differences in the levels of volatility attained during these peri-
ods. For example, while the average level of the volatility is 0.002 it rises to 0.009 and
0.007 during the ‘oil crises’ and the ‘Great Recession’, respectively. In addition, there
are also spikes at four other instances. First, during the final months of 1962 which
is caused by three large and negative returns during the second quarter of that year.
Second, at the final quarter of 1987 which is the result of the stock market crash in Oc-
tober 1987; rising to its second highest level over this sample period. Third, during the
final months of 1998 which is related to the Russian crises in the summer of 1998 and
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the resulting default of Long-Term Capital Management. Finally, at the final quarter
of 2002 which is the result of a large negative excess return in September 2002. Note
that these are all periods in which large negative returns result in higher conditional
variances, hence substantiating the asymmetric GARCH effect.
Figure 5.3: Conditional variance of innovations in the real excess return (exr) innovations over the
sample period running from January 1960 until June 2011, given by equation (5.20). Shaded bars
indicate official recession dates.
Figure 5.4 presents the GARCH series for consumption growth. During all reces-
sions we observe spikes in the conditional volatility, except for recessions II and V.
The highest level of volatility is attained during the first recession which is due to the
fact that the largest monthly drop in consumption growth took place in May 1960. The
spike in volatility around 1965 comes from the highest gain in October 1965. Given
that we observe spikes during these two occasions provides additional evidence that
there should not be an asymmetry effect for consumption growth; this is exactly what
we find from Table 5.2. Note that while the conditional volatility series of the real
excess return innovations is quite erratic, the series for innovations in consumption
growth is much smoother.
The conditional covariance series between the innovations in the excess return and
the innovations in consumption growth is shown in Figure 5.5. Note that this series is
the product of 0.81 — the correlation between these innovations — and the square root
of the conditional volatilities shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. As it inherits its dynamics
from the latter two series, kgt shows spikes during all eight recession periods, the four
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Figure 5.4: Conditional variance of consumption growth (c) innovations over the sample period running
from January 1960 until June 2011, given by equation (5.20). Shaded bars indicate official recession
dates.
additional periods identified for excess return volatility and, to a lesser extent, the
two instances where consumption growth shocks are characterized by a high level of
volatility. Note that it is more closely related to the conditional volatility of the real
excess return than to the GARCH process of consumption growth. The reason is that
the former is much larger than the latter, hence dominating their product.
Figure 5.5: Conditional covariance of innovations in the real excess return (exr) and consumption
growth (c) over the sample period running from January 1960 until June 2011, given by equation (5.21).
Shaded bars indicate official recession dates.
As mentioned before, differences between γ1 and γ2 are not necessarily the conse-
quence of having variation in the covariance between the excess return and consump-
tion growth. Nevertheless, there are at least two differences which are likely the result
of introducing a varying covariance: recession periods III and VIII. Comparing γ1 and
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γ2 reveals the latter increases less during these two periods. At the same time, kct is
much higher than its average during these times. Hence some of the variation in the ex-
cess return that had to be ascribed to risk aversion in the first specification is assigned
to the conditional covariance in the second model. This is, to a lesser degree, also the
case for the events that took place in 1987, 1998 and 2001.
5.4.3 Third specification
The third model uses information on inflation and unemployment growth along with
consumption growth, normalizing the absolute sum of θc, θpi and θu to unity. The
first row of Table 5.5 reveals that the parameter of consumption growth is (in ab-
solute sense) largest (0.46), followed by unemployment growth (-0.32) and inflation
(-0.21). Hence consumption growth is, based on this specification, most important.
Note that the estimate of θpi is not statistically significant at the 5% level. A likely
reason is that the shock to inflation contains more or less the same information as the
innovation in consumption growth as both are procyclical and coincident. In contrast,
unemployment growth is countercyclical and lagging so it makes sense that it contains
information not present in the consumption growth shock.
While the persistence parameter of consumption growth is 0.48 in the first specifi-
cation, it has a value of 0.64 in this more elaborate model. The parameter values of the
equation for inflation are comparable to those of consumption growth, but unemploy-
ment is estimated to be considerably less persistent. As before, relative risk aversion
remains very persistent.
The two correlations involving consumption growth keep their correct sign. More-
over, they are in an absolute sense larger than those of the first model. The correlation
between the real excess return and inflation is negative but not statistically significant.
This is surprising as we expected to find a clear negative relationship between these two
variables. The finding that the correlation with innovations in unemployment growth
is not significant is less puzzling: the stock and bond market adjust immediately to
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the current state of the economy (or perhaps even reflect this), while unemployment
adjusts very slowly and is usually lagging. The negative sign is in line with our ex-
pectation as one would expect that these two variables move in opposite direction over
longer time horizons.
The final line shows the correlation between the innovations in relative risk aver-
sion and news in our three explanatory variables. With regards to inflation we find
a positive and significant relationship. If there is positive shock to inflation (i.e. in-
flation increases) then risk aversion rises as well. Finally, while unemployment news
does not appear to have a direct impact on excess returns, it does have a positive and
statistically significant impact on γ3. In others words, if unemployment goes up, risk
aversion tends to increase as well.
Table 5.5: Parameter estimates of the third specification
Notes: Series abbreviations are as follows: real excess return (exr), real per capita consumption growth
(c), inflation (pi), unemployment growth (u) and the coefficient of relative risk aversion (labeled γ3).
Estimation results refer to equations (5.22)-(5.27), see Appendix 5.A.3. This model keeps the innovation
variances fixed. As a result the covariances between excess returns and, respectively, consumption
growth, inflation and unemployment growth are also constant. In addition, the absolute sum of θc, θpi
and θu is normalized to unity. Correlations (denoted by ρ) are calculated between the innovations of the
series in question. Every column pertains to a single series and shows its relevant parameter estimates,
with superscript i referring to these series. The sample period runs from January 1960 until June 2011;
sandwich based standard errors in parentheses.
exr g pi u γ3
θi - 0.46 -0.21 -0.32 -
- (0.18) (0.11) (0.13) -
i¯ - 0.07 0.11 4.0E-3 1.02
- (0.02) (0.04) (6.9E-4) (0.47)
φi - 0.64 0.63 0.39 0.95
- (0.27) (0.21) (0.13) (0.35)
(σi)2 9.5E-3 4.5E-4 8.7E-4 3.3E-3 261.68
(3.6E-3) (9.3E-5) (3.3E-4) (4.9E-4) (121.43)
ρ(exr,i) - 0.89 -0.33 -0.18 -
- (0.37) (0.21) (0.16) -
ρ(i,γ3) - -0.56 0.35 0.72 -
- (0.19) (0.13) (0.32) -
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Figure 5.6 shows the log relative risk aversion generated by the third model. Risk
aversion rises sharply during the first two recessions. Although inflation is low, un-
employment growth is skyrocketing during both periods so this result is likely due to
the inclusion of u as an additional source of information regarding risk aversion. The
sharp increase in γ3 during the third recession and the results that risk aversion re-
mains at an elevated level for quite some time afterwards is not surprising given that
this recession is also known as the ‘Stagflation recession’. In general the 1970s can be
characterized as a period in which economic growth was low, unemployment therefore
remained elevated, but inflation was high as well. Given the two additional innovations
in this specification, the path of γ3 during this decade is not surprising.
Although risk aversion increases in late 1987, this rise is less pronounced com-
pared to the first model. A likely reason is that both inflation is relatively low and
unemployment growth is decreasing, so these two variables are not hit by shocks that
suggest that risk aversion should increase. Concerning the events that took place dur-
ing the second half of 1998 and in September 2001 a similar reasoning applies; infla-
tion is low and unemployment growth is more or less constant so the response of γ3 is
small(ler). During the latest recession we again observe a sharp increase in log relative
risk aversion. As inflation is decreasing, this effect is again due to increasing levels of
unemployment. In sum, γ3 differs from γ1 and this is primarily due to the inclusion of
unemployment growth.
The minimum is attained in May 1966 and has a value of 1.16. The overall maxi-
mum value is 6.49 and it is again during the latest recession that this value is observed
but the value of 6.30 just after recession III is a close second. Finally, the average is
3.35 such that the coefficient of relative risk aversion takes on a value of about 64. Al-
though still too high to resolve the equity premium puzzle, it does appear that adding
inflation and unemployment growth can substantially reduce the coefficient of relative
risk aversion.
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Figure 5.6: Smoothed log relative risk aversion coefficient generated by the first specification (γ3) over
the sample period running from January 1960 until June 2011. Shaded bars indicate official recession
dates. Risk aversion is estimated from equations (5.22)-(5.27), see Appendix 5.A.3. This specification
involves consumption growth, inflation and unemployment. Moreover, innovations in these three series
and the excess return are assumed to have a constant variance. As a result the covariance between shocks
in the excess return and, respectively, consumption growth, inflation and unemployment innovations is
also constant.
5.4.4 Fourth specification
Parameter estimates of our fourth and final model are presented in Table 5.6. With
respect to the θ’s — the absolute sum of which has again been normalized to unity —
we observe the same pattern as in the previous specification: consumption growth is
most important, followed by unemployment growth and inflation. Both θc and θu are
larger than before and hence θpi is smaller, but in contrast to the third specification it is
now also statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
The constants, φ and σ2 parameters are more or less in line with those of the pre-
vious model with only slight changes in persistence. The GARCH parameters of con-
sumption growth are also similar to the estimates reported in Table 5.4 with β4 being
the largest and the parameter of asymmetry β2 insignificant. In contrast, and in line
with our expectation, this parameter is positive and significantly different from zero
for inflation. If there is a positive shock to inflation, its volatility tends to go up. The
parameter on the GARCH lag is very high (0.92). Remember that there is not enough
evidence for a varying volatility in unemployment growth innovations hence this is
variance is constant.
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The first three correlations (i.e. those involving the real excess return) are com-
parable to those in the previous model. The only exception is ρ(exr,c) which is now
much larger, positive but still not significant. All three correlations involving γ have
kept their correct sign, but inflation no longer has (in an absolute sense) the largest
correlation. It is now consumption growth that seems to be most associated with risk
aversion.
Table 5.6: Parameter estimates of the fourth specification
Notes: Series abbreviations are as follows: real excess return (exr), real per capita consumption growth
(c), inflation (pi), unemployment growth (u) and the coefficient of relative risk aversion (labeled γ4).
Estimation results refer to equations (5.1)-(5.6), see Section 2. This model allows for variation in the
innovation variances. As a result the covariances between excess returns and, respectively, consumption
growth, inflation and unemployment growth are also time-varying. In addition, the absolute sum of θc,
θpi and θu is normalized to unity. Correlations (denoted by ρ) are calculated between the innovations
of the series in question. Every column pertains to a single series and shows its relevant parameter
estimates, with superscript i referring to these series. The sample period runs from January 1960 until
June 2011; sandwich based standard errors in parentheses.
exr g pi u γ4
θi - 0.51 -0.14 -0.35 -
- (0.15) (0.06) (0.16) -
i¯ - 0.01 2.0E-3 3.8E-3 0.30
- (4.9E-3) (9.7E-4) (5.2E-4) (0.11)
φi - 0.58 0.69 0.32 0.96
- (0.11) (0.24) (0.15) (0.25)
(σi)2 - - - 4.3E-3 39.53
- - - (6.9E-4) (17.05)
βi1 7.2E-5 7.3E-3 5.8E-3 - -
(3.1E-5) (2.1E-3) (2.7E-3) - -
βi2 -0.37 0.05 0.12 - -
(0.16) (0.03) (0.02) - -
βi3 0.21 0.20 0.05 - -
(0.10) (0.07) (0.01) - -
βi4 0.72 0.72 0.92 - -
(0.25) (0.14) (0.20) - -
ρ(exr,i) - 0.73 -0.52 -0.47 -
- (0.28) (0.21) (0.27) -
ρ(i,γ4) - -0.59 0.31 0.46 -
- (0.26) (0.12) (0.15) -
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Figure 5.7 shows the estimated log relative risk aversion coefficient of this speci-
fication. While risk aversion rises during the first two recessions, its behavior during
period III is a little puzzling. Although it first goes up, it falls afterwards. However,
note that its movement during this period is quite limited. In other words, γ4 does not
move a lot within this time span. In contrast to the third specification we do not observe
an economically significant rise in risk aversion while it is known that both inflation
and unemployment growth were high. The only possibility is that the time-varying
covariances pick up this effect; we will come back to this later. Risk aversion rises in
periods IV and V and there is also an upward movement in late 1987. It rises sharply
in the sixth recession and keeps on increasing for most of the 1990s. Recession VII is
the only downturn in which γ4 falls, but note that it goes up just afterwards. During the
‘Great Recession’ we again observe a sharp rise and risk aversion attains its highest
value.
For this final specification the maximum value of risk aversion also occurs at the
latest recession (5.47). Again, the minimum of 0.68 is attained in the late 1980s. Not
surprisingly, this specification yields the lowest average of 2.97 which translates into
an average risk aversion coefficient of 51 over the sample period.
Figure 5.7: Smoothed log relative risk aversion coefficient generated by the first specification (γ4) over
the sample period running from January 1960 until June 2011. Shaded bars indicate official recession
dates. Risk aversion is estimated from equations (5.1)-(5.7), see Section 2. This specification involves
consumption growth, inflation and unemployment. Moreover, innovations in these three series and the
excess return are assumed to have a time-varying variance. As a result the covariance between shocks in
the excess return and, respectively, consumption growth, inflation and unemployment innovations also
varies.
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The conditional variance series for real excess return innovations for this fourth
specification is not shown. The reason is that it closely resembles the QGARCH series
from the second model. This is not true for consumption growth, Figure 5.8 presents
this conditional variance series. There is still a large spike in volatility (in response
to a very negative consumption growth realization) during the first recession but note
that the level of this series is smaller compared to the one depicted in Figure 5.4. In
contrast, there is no clear response to the highest growth rate in late 1965. There are,
however, some additional spikes in 1972Q2, 1983Q2, 1984Q2 and during the first six
months of 2000. A look at the unobserved error term of the equation for unemploy-
ment growth, i.e. ct+1, reveals that all these periods are characterized by either very
negative or highly positive innovations. Despite some notable differences between the
conditional volatility series of consumption growth generated by the second and fourth
specification, the conditional covariances series look fairly similar. As mentioned in
the discussion of Figure 5.5, the real excess return is the dominant driving force in kct
and as they are quite similar, the conditional variances series is fairly similar too. For
sake of brevity we again decide not to show it.
Figure 5.8: Conditional variance of consumption growth (c) innovations over the sample period running
from January 1960 until June 2011, given by equation (5.6). Shaded bars indicate official recession
dates.
The final two models also use information in inflation and unemployment growth to
model risk aversion. While there is no evidence that the variance of the unemployment
growth shocks is time-varying, such evidence is abundant when it comes to inflation.
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In particular, it is well documented that during periods of high inflation, the volatility is
high as well. The path of the estimated QGARCH(1,1) process of inflation depicted in
Figure 5.9 supports this. As mentioned above, most of the 1970s can be characterized
as a period of high inflation and high unemployment. Hence the peak of inflation
during the third recession is no surprise. The finding that the volatility of inflation does
not really respond to the events of 1987, 1998 and 2001 is also probable as inflation is
not at an elevated level during any of these three periods. The spike in 2005 is the result
of a monthly inflation rate of 1.2% in September; the spike just the latest recession is
the result of the deflation rate of -1.2% in November 2008.
Figure 5.9: Conditional variance of inflation (pi) innovations over the sample period running from
January 1960 until June 2011, given by equation (5.6). Shaded bars indicate official recession dates.
Note that due to the negative correlation between the innovations in the excess
return and inflation the conditional covariance series, i.e. kpit in Figure 5.10 is negative
over the whole sample period. As the average conditional volatility of inflation shocks
is about 24 times smaller than the average conditional volatility of real excess return
innovations, kpit predominantly follows the path of the latter. Nevertheless, as inflation
volatility peaks at recessions III and VIII, it does contribute to the large values in these
two downturns.
Although there is not enough evidence to conclude that unemployment shocks have
a time-varying variance, kut still varies as a result of the variation in the variance of ex-
cess return innovations; see Figure 5.11. This series therefore derives its time-varying
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Figure 5.10: Conditional covariance of innovations in the real excess return (exr) and inflation (pi) over
the sample period running from January 1960 until June 2011, given by equation (5.7). Shaded bars
indicate official recession dates.
nature solely from the variation in the variance of shocks to the real excess return. But
note that it is not a scaled version of this series due to the non-linear effect of the square
root.
Figure 5.11: Conditional covariance of innovations in the real excess return (exr) and unemployment
growth (u) over the sample period running from January 1960 until June 2011, given by equation (5.7).
Shaded bars indicate official recession dates.
5.4.5 Comparison
Comparing the four estimated paths of the log coefficient of relative risk aversion (la-
beled Γ) reveals quite some differences. Table 5.7 provides a concise overview of some
descriptive statistics. The top panel reveals that risk aversion in the first and third spec-
ification (those with non-varying covariances) is lowest in the years 1966 and 1967,
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while this occurs in in the years 1989 and 1990 for the two models in which there is
variation in the covariances as well. Regarding the maximum, all four models are very
clear: over the last fifty years log risk aversion has never been higher than during or
just after the latest recession. Note that while the dispersion between the minimum and
maximum values is, respectively, 0.93 and 1.34, average values of Γ range from 2.97
(model 4) to 3.51 (model 1). Standard deviations of the the four series are comparable.
Average values of risk aversion over the sample period reveal that all four models
suffer from the equity premium puzzle, i.e. coefficients of risk aversion exceeding 10.
Nevertheless, the value attained by the second and fourth specification is much closer
to this upper bound than the first and third model. Of course this is not surprising as
the former two specifications encompass time-varying covariances, hence part of the
variation is captured through these terms.
Table 5.7: Descriptive statistics risk aversion
Notes: Models 1-3 are respectively based on equations (5.13)-(5.16), (5.17)-(5.21) and (5.22)-(5.27);
see Appendix 5.A.3. The fourth model is based on equations (5.1)-(5.7), see Section 2. The first spec-
ification excludes inflation and unemployment growth and keeps the variance of consumption growth
innovations fixed. The second specification is similar to the first but allows this variance to be time-
varying. The third specification includes consumption growth, inflation and unemployment growth but
keeps their innovations variances fixed. The fourth specification is similar to the third but allows these
variances to be time-varying. Log risk aversion is denoted by Γ, while risk aversion is denoted by γ and
so Γ ≡ log γ. The sample standard deviation is denoted by StDev. Sample period runs from January
1960 until June 2011.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Minimum Γ 0.67 0.23 1.16 0.68
Minimum γ 1.95 1.26 3.19 1.96
Date Sep-1967 Mar-1990 May-1966 May-1989
Maximum Γ 6.81 5.52 6.49 5.47
Maximum γ 908.29 249.64 658.52 237.46
Date Dec-2009 Jan-2010 Sep-2009 May-2009
Average Γ 3.51 3.18 3.35 2.97
StDev 1.52 1.30 1.24 1.31
Average γ 98.33 47.49 64.42 42.37
StDev 156.13 50.89 102.09 51.02
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5.5 Conclusion
Instead of treating risk aversion as a structural parameter that remains constant over
time, existing research has recognized that this assumption can no longer be main-
tained given the abundance of real life evidence against it. Another motivation for this
paper is the recent supposition that discount-rate variation is at the heart of current
asset-pricing research and time-varying risk aversion can be seen as a manifestation of
this.
This paper formulates four asset pricing models. The first is the standard c-CAPM
with the single difference that risk aversion is time-varying. We then extend this model
by allowing for time-varying volatility of consumption growth innovations. While this
increases the validity of the model it also has one important side-effect: it induces
variation in the covariance between the excess return and consumption growth. Our
third specification adds inflation and unemployment growth to the identity such that
risk aversion now also varies in response to news concerning these two variables. Fi-
nally we also allow for variability in the volatility of inflation innovations, keeping the
volatility of unemployment growth constant. The main novelty is that our models are
estimated using state space techniques which are ideally suited for this purpose as risk
aversion is a latent variable.
In general the paths of risk aversion generated by our four specifications are in line
with the business cycle implying that risk aversion is low during expansion periods
and rises around recession dates. Moreover, we also observe that aversion increases
in late 1987 (stock market crash), during the summer of 1998 (Russian ruble crises)
and in late 2001 (September terrorist attacks). Over the last 50 years the lowest level
of risk aversion occurred at the late 1980s / early 1990s while the highest level is
seen at the end or just after the latest recession, also known as the ‘Great Recession’.
The level of risk aversion decreases as the models are extended but our most elaborate
specification still generates an average risk aversion of about 42 which is outside of the
range of values deemed plausible. However, given the plethora of resolutions offered
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by existing research, this should not come as a surprise.
5.A Appendices
5.A.1 Derivation
Assume there is a representative agent who maximizes a time-separable power utility
function defined over aggregate consumption Ct, price level Pt and unemployment Ut,
i.e.
U(Ct, Pt, Ut) =
[
Cθ
c
t P
θpi
t U
θu
t
]1−γ − 1
1− γ ,
where Γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the θ′s are parameters con-
strained to lie between -1 and 1. Their purpose becomes apparent later. Moreover,
both the price level and unemployment are exogenous to the agent’s choice set.
Marginal utility is given by
Uc(Ct, Pt, Ut) =
[
Cθ
c
t P
θpi
t U
θu
t
]−γ
,
where we made use of the fact that Pt and Ut are exogenous and that ∂P∂C =
∂U
∂C
= 0.
This implies that the stochastic discount factor, denoted by Mt+1, reads
Mt+1 =
δUc
(
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c
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θu
t+1
)
Uc
(
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]−γ
= δ
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)θc (
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)θpi (
Ut+1
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)θu]−γ
. (5.8)
The conditional pricing relation is
1 = Et [(1 +Rt+1)Mt+1] , (5.9)
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where Rt+1 is the net return on an asset held from time t to time t+ 1. Next we follow
Hansen and Singleton (1983) and assume that joint conditional distribution of asset
returns and the stochastic discount factor is lognormal. Taking logs of equation (5.9)
leads to
Etrt+1 = −Etmt+1 − 1
2
[(
σ2r
)
t
+
(
σ2m
)
t
+ 2 (σr,m)t
]
.
Lower case denote logarithms, (σ2r)t = Et
[
(log r − Et log r)2
]
is the conditional vari-
ance of the log equity return innovations, (σ2m)t = Et
[
(logm− Et logm)2
]
is the con-
ditional variance of the stochastic discount factor innovations and (σr,m)t = Et[log r−
Et log r, logm−Et logm] is their conditional covariance. Using equation (5.8) to sub-
stitute for the stochastic discount factor yields
Etrt+1 = − log(δ) + ΓEt [θc∆ct+1 + θpi∆pit+1 + θu∆ut+1]
− 1
2
{(
σ2r
)
t
+ γ2
[
(θc)2
(
σ2c
)
t
+ (θpi)2
(
σ2pi
)
t
+ (θu)2
(
σ2u
)
t
]}
+ γ2
[
θcθpi (σc,pi)t + θ
cθu (σc,u)t + θ
piθu (σpi,u)t
]
− γ [θc (σr,c)t − θpi (σr,pi)t − θu (σr,u)t] . (5.10)
Lower care letters denote logarithms and ∆ct+1,∆pit+1 and ∆ut+1 refer to consump-
tion growth, inflation and unemployment growth, respectively. The conditional vari-
ances and covariances are similar to those defined just above.
To get an expression for the expected excess return, we repeat the above exercise
for the riskfree rate. Its innovation variance is obviously zero and hence so is its
covariance with any other series. This implies that
Etrft+1 = − log(δ) + γEt [θc∆ct+1 + θpi∆pit+1 + θu∆ut+1]
− γ
2
2
[
(θc)2
(
σ2c
)
t
+ (θpi)2
(
σ2pi
)
t
+ (θu)2
(
σ2u
)
t
]
+ γ2
[
θcθpi (σc,pi)t + θ
cθu (σc,u)t + θ
piθu (σpi,u)t
]
, (5.11)
where all variables are as defined before.
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Subtracting equation (5.11) from equation (5.10) yields an expression for the ex-
pected equity premium
Et[rt+1 − rft+1] + (σ
2
r)t
2
= γ[θc(σr,c)t + θ
pi(σr,pi)t + θ
u(σr,u)t]. (5.12)
Compared to the canonical c-CAPM there are two differences. First, besides con-
sumption growth, the excess return is now also a function of inflation and unemploy-
ment growth. The second difference is the presence of the θ′s. As mentioned, these
parameters are constrained to lie between -1 and 1 and are used to test whether infla-
tion and unemployment growth contain information not present in consumption growth
that helps explain the equity premium. In other words, if either θpi or θu is statistically
different from zero it helps explain the excess return.
5.A.2 State Space Representation
The general state space representation is given by a measurement equation
yt+1 = Zt+1αt+1 +Ht+1t+1, where t+1 ∼ N(0, Gt+1),
a transition equation
αt+1 = Tt+1αt +Rt+1ηt+1 where ηt+1 ∼ N(0, Qt+1),
and an initialization of the state vector
α1 ∼ N(a1, P1).
For our model, we have the following state space representation
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yt+1 =
[
exrt+1 ct+1 pit+1 ut+1
]′
,
Zt+1 =

0 0 0 0 kct+1 + k
pi
t+1 + k
u 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
 ,
αt+1 =
[
1 ct+1 pit+1 ut+1 γt+1 
exr
t+1 
c
t+1 
pi
t+1 
u
t+1
]′
.
Tt+1 =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
c¯ φc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
p¯i 0 φpi 0 0 0 0 0 0
u¯ 0 0 φu 0 0 0 0 0
γ¯ 0 0 0 φγ 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

,
Rt+1 =

0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0

,
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ηt+1 =
[
exrt+1 
c
t+1 
pi
t+1 
u
t+1 
γ
t+1
]′
,
Qt+1 =

(σexrt+1)
2 kct+1 k
pi
t+1 k
u 0
kct+1 (σ
c
t+1)
2 0 0 mct+1
kpit+1 0 (σ
pi
t+1)
2 0 mpit+1
ku 0 0 (σu)2 mu
0 mct+1 m
pi
t+1 m
u (σγ)2

,
where
kct+1 = ρ(exr,c)(σ
exr
t+1)
2(σct+1)
2,
kpit+1 = ρ(exr,pi)(σ
exr
t+1)
2(σpit+1)
2,
ku = ρ(exr,u)(σ
exr
t+1)
2(σu)2,
mct+1 = ρ(c,γ)(σ
c
t+1)
2(σγ)2,
mpit+1 = ρ(pi,γ)(σ
pi
t+1)
2(σγ)2,
mu = ρ(u,γ)(σ
u)2(σγ)2 and
(σit+1)
2 = βi1 + β
i
2
i
t + β
i
3(
i
t)
2 + βi4(σ
i
t)
2 for i = exr, c and pi.
and
a1 =
[
1 c¯
1−φc
p¯i
1−φpi
u¯
1−φu
γ¯
1−φγ 0 0 0 0
]′
,
diag(P1) =
[
0
σ2c1
1−(φc)2
σ2pi1
1−(φpi)2
σ2u
1−(φu)2
σ2γ
1−(φγ)2 σ
2
exr1 σ
2
c1 σ
2
pi1 σ
2
u
]′
,
5.A Appendices 137
where
σ2exr1 =
βexr1
1− βexr3 − βexr4
,
σ2g1 =
βc1
1− βc3 − βc4
,
σ2pi1 =
βpi1
1− βpi3 − βpi4
.
Technical Notes
1. The method proposed by Harvey et al. (1992) requires that the conditional dis-
tribution of the error ηt+1 is Gaussian. Note that the unconditional distribution
is non-Gaussian, see Hamilton (1994, p. 662).
2. The system matrices Zt+1, Tt+1, Rt+1 and Qt+1 need to be constant, exogenous
or predetermined (see Hamilton, 1994, Chapter 13)]. Our model satisfies this
condition.
3. The filter is initialized with the matrices A1 and P1 which, given the assumption
of stationary states, contain the unconditional means and variances of the states.
4. The time-varying conditional variances (σit+1)
2, for i = exr, c and pi, compli-
cate the linear Gaussian state space framework. To deal with this we follow the
approach by Harvey et al. (1992) and include the stocks exrt+1, 
c
t+1, 
pi
t+1 and 
u
t+1
in the state vector. We then note that the conditional variances and therefore
Qt+1 are functions of the unobserved states exrt+1, 
c
t+1, 
pi
t+1 and 
u
t+1. Harvey
et al. (1992) replace (σit+1)
2 in the system by (σi∗t+1)
2 = β1 + β2
i∗
t + β3(
i∗
t )
2 +
β4(σ
i∗
t )
2 where the unobserved (it)
2 are replaced by their conditional expecta-
tions (i∗t )
2 = Et(it)
2. Note that Et(it)
2 = [Etit]
2
+ [Et(it − Etit)2] where the
quantities between square brackets are period tKalman filter output (conditional
means and variances of the states it. Thus, given (σ
i
t)
2 (which is initialized by
the unconditional variances of it, i.e. σ
2
i1 and given the Kalman filter output from
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period t, namely Et(αt) and Vt(αt), we can calculate (σit+1)
2 and the system ma-
trix Qt+1 which makes it possible to calculate Et(αt+1), Vt(αt+1), Et+1(αt+1),
Vt+1(αt+1) and so on.
5.A.3 Specifications
This appendix provides details of the first three specifications, the fourth model is
described in Section 2.
First model
The first specification only includes consumption growth (c). In addition, the variance
of shocks in this variable (σc)2 and the real excess return (σexr)2 is kept constant. As
a result, the covariance between the innovations in the excess return and consumption
growth (kc) is also fixed. More formally,
exrt = γtk
c + exrt , (5.13)
ct = c¯+ φ
cct−1 + ct , (5.14)
γt = γ¯ + φ
γγt−1 + 
γ
t , (5.15)
kc = ρ(exr,c)σ
exrσc. (5.16)
Second model
This specification extends the setup of the first model by allowing the shocks in the real
excess return and consumption growth to have time-varying volatilities. This variation
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is modeled through the use of the QGARCH(1,1) model. It is given by
exrt = γtk
c
t−1 + 
exr
t , (5.17)
ct = c¯+ φ
cct−1 + ct , (5.18)
γt = γ¯ + φ
γγt−1 + 
γ
t , (5.19)
(σit)
2 = βi1 + β
i
2
i
t−1 + β
i
3(
i
t−1)
2 + βi4(σ
i
t−1)
2, for i = exr and c (5.20)
kct−1 = ρ(exr,c)σ
exr
t σ
c
t . (5.21)
Third model
The third model adds inflation (pi) and unemployment growth (u) to the list of ex-
planatory variables. Just like the first specification, all innovation variances (and co-
variances) are kept fixed. Hence we estimate
exrt = γt[k
c + kpi + ku] + exrt , (5.22)
ct = c¯+ φ
cct−1 + ct , (5.23)
pit = p¯i + φ
pipit−1 + pit , (5.24)
ut = u¯+ φ
uut−1 + ut , (5.25)
γt = γ¯ + φ
γγt−1 + 
γ
t , (5.26)
ki = ρ(exr,i)σ
exrσi, for i = c, pi and u. (5.27)

Chapter 6
Nederlandse samenvatting (Summary
in Dutch)
Het is algemeen bekend dat op lange termijn het rendement op aandelen veelal hoger is
dan op staatsobligaties. Dit verschil in rendement staat in de economische wetenschap
bekend als de aandelenpremie. Hoe langer de looptijd van de investering, des te beter
renderen aandelen ten opzichte van obligaties. Dit houdt ook in dat op de korte termijn
het tegenovergestelde vaak waar is. Zo verloor de AEX-index gedurende het jaar 2008
meer dan de helft van haar waarde, terwijl obligaties dat jaar met een positief rende-
ment afsloten. Aangezien aandelenkoersen heftiger fluctueren dan obligaties, worden
ze over het algemeen als risicovoller beschouwd. Gelet hierop kan de aandelenpremie
worden beschouwd als compensatie voor dit hogere risico.
Het consumptie Capital Asset Pricing Model (hierna c-CAPM) wordt veelvuldig
gebruikt om de prijs van financie¨le activa vast te stellen. Het genoemde model gaat uit
van een belegger die zijn nut — de bevrediging die een goed bij consumptie verschaft
— maximaliseert. Met andere woorden, een investeerder is niet primair geı¨nteresseerd
in de eigenlijke rendementen, maar meer in de consumptie die hij zich kan veroorloven
door in aandelen en obligaties te handelen. Uit data-onderzoek blijkt dat werkelijke
aandelenpremies niet consistent zijn met consumptiegegevens, tenzij we ervan uitgaan
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dat huishoudens extreem risico-avers zijn. Dit is in het kort de aandelenpremiepuzzel.
De puzzel is niet dat aandelen beter renderen dan obligaties, maar dat de hoogte van
de premie niet verenigbaar is met consumptiegegevens als we uitgaan van beschikbare
gegevens ten aanzien van risico-aversie.
De kern van de aandelenpremiepuzzel is de relatief lage variatie in de waargeno-
men consumptiegroeicijfers. Een risicovol activum heeft een laag rendement indien
het niet met consumptiefluctuaties meebeweegt door het goed (slecht) te doen in peri-
odes van lage (hoge) consumptiegroei. De achterliggende gedachte is dat een activum
dat hieraan voldoet een investeerder verzekert tegen moeilijke tijden. Hierdoor zal er
veel belangstelling voor zijn waardoor het rendement lager uitvalt. Andersom is een
activum dat weinig betaalt in moeilijke tijden en veel in goede tijden minder wense-
lijk. Als gevolg zal het beleggers een hoger rendement moeten bieden om hen over te
halen het in hun portefeuille op te nemen. Aangezien consumptiegroei maar weinig
varieert, kan een hoog rendement op risicovolle activa alleen worden ondersteund als
men er van uitgaat dat zelfs zeer geringe consumptie-schommelingen zeer pijnlijk zijn
voor de consument. Met andere woorden, de enige verklaring is dat consumenten een
buitengewoon hoge mate van risico-aversie moeten hebben.
In dit proefschrift wordt de aandelenpremiepuzzel vanuit vier verschillende in-
valshoeken benaderd. Het eerste hoofdstuk introduceert deze puzzel, bespreekt re-
levante literatuur en gaat in op de maatschappelijke relevantie. Het tweede hoofdstuk
ontwikkelt een methode om de onzekerheid rondom de schatting van de coe¨fficie¨nt
van relatieve risico-aversie te kwantificeren. Deze uitkomsten worden vervolgens ge-
bruikt om de gegevens van een aantal landen op een optimale manier samen te voe-
gen om zodoende een meer precieze schatting te krijgen. Hoofdstuk 3 vormt de kern
van dit proefschrift. Het introduceert een heterogeen-agent model voor het gedrag
van aandeelhouders en niet-aandeelhouders. De belangrijkste innovatie is het macro-
economische perspectief, geoperationaliseerd met behulp van gegevens uit nationale
rekeningen. Hoofdstuk 4 past het c-CAPM aan door de focus te leggen op een ele-
ment dat tot nu toe in de literatuur onderbelicht is gebleven: de risicovrije rentevoet.
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In tegenstelling tot de andere hoofdstukken houdt hoofdstuk 5 zich niet rechtstreeks
met de aandelenpremiepuzzel bezig. Het centrale thema hierin is de variabiliteit van
risico-aversie door de tijd heen; de puzzel wordt in de kantlijn besproken. Meer in
detail is de indeling als volgt.
Hoofdstuk 2 is gebaseerd op Pozzi et al. (2010). Het zoekt een antwoord op de
vraag in welke mate de aandelenpremiepuzzel een statistisch fenomeen is, te wijten
aan de gebrekkige betrouwbaarheid van de macro-economische gegevens. Uit het li-
teratuuroverzicht van Campbell (2003) blijkt dat schattingen van risico-aversie beho-
rend bij verschillende landen sterk uiteenlopen, maar dit onderzoek onderwerpt deze
onzekerheid niet aan een statistische analyse. Dit hoofdstuk repliceert de resultaten
van Campbell, voegt recente gegevens toe en gebruikt de “jackknife methode om de
onzekerheid waarmee risico-aversie wordt geschat in het c-CAPM te kwantificeren.
Bovendien, door het bundelen van land-specifieke gegevens ontstaat een veel kleiner
betrouwbaarheids-interval rondom de coe¨fficie¨nt van relatieve risico-aversie vergele-
ken met een analyse op basis van een individueel land.
De Vries and Zenhorst (2012) vormt de basis voor Hoofdstuk 3. E`e`n van de voor-
gestelde oplossingen voor de aandelenpremiepuzzel is de beperkte toegankelijkheid
van aandelenmarkten. Oftewel, niet iedereen heeft de mogelijkheid om in aandelen te
beleggen. Het idee is dat de consumptiegroei van aandeelhouders nauwer verbonden
is met de aandelenpremie dan die van niet-aandeelhouders. Dit betekent dat de cova-
riantie groter is en de coe¨fficie¨nt van relatieve risico-aversie lager. Bestaand onder-
zoek op dit gebied maakt over het algemeen gebruik van gegevens op het niveau van
huishoudens. Daarentegen gebruikt dit hoofdstuk macro-economische gegevens om
onderscheid te maken tussen de verschillende bronnen van inkomsten en bijbehorende
consumptie. Naast het gegeven dat dit langere tijdreeksen oplevert, heeft deze aanpak
ook als voordeel dat het een internationale vergelijking vergemakkelijkt. De gedachte
achter deze macro-economische benadering is als volgt. Aandeelhouders consumeren
uitsluitend uit hun kapitaalinkomen, terwijl niet-aandeelhouders alleen de beschikking
hebben over arbeidsinkomen. Het inkomen uit kapitaal en de loon-inkomsten zijn op-
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gebouwd uit de categoriee¨n van het beschikbaar nationaal inkomen. Aansluitend wordt
de geaggregeerde consumptie verhoudingsgewijs toegewezen aan deze twee vormen
van factorinkomen. Deze reeksen worden vervolgens gebruikt om de coe¨fficie¨nt van
relatieve risico-aversie voor beide groepen te berekenen. Zoals verwacht zijn de schat-
tingen behorende bij aandeelhouders lager dan die van de representatieve agent. Toch
is de risico-aversie van aandeelhouders nog steeds te hoog om plausibel te zijn.
Hoofdstuk 4 heeft zijn oorsprong in Zenhorst (2012a). E`e`n van de noodzake-
lijke variabelen om de relatieve risico-aversie coe¨fficie¨nt te schatten is de risicovrije
rentevoet. Terwijl andere aspecten van het model, zoals de functionele vorm van de
nutsfunctie, veel aandacht hebben gekregen, gaat dit niet op voor deze variabele. De
meeste studies maken gebruik van de rente op een staatsobligatie met een looptijd van
drie maanden om als risicovrije rente dienst te doen. Het is echter de vraag of dit acti-
vum voor de gemiddelde consument inderdaad de beste maatstaf is. Het lijkt erop dat
de geboden rente op een spaarrekening of termijndeposito veel dichter bij de inves-
teringsmogelijkheden van een gemiddeld huishouden ligt. Aangezien deze rente over
het algemeen lager is dan de rente die overheden betalen op hun korte-termijn schul-
den, zal de aandelenpremie toenemen. Dit houdt in dat de coe¨fficie¨nt van relatieve
risico-aversie hoger uitvalt en daarmee wordt de aandelenpremiepuzzel dus groter.
Hoofdstuk 5 komt voort uit Zenhorst (2012b). Bestaand onderzoek met betrek-
king tot de aandelenpremiepuzzel behandelt risico-aversie als een structurele parame-
ter waarvan de waarde constant is door de tijd heen. Hoewel dit het model aanzienlijk
versimpelt, is deze aanname moeilijk te rechtvaardigen. Inzichten uit de psychologie
van besluitvorming laten zien dat mensen verliezen en winsten asymmetrisch waar-
deren. Met andere woorden, een verlies van e 100 komt harder aan dan de vreugde
waarmee het winnen van ditzelfde bedrag gepaard gaat. Uit waarnemingen blijkt dus
duidelijk dat risico-aversie varieert. Het centrale doel van dit hoofdstuk is om deze
tijdsvariatie in de coe¨fficie¨nt van relatieve risico-aversie zichtbaar te maken. Hiervoor
formuleert het een model waarin variatie in risico-aversie wordt gedreven door nieuws
in consumptiegroei, inflatie en de groei in werkloosheid. Het belangrijkste criterium
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om het model te beoordelen is de mate waarin de variatie in de coe¨fficie¨nt van relatieve
risico-aversie in lijn is met recessieperiodes en andere belangrijke gebeurtenissen die
gedurende de onderzoekssperiode plaatsvinden. De resultaten laten zien dat risico-
aversie zeer persistent is en, zoals verwacht, stijgt in de aanloop naar en gedurende
recessies.
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